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ABSTRACT 
 This study explores the affective dimensions and intersecting politics of service 
operations for North Koreans, focusing on semi-government institutions, Hana Centers in 
two different regions of South Korea. It probes into how bureaucratic service institutions 
for North Koreans operate on the ground using affect-laden languages and practices in 
creating a specific type of clientele subjectivity. This study also points out how the state 
bureaucracies identifying themselves as “practical” and “neutral” agencies reveal 
contradictory and fragmented governing which is antithetical to how the state institutions 
are imagined. There are underlying politics working in the realm of a so-called neutral 
service agency, such as Cold War memories, imagined homogeneity regarding ethnicity, 
and neoliberal changes in the welfare area and beyond. Even though these are hidden on 
public and formal policy and statements, they inevitably emerge in unexpected contexts in 
forms of mistrust, conflicts and anxiety among the service providers and the recipients. 
Through ethnographic research, this study highlights flexible, performative and emotional 
aspects of the relationships between the service providers and the service recipients by 
attending to affective dimensions. It finds that desirable figures of North Korean clientship 
are represented differently, depending on distinctive characteristics of the locations as well 
as different modes of governing.  
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This study explores the significance of the national operation of Hana Centers, 
South Korean refugee resettlement agencies for North Koreans, spanning the years from 
the late 2000s to the early 2010s. It particularly zooms in on two local Hana Centers’ daily 
operations, highlighting how the complex politics of ethnic homogeneity, Cold War 
ideology, and the neoliberal arrangement of the welfare system permeate the Centers’ 
operational logics such as neutrality, practicality and professionalism. Through 
ethnographic research, this study explores the bureaucratic technologies of the institutions 
and affective service interactions between the service providers and service recipients in 
Hana Centers, and scrutinizes the socio-political significances of the practices. While the 
affective values of intensive care, brotherly love and trust are stressed but differentiated by 
the level of institution and the mode of service delivery, the state bureaucratic services 
reveal their contradictory, inconsistent and fragmented dimensions of governing which is 
antithetical to how the state bureaucracies are imagined. The study engages a critique of 
state bureaucracy and ethico-political operations of “practical” service delivery, by 
connecting the broader politics and ideologies with the analysis of mundane interactions, 
discourses and actual service operations in the space of welfare institution.    
The main service recipients here are North Korean defectors – refugees or migrants 
depending on the socio-political contexts invoked. The presence of North Korean defectors 
in Northeastern China and Southeast Asia since the 1990s is well-known in global
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humanitarian discourses. As their clandestine and destitute life conditions in the region 
gained international awareness, hundreds of missionaries, transnational non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and individual actors have been engaged with “save North Koreans” 
activities. Coupled with the images of North Korea as a failing and incomprehensible state 
(see Ryang 2010), the discourses and political claims surrounding North Korean defectors 
have been overshadowed by either “national security” or “international politics” discourses 
motivated by the Cold War ideology and US-led humanitarian efforts (Ryang 2009; 
B.Chung 2009).  
South Korea, in the meantime, has seen a sudden increase of the people from “the 
North” since the mid-1990s, which sparked discussions and practices surrounding policy 
implementation to help North Koreans settle in the South. The early discussions reflect the 
urgent institutional needs in practical matters in treating North Koreans in South Korea. 
The recent scholarship and the popular media have dealt with more socio-culturally 
oriented matters associated with everyday life and identity matters of North Koreans as 
well as South Koreans’ cultural perceptions of the Northerners, many of which advanced 
the understanding of North Koreans’ lives from diverse perspectives, other than the issue 
of adjustment (see H. Lee 2012). By and large, being the “same ethnicity” has meant special 
treatment for them, which is distinguishable from multicultural citizens or foreigners in 
South Korea. Resettlement funds, affordable housing support, initial adjustment facilities 
and overall welfare service provisions are unrivaled compared to other foreign groups. 
Nonetheless, North Korean settlers in South Korea experience convoluted socio-cultural 
developments to their identity, not to mention the unique political-legal significance of 
their situation of the divided nations. North Koreans’ self-identifications disclosed from 
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qualitative studies show an ambivalence rather than a confirmation of the South Koreans’ 
imaginaries of kinship (Bell 2013; Chung et al. 2006).        
In 2009, the Ministry of Unification launched a project to set up local resettlement 
agencies, Hana Centers, for North Koreans in different regions. As of 2015, they operate 
in thirty one locations across the country. The plan was laid out to fulfill an ambitious end: 
settling and integrating North Koreans into local communities stably and successfully. In 
addition to the initial settlement facility, Hanawon, the state aims to deliver additional 
education/service programs for North Koreans through Hana Centers (The Act 15:2, 22:2). 
Hana Centers are expected to provide the service with local knowledge, resources and 
experiences, with the operational values such as neutrality and practicality (Ahn and Lee 
2007; S. Lee 2008; Y. Suh 2000, 2004; W. Yoo 2008). In addition, as they are designated 
by the government, institutional legitimacy and accountability are supposedly guaranteed, 
along with financial and organizational stability. These are what policy makers and law 
executers sought to achieve through the nationwide establishment of Hana Centers, 
because the service field for North Koreans has been muddied with competition, regional 
concentration and inefficiency in service delivery (Ahn and Lee 2007; Noh 2010; W. Yoo 
2008). Recent studies affirm that Hana Centers have much potential to facilitate a decent 
local settlement for North Koreans through “individualized” and “efficient” service 
provision while creating a cooperative environment among diverse service agencies 
(S.Kim et al. 2010; Y.H.Kim 2009; Y.H.Kim and Paik 2010; H.S.Kim and D. Choi 2011). 
So to speak, Hana Centers are thus regarded as “the cure for all” to solve the deeply 
engrained problems. As a “total care” service agency for North Koreans providing a warm, 
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human touch,1 Hana Centers are expected to serve the beneficiaries with the symbolic 
cultural values such as unified nation and ethnic homogeneity as well as operational 
standards of impartiality, practicality and efficiency of service delivery. The characteristics 
of the Centers being regionally located, utilizing the accumulated knowledge in services, 
attending to individual’s needs, boosting local networks and focusing on practical matters 
all look very promising in the complicated service area. However, more often than not, 
Hana Centers face accusations from both the clients and other kinds of service providers 
as being overly bureaucratic, stiff and inefficient. Why then does an institution that purports 
to be decentralizing power and serving the minority with good intentions end up being “just 
another” bureaucratic institution? Is it simply “cultural differences” between North and 
South Koreans who coincidentally end up being in an unhappy cohabitation and fail to 
communicate with each other? Or does the monstrous machine of South Korea’s version 
of a “national institution” make it so, no matter what identities the service providers and 
the clients possess? And which desirable figures of service recipients and providers emerge 
in the service scene?  
This study approaches the service operations on the ground, focusing on the 
affective dimension of the service provision. It probes both the service providers’ and the 
clients’ assumptions regarding the role of the state in forging a unified nation. In doing so, 
it contributes to the literature of North Koreans’ desirable citizenship vis-à-vis the state and 
South Korean public, and develop research on bureaucratic practices of semi-state agencies 
which are utilizing aforementioned imaginaries to gain legitimacy and justify the kinds of 
services being offered. In probing into the South Korean service providers’ (lower-level 
                                                          
1 Hana Foundation’s (Hana Centers’ supervisory institution) introductory image  
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bureaucrats’) and the beneficiaries’ expectations of the state, ethnic homogeneity and the 
desirable service-client figures in neoliberal welfare settings, the study intends to bring to 
the fore the features of institutional practices as contradictory and incoherent, apart from 
the preconceived notions of the state agencies as firm and consistent entities. It starts from 
the question of why the state agencies, with their humanitarian mottoes, claims of moral 
superiority, practicality and provision of total care for every need, still fail not only to gain 
North Koreans’ trust but also to satisfy their practical needs. Even worse, it also concerns 
North Koreans’ prevailing accounts of Hana Centers as unnecessary, “just an addition” to 
more bureaucracy, and as cold and distant edifice. This study does not, however, seek to 
accuse lower-level bureaucrats of inattentiveness or carelessness. On the contrary, from 
my fieldwork, it is fair to say that they are the ones who are working the hardest among 
those bureaucrats that we can see in any of the bureaucratic organizations. To probe these 
questions, I pay close attention to how the broader politics of the Cold War, beliefs about 
ethnic homogeneity and the neoliberal arrangement of the welfare regime infiltrate the 
interactive and affective space of service provision. By looking closely into the affective 
side of service delivery, which arises from everyday service interactions between both the 
service providers and the recipients, this study highlights the limitations and potentialities 
of the local institutions’ operations in creating specific North Korean clientele subjectivity. 
As it highlights how the local practices of the national agency mediate and elaborate 
imaginaries and expectations of the state agency, it addresses the anthropological questions 
of the state, neoliberal rearrangement of society, and the inconsistent nature of institutional 
operations and its ramifications. In the remainder of this introduction, I will explore how 
social sciences and philosophical traditions have discussed bureaucracy in relation to the 
6 
modern state, practices of institutional care for a social minority in the neoliberal welfare 
regime as well as the historical configurations of North Korean citizenship in South Korea. 
Finally, I will address the ethico-political significance of the bureaucratic practices in 
caring for North Koreans in the contemporary South Korea.  
 
1.1. ANTHROPOLOGY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS AND BUREAUCRACY FOR CARING POPULATION    
Bureaucracy and modern institutions have long been on the agenda for social critics 
and philosophers problematizing modernity. As is well-known, Max Weber examined the 
operational specificities of how modern institutions employed written documents and rules 
guarded by laws or administrative regulations (Weber 1947), which he viewed as the 
epitome of the modern rational-legal authority. The bureaucratic practices are “encroaching 
into almost every sphere of life” (Clegg 1994, 152) and exist “at all levels of society” 
(Graham 2002, 201). Weber conceptualizes the state in terms of “monopoly” of the use of 
legitimate force over a given territory, which successfully concentrates the economic and 
political means onto bureaucratic institutions of the state with the ideal of “rationalization” 
(Weber 1921, 397; Gerth and Mills 1946, 48). However, Weber neither explicitly 
designated which levels of bureaucratic administration were particularly critical in 
formulating the legitimacy and power of the state, nor did he inquire into how differentiated 
and fragmented operations of state institutions create a specific socio-political meanings or 
ideology in and out of the state. Meanwhile, the French Marxist tradition views nation-
states as governing devices for the bourgeoisie’s control over the proletariat through 
religious, educational, correctional and media institutions featured as ideological state 
apparatuses (Althusser 1971). However, Marx himself and Marxist theorists do not provide 
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tangible answers to what the state is, nor what it consists of. As Philip Abrams puts it, 
“aridity and mystification” prevails in Marxist tradition and sociological traditions in 
scrutinizing the subject of state (Abrams 1988, 61).  
The work of Michel Foucault, on the other hand, draws attention to how power and 
knowledge create orders and categories of normalcy through “governmentality,” reframed 
as “the conduct of conduct,” which regulate the population with bio-political measures 
(Foucault 1979; Lemke 2001). Even though Foucault does not specifically pinpoint the 
kinds of and day-to-day practices of bureaucratic institutions which exert power over each 
individual, he specifies that the state “is not a thing, but practices.” He pushes the notion 
of the state even further, as he sees it as “nothing more than the mobile effect of a multiple 
regime of governmentality.” (Foucault 1991, 87-104) By doing so, he underlines 
governmentality as being exercised everywhere through institutional or discursive 
technologies, rather than hammering on the specific kinds of state institutions. This 
convergence of power, or bundles of practices, rather than “a thing,” is what Foucault aims 
to bring to light when it comes to a matter of the state and governing. He provides an 
analytic means to think of the state as accumulative, multilevel and decentralized actions, 
rather than a physical entity, which can serve the understanding of the operations of state 
institutions. As Akhil Gupta also clarifies, the workings of bio-politics signify “the 
convergence of diverse institutions in different settings around a particular way of 
conceptualizing a problem,” which then search for ways to control and care for a population 
(Gupta 2012, 42).   
Where Marxist, Weberian and Foucauldian traditions of thought have influenced 
recent scholarship regarding institutions and the state, scholars particularly in disciplines 
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of sociology and anthropology have contributed to unraveling the operations of the state 
and non-state institutions and bureaucracies of different sizes, levels and scopes of action. 
Richard Weatherly and Michael Lipsky (1977) stress how service providers exercise 
considerable discretion in performing their work leading to discrepant operations of 
bureaucracy, as they sets forth the idea of “street-level bureaucracy.” Lipsky (1980) 
pinpoints the relation between written rules and practices on the ground. He argues that the 
actual operations of institutions often do not concur with written policies or organizational 
ideals, as individual bureaucrats establish their own work patterns and perspectives 
informing their work. The subsequent literature utilizing the concept of street-level 
bureaucracy has dealt with the complexities and discrepancies of the broader policies and 
rationales for service recipients (Hupe and Hill 2007; Sanfort 2000; Stacey 1996).2  
Anthropological literature further offers rich ethnographic studies in developing the 
discussion of the state and bureaucracy. They particularly attend to the demarcation 
boundaries, reification practices of the state, symbolic and cultural assemblages as well as 
the concrete places where practices, discourses and imaginations are enacted. For instance, 
several studies have attended to how bureaucrats manage and negotiate the gaps between 
the stated policy and practices, and what the bureaucratic measures bring about in a broader 
political outcomes in a society (Deeb and Marcus 2011; Ferguson 1990; Gupta 1995; 2012; 
Herzfeld 1992; Heyman 2004; Hoag 2011). The anthropological perspective has revealed 
that inconsistencies and contradictions between policy and actual operations are the norm 
                                                          
2 Even though Weber already recognized the disparities among different institutions through his 
massive case studies, the adoption of his ideas has mostly contributed to the interpretation of 
modern society as impersonalized and mechanical.  
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in bureaucracy, rather than the exception, as they questioned the specific kinds of political 
and economic effects that these bureaucratic practices have brought to life. For instance, 
James Ferguson (1990) spells out the socio-political effects of collective actions that 
bureaucratic agencies put forward. In his study on the operations of development apparatus 
such as international agencies, non or quasi-governmental organizations in Lesotho, he 
contends that agencies end up creating powerful, unintended constellations of control, apart 
from what is conventionally considered about development: a practically good solution for 
the pervasive poverty problems. However, starting from the question of why these 
development projects are all failing in the country, he expands on the idea that unintended 
elements serve to exert “a powerful depoliticizing effect” (1990:21). Through the 
ethnographic data, he analyzes the particular sort of constellation functioning as “the anti-
politics machine,” which echoes Foucault’s idea of the unintended effects of de-centered 
power (Foucault 1979).  Michael Herzfeld (1992), on the other hand, spells out how 
bureaucrats and citizens of a society produce a specific ethico-political effect with 
symbolic properties. He explicates how institutional clients and officials together serve to 
present “indifference” to minorities as a way of maintaining a symbolic institutional and 
social order. Herzfeld accounts for the operation of democracy in modern nation-states as 
based on the justification of indifference by accepting the transcendent values of the nation-
state. By using symbolic markers of insider/outsider and difference as well as by selectively 
choosing to pay attention to a certain agenda or a group, Western bureaucracy produces 
social indifference in a society. Akhil Gupta (2012) also develops the discussions engaging 
the state bureaucracies with the concept of arbitrariness, rather than indifference or hostility 
toward the service recipients. He shows the example of the best intentions of eradicating 
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the poverty still failing in caring for the poor in India. With a concept of structural violence, 
elaborated by Veena Das (2007) and Paul Farmer (2005), he elucidates that the specific 
mechanisms of corruption, inscription and governmentality produce arbitrariness through 
the bureaucratic work of poverty reduction. Heyman (2004) also adds to the discussion, as 
he examines the operational rules such as practicality and neutrality in the broader cultural 
analyses. Bureaucracies often act according to the rule of “practicality,” which does not 
seem to have any relation to the political interests, and they end up involving itself as a 
political-ethical engagement. However, quite frequently, neutrality and practicality, with 
their own specific ethical attributes, become the slogans of bureaucratic institutions seeking 
legitimacy and rational authority. 
  These findings of the unintended effects of bureaucratic operations, powered by 
both officials and clients, with the rationale of practicality and depoliticization are 
compelling presentations of the particularities of governmentality in modern institutions. 
The anthropological accounts on the state agencies offer pictures of them being far from 
consistent, rational and impartial organizations. By disaggregating and decentralizing the 
imaginations of the state, the previous literature provides rich accounts of how normalcy 
of a citizenship and markers of insider/outsider are identified. Without readily assuming 
the binary conceptualization of the state and civil society, previous literature also outlines 
at which point and in what circumstances the state agencies are failing to care for the 
beneficiaries. As exploring diverse kinds of bureaucratic works and governing, recent 
anthropological studies have further examined bureaucratic practices in different fields, 
such as supranational organizations (Anders 2008; Sandvik 2011), developmental agencies 
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(Mathews 2011; Mathur 2012), state and national social service agencies (Cherz 2011; 
Gupta 2012) and various kinds of communities.  
Building upon the critical scholarly work on institutional engagement for social 
minorities, this study focuses on the institutions whose purpose is “caring for” social 
minorities in a society. Particularly, I engage Foucault’s framework of bio-political power 
as caring for a population, which is defined as “pastoral care” and which aims to improve 
the welfare of everyone (Foucault 1991). Pastoral care works in a way where “everything 
the shepherd does is geared to the good of his flock…. The shepherd acts, he works, he 
puts himself out, for those he nourishes and who are asleep…. He must also know each 
one’s particular needs”(Foucault 1986, 303). Throughout his study, Foucault focuses on 
the overall governing of individuals through bio-political measures, which attend to the 
welfare, health, and morality of the population. While this study aligns with Foucault’s 
conceptualization of pastoral care, it specifically depicts the unintended effects of “the 
specific modality of uncaring” (Gupta 2012, 23) and the fragmented and contradictory 
figures of pastoral care (Ong 2002, 146), while the crucial mission of the institutions lies 
in an intensive “caring.” As opposed to other kinds of institutions, the organizations 
particularly geared towards “caring for minorities” in a society show unique characteristics 
in operating service, which I will connect it to the discussions of “affect” as a specific mode 
of governing and simultaneously, as something rendering potentialities and 
“anticipations.”    
As several scholars so far have discussed, affect signifies interpersonal capacity to 
“be affected” and “to affect,” as it encompasses bodily compositions and receptivity of 
bodies (Anderson 2009; Clough 2007; Massumi 2002; Seyfert 2012) Deleuze interpreted 
12 
Spinoza’s idea of affect as two different aspects: the bodily experience depending on its 
affects and the power of the affect changing our capacity to experience. In so doing, affects 
are crucial in the establishment of knowledge (Deleuze 1988). Clough outlines the 
discussion of affects as the body’s capacity to “act, to engage, and to connect, such that 
autoaffection is linked to the self-feeling of being alive – that is, aliveness or vitality” 
(Clough 2007,2). Thus, it seems apparent that the scholars of affect highlight the point that 
affect involves bodily matters as well as mental and emotional workings of an individual. 
However, more importantly, it goes beyond the boundaries of the physical body, which is 
implied in its reference as a way of affecting and being affected. It can escape “confinement 
in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction.” (Massumi 2002, 35) In 
this regard, affect is continuously in formation and the process of formation brings forth 
the “unforeseeable newness” (Anderson 2009, 116). It is used to refer to processes and 
connections, rather than essences and significances. Michael Hardt analyzes affect as “an 
exploration of these as yet unknown powers” (Hardt 2007, x), from which potentials and 
arbitrary connections are created. As discussions of affects have brought up the matters of 
relationships among bodies, experiences, technology and energetic transfers (Massumi 
2002; Puar 2011), they help us examine specific affective intensifications and connections 
in the cultural, economic and political realms (Clough 2007), encompassing numerous 
“powerful technologies”(Thrift 2007), or “atmospheres” (Brennan 2004), while involving 
unexpected “events” or “ruptures”(Negri 2003).      
Affects are interrelated with governmentality – if the bodily capacities, emotional 
workings and any events emerge in conjunction with the “population.” As maintaining of 
the population is the crucial mantra for the modern state, presentations of collective affects 
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are important junctions that require attentions, and “a set of differentiated affective 
publics”(Anderson 2012,32) can become targets for governmentality. From a different 
angle, geographer Nigel Thrift sets forth the idea of bodily interactions constituting a series 
of operations and technologies, developing Foucault’s idea of biopolitcs. As he puts it, 
affect is the subject of “numerous powerful technologies which have knotted thinking, 
technique and affect together in various potent combinations” (Thrift 2008, 182). Thrift 
further suggests conceptualizing affect from the perspective of “microbiopolitics,” which 
becomes “visible and so available to be worked upon through a whole series of new entities 
and institutions” (Thrift 2008, 187). It opens up multiple potentialities and anticipations 
that are inherently political, and becomes “explicitly political through practices and 
techniques which are aimed at it specifically” (Thrift 2008, 187). Institutions here are seen 
and analyzed in a view that their practices and techniques as explicit presentations of 
politics, where bodily functions and interactions are points of multiple anticipations. With 
the concept of affect, the subjectivity configured in the institutional space can be traced in 
more tangible ways, which can open up much richer ethnographic illustrations. 
 Anthropologists have been engaged in the discussion of affects through their 
ethnographic studies in institutional spaces. Hoschchild’s (1979) pioneering work 
examines the realm of care and its affective dimensions in work places, and more recently 
Ong’s work (2006) on how the American welfare institutions deal with refugees shows the 
mode of “feminist pastoral power” is instilled in operating the notions of self-discipline 
and empowerment. Predicated upon female refugees’ dependence on the welfare system, 
and racial and gender relations between the clients and the service providers in the region, 
social workers and health service providers encourage Cambodian refugee women to be 
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independent, empowered and autonomous which promotes the American idea of 
independence and materialism. Linguistic anthropologist Summerson Carr observed more 
closely the different modalities and spaces of institutional talks, such as board meetings, 
individual counseling, empowerment programs and group meetings required to place poor 
women living with addiction in welfare services. In these different spaces, speaking 
activities reveal how subjects continuously forge their identities, perform like addicts, and 
therefore draw unexpected gains (Carr 2011). She also attends to the regulating governance 
of this caring agency, as revealing particularly how the evaluation techniques in measuring 
sobriety of the recovering addicts in welfare institutions are based on affective and 
performative expressions such as exaggerations or fancy which are used for referencing 
“inner states” (Carr 2011, 4). More broadly, at a state level, Shoshan (2014) investigates 
how a penal institution practice affective governance in dealing with young right-wing 
extremists in Germany, which she frames as “political delinquency.” The mediation and 
elaboration of the management of hate reveals itself as “inscribed within cultural and 
political aporias,” which is aligned with discussions of affects as “anticipated” atmosphere 
and “yet unknown powers” (Hardt 2007, x).  
These studies show how the various levels, modalities of techniques as well as 
ethical standpoints are intermingled with affects in institutional spaces. In a Foucauldian 
sense, the affects are to be regulated and disciplined by certain modes of technologies. 
However, these studies show how the space where affects are enacted is not completely 
subsumed under the overarching technologies of governing. Affective practices entail 
something that has not happened, but still reside in people’s collective memory, feelings, 
and possibly emerge in ruptured events. Similarly, this study pays attention to how affects 
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emerge and are spawned in the particular caring institution that is geared towards the 
enhancement of the welfare of North Koreans.  
There are three different dimensions that this study is concerned with: 1) Diverse 
affect-laden expressions are utilized, when the institutions attempt to promote positive 
images to the clients and South Korean public. For instance, imaginaries of a unified (one) 
nation, a fair and good welfare agency, and images of harmless North Koreans are 
advertised. 2) In terms of internal operations, which service providers and volunteer 
workers are expected to perform, the affective imaginaries of nationalism and state agency 
are particularly materialized. 3) The ways in which service providers show pastoral care, 
influenced by uneven ethnic relations and the neoliberal logic of self-reliance, leave space 
for unexpected outcomes to arise. In a nutshell, this study focuses on how these different 
technologies of managing affects and applying ethics with different subjects emerge, are 
juxtaposed and inscribed. The focus of affects will enable us to see how the bodily 
interactions among service providers and the clients generate specific configurations of 
governing and subject-making, and how service providers and recipients elaborate, 
perform and present the desirable symbolic values as participating in these cultural and 
political aporias. Hence, the study focuses on the ruptures and anticipated expressions in 
the welfare space, which will serve to advance understanding of the particular affective 
governing of South Korean welfare bureaucracy.        
 
1.2 NORTH KOREAN IDENTITY AND ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY IN THE DIVIDED NATION  
North Koreans have been “special” subjects to South Korean society and its people 
(B.Chung 2009) because of the notion of the same ethnicity and the unique situation that 
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the two Koreas have had to face since the Korean War in the 1950s. South Korea has 
presented itself as a modern defender of “liberal democracy,” in contradistinction to the 
anachronistic communist North. Since the national division, South and North Korean 
regimes have competed to assert the “state legitimacy (cheje jeongdangseong 
체제정당성)” of their own regime over that of the other (Abelmann 1996; Cumings 2007; 
Grinker 1998). South and North Korean governments have shaped a strong animosity to 
each other, which mainly emerged as claims of state legitimacy. If ethnic identity is 
constructed and preserved through dynamic social practices (Calhoun 2006; Barth 1969), 
two Korean states are more likely to form their national identities in opposition to each 
other. The conditions that South and North Korean people have been forced to endure - 
separation of the country, separation of individual families, complete closure of the border, 
different social systems as capitalism and communism, and a highly antagonistic political 
relationship between the two countries – did not provide shared experiences, but nurtured 
enmity toward each other. The augmented sense of “differences” and animosity however, 
seems not to disrupt the notion of fraternity and the passion toward national unification, at 
least on the surface level.  
It looks odd at first glance, why the South Korean government would try hard to 
incorporate North Koreans into South Korean society, considering the cultivated 
perception of North Koreans as “enemies.” Discourses of ethnic homogeneity and the 
unquestionable aspirations for unified nation are used frequently to justify the “special” 
treatment of the people. To South Koreans, homogeneity of ethnicity is something natural 
and taken for granted (Grinker 1998; H.Kwon 2004; Shin 2006). Hegemonic nationalist 
discourses of “ethnic homogeneity” are present in both official and unofficial discourses, 
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and North Koreans are often referred to as people of the “same blood” or “wooridongpo” 
(우리동포, our brethren) separated by unfortunate historical circumstances. Despite the 
antagonistic political and discursive relationship between the two Koreas, ethnic 
homogeneity functions as a primary group identity in contemporary Korea (Shin et al. 
1999). As Roy Grinker (1998) attests, unification is often imagined as “recovery of (ethnic) 
homogeneity” in South Korea (Grinker 1998,xiii). Gi-wook Shin also observed that ethnic 
nationalism plays a major role in generating desire for national unification, a strong sense 
of “oneness” predominates in the discourses of race, ethnicity and nation-state in South 
Korea (Shin 2006). Ethnic homogeneity is hardly a new concept or discourse in South 
Korea; though, it is never fully scrutinized and questioned critically in the society. As 
several scholars argued, ethnic nationalism is constructed by mobilizing the aspirations of 
purity and homogeneity in a modern state (Anderson 1991; Verdery 1994; Williams 1989). 
As an “imagined community,” politics of nationalism and ethnicity promote a rethinking 
of spatial and historical boundaries. This imagined community conceives itself as a “deep, 
horizontal comradeship,” where “this fraternity makes millions of people …willing to die 
for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 1991,7). Such feelings and sentiments of being 
one and homogenous create sovereign and exclusive “national order of things,” by 
pathologizing heterogeneity and differences within national boundaries (Malkki 1992). 
Based on shared perceptions of historical memory, language and cultural traditions, 
ethnicity becomes a crucial ground for modern nation-states and nationalism.   
Compared to multicultural citizens in South Korea, North Koreans still take up a 
significant position in the society. With accelerated globalization, South Korean 
demographics became more noticeably diverse and created a discourse of “multicultural 
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citizens” (see S. Kim 2000; Seol 1999, 2000; Shin 2006),3 and North Koreans are in some 
cases positioned as a de-facto “multicultural” group (Rainbow Youth Center 2013;  I.Yoon 
2003). However, it does not gain much popularity in real life, even though there have been 
conscious efforts to incorporate them through the multicultural field of research and 
practices (Rainbow Youth Center 2013; I.Yoon 2003) This hesitation could be attributed 
to the popular rationale of the “same ethnicity,” or “national unification” rather than 
situating North Koreans as “different” or “other” within the national community. More 
often than not, they are differentiated from multicultural groups and instead considered the 
same as South Korean nationals. In the changing geography of the national identity and 
ethnic nationalism in recent times (Moon 2000; J.Seo 2014; S. Kim 2003)4, how this 
dynamic based on the notion of homogenous ethnicity shift will be another important site 
to look into. More notably, a few scholars have discussed how the politics of ethnicity and 
kinship regarding North Koreans are imagined and complexly presented in the societal 
level, apart from the state’s tenuous claim of ethnic homogeneity. North Koreans are not 
considered “the same” as their Southern counterpart due to the lack of psychological 
capacity to become autonomous citizens (Sung 2010). They are “welcomed” on their 
arrival just as other foreigners, but experience hearing confusing messages as the same 
                                                          
3 With the skyrocketing rate of international marriages in recent years (mainly due to the reproduction need 
of rural communities), multiculturalism in South Korea has largely come to represent “multicultural 
families” (damunhwa gajok  다문화가족) made up of South Korean men, foreign women and their formed 
families Much recent scholarship in diverse disciplines reflects upon this phenomenon, examining issues of 
cultural recognition of new others ( Y.O.Kim 2007), the political-economic effects of migration (J.Hwang 
2011; Y.O.Kim 2007; H.M. Kim 2008), the characteristics of Korean multiculturalism (E.R. Jun 2011), and 
citizenship issues and multiculturalism (Y.O.Kim 2007; J.M.Hwang 2011; 2012) as well as the overall 
living conditions of migrant women. 
4 For instance, D.H.Seo and J.M.Seo (2014) observed that South Korean ethnic nationalism 
changed from dichotomy – inclusion and exclusion – to hierarchy in its operations, as the country 
tries to embrace different nationals and ethnic groups into their society albeit with assigning 
different positions, thus creating hierarchy in the system.   
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ethnic group from the society (Chung et al. 2006). North Koreans themselves are aware of 
this blurry line of categorization, and sometimes they expressed their identities 
interchangeably to accommodate themselves better within welfare frames and socio-
cultural discourses. This project will address how the recent multicultural discourse and 
practices are interpolated in constructing North Korean subjectivity, which is often 
convoluted by ideological landscapes and ethnic politics.    
Just as ethnic homogeneity is obfuscating and unfounded, North Koreans’ legal and 
cultural identities are defined with “ambiguity and arbitrariness” (B. Chung 2009,3) and in 
a similar sense, they become “circumstantial citizens” (I.Yoon 2011) whose conditions of 
citizenship depend on particular political and social circumstances. They were defined in 
distinctly different ways at different periods – or “events” – of time. In the post-Korean 
War period, “system selective migrants (chejesuntaekijumin 체제선택주민)” was the term 
used for the people who moved from the North to the South with the intention of settling 
in the capitalist South instead of the communist system in the North. Later, “war refugees 
(pinanmin 피난민),” or “people who lost their hometown (silhyangmin 실향민)” were 
widely used spanning from the 1960s through the early 1990s. They were also called 
“heroes who returned to the state (guisoonyongsa 귀순용사)” in this period. They became 
“heroes” who could witness the supremacy of the South, and served well the national 
propaganda during the rule of militaristic and antagonistic political regimes in the South. 
Among the small number of heroes, high-profiled political people were the majority who 
moved to the South and they were treated exceptionally well in the South due to their 
political values. In the early 1990s, when the Cold War-style competition between the 
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regimes started to dwindle, South Korean society began to locate these North Koreans in 
the lower rung of society. As South Korean citizens saw North Korean regime decline in 
its political and economic power, the term “defected people from the North (talbukja   
탈북자)” for North Korean defectors gained much popularity in society, which has 
negative and pejorative connotations. North Koreans then were called “brethren who 
returned to the state (guisoonbukhandongpo 귀순북한동포)” and “defector (talbukja 
탈북자).” Since this period, the definitions started to lose an ideological significance, and 
instead indicated under privileged and under-served demographics of the population. These 
popular terms were associated with a lower social class or in some way criminal activities. 
In 1997, North Koreans gained the name “ordinary residents who escaped from North 
Korea (bukhanitaljumin 북한이탈주민)” following the new act that the Kim Dae Jung 
administration launched. 
 Invariably, scholarly findings regarding the identities of North Koreans and their 
relationship to South Koreans suggest that North Korean citizenship is dominantly shaped 
by division politics, and co-ethnic politics (Chung et al. 2006; J.Jo  2010; Y.Jo and Jeon 
2005; J.W. Kang 2003; K.S. Lee 2006; Y.S. Park and I.Yoon 2007; I.Yoon 2007). Previous 
studies often guide our understanding of North Koreans’ unsatisfactory lives in post-
settlement period as they are employed in lower-paying and unstable jobs, suffer identity 
crises and face discrimination in South Korea (J.A. Jo 2010; J.W. Kang 2011; Y.S.Park 
and I.Yoon 2007; Sun et al. 2005; I.Yoon 2007). The prejudices of South Korean society 
have positioned North Koreans as “second-class” or “inferior” citizens in myriad subtle 
ways (Choo 2006; J.W.Kang 2003; J.W.Kang 2011; I.Yoon 2004). Ordinary South 
Koreans often distinguish themselves from this new “cultural other” in their daily lives via 
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various mechanisms of distinction (J.W.Kang 2003; Y.Song 2007). North Koreans are also 
frequently associated with figures of personhood such as untrustworthiness, criminality 
and backwardness (B.Chung 2004; K.Lee 2003). South Korean society does not seem to 
be ready to accept “different” citizens who will help to diversify the concept and practices 
of South Korean citizenry (H.Lee 2012; H.Park 2010) in the perspective of “recognition 
politics” (Taylor 1994) and “cultural citizenship” (Rosaldo 1994).   
 
1.3 NEOLIBERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN SERVICE REGIME  
With drastic changes in the political climate regarding Cold War politics worldwide in the 
early 1990s; the economic and social crises of the North in the post-Kim Il Sung period; in 
addition to the change in administration in the South, inter-Korea relations entered a new 
era of understanding between their peoples and society. The new leader Kim Jeong Il 
attempted to attune the society to the changing international politics surrounding his 
country, so that social, political and economic changes accompanied his reign of the 
country. South Korea, on the other hand, elected the first oppositional party leader, the 
relatively progressive Kim Dae Jung as president in 1997. The socio-political environment 
of inter-Korea relationships looked to change imminently.     
The recent surge of North Korean migration is due to social crises stemming from 
the leadership change and natural disasters in North Korea in the mid-1990s, North 
Koreans started to defect from their country for survival and better opportunities (Kwak 
2000; Lankov 2006). In the early period of migration, a majority chose to stay in the 
vicinity of North Korea even after their crossing the national border between North Korea 
and China, and they gradually moved deeper into mainland China. Some of these migrants 
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remained as a refugee-like people, and reportedly about 20% of those migrants chose to 
come to South Korea (Good Friends 1999; Lankov 2006). Since the beginning of 
significant numbers of North Korean settlements in the late 1990s, the annual influx to 
South Korea has been approximately 1,000 to 3,000 throughout the 2000s (Ministry of 
Unification 2015). As a result, the number of North Koreans residing in South Korea 
reached 20,000 in 2010 and as of 2015, it reached approximately 28,000, with the number 
of North Koreans incoming yearly at around 1,200 (Ministry of Unification 2015). This is 
a significant rise, compared to immigration statistics before the North Korean social crisis 
became critical.   
 The Kim government devised a new policy package and the supporting Act, which 
was geared particularly towards North Koreans, as it saw North Koreans as a distinctively 
new group of people who could play an important role in the future unified Korea. With 
the Act of the Protection of and Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors in 1997, 
the South Korean government legally and politically aimed to transform its definition of 
North Korean citizenry. The Act stressed that newly settled North Koreans are neither 
ideological subjects targeted for political gains regarding inter-Korea relations nor helpless 
welfare recipients dependent on South Korean welfare benefits (Ministry of Unification 
2015). This was a critical development regarding North Korean resettlement policy and 
North Koreans’ identity as well as a relationship building opportunity with North Korea. 
In a nutshell, the North Koreans were given a new, proactive and positive identity by the 
definition of the law. Common terms referring to them signify this change. “Unification 
protagonists (tongileui juche  통일의 주체)” and “cultural mediators for unification 
(tongileui gyodubo 통일의 교두보)” are just two examples of the state’s rhetorical 
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definition of the defectors which signal changes in the way North Koreans were treated in 
the South. 5  This policy towards North Koreans was aligned with the Kim Dae Jung 
administration’s overall policy of inter-Korea relationships, as it pursued national 
unification as a realistic and possible political process, which was expected to happen in 
the near future. The unification discourse started to become more concrete at the policy 
level after the first-ever two-summit meeting took place in Pyongyang, the North Korean 
capital city, in 2000. 
 Since that time, the policy on recent North Korean resettlement has seen modest 
changes. Several South Korean administrations with different political stances have taken 
office over the last fifteen to twenty years. In the Kim Dae Jung and the following Roh 
Moo Hyun administrations, the basic foundation for North Korean resettlement remained 
the same. Following the Kim Dae Jung government’s welcoming policy for North Koreans 
and an amenable stance toward the North Korean regime, the Roh administration amended 
it with focuses on the cost-efficiency of the programs and the self-sufficiency of the target 
population. The Roh administration took a motto of “productive welfare,” making North 
Koreans and other welfare recipients more self-sufficient and self-reliant mainly through 
active job seeking. When the conservative Lee administration took office in 2007, the 
North Korean resettlement policy was turned in a more market-driven direction, where 
cost-efficiency and the increase of employment among North Koreans was highlighted and 
competitions among the civil groups serving various groups of social minorities were 
encouraged. Stressing North Koreans’ economic self-sufficiency through strengthened 
                                                          
5 Before this period, North Koreans were at best welfare recipients, if not an ideologically 
stereotyped group of people. Unification was addressed only rhetorically, and the Southern 
government had maintained an adversary position towards the North (Grinker 1998). 
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employment and education programs, the Lee administration further privatized the welfare 
sector, mainly by launching the “social enterprise” program to reduce overall expenditures 
in welfare areas for social minorities. 
Aligned with the overall neoliberal arrangement of the welfare system in South 
Korea, the “workfare”, which highlights enhanced productivity and employment, works 
hand in hand with reducing the cost for social minorities by co-opting civil forces, and 
outsourcing the ground operations. By promoting individuals’ efforts and self-reliance, it 
presents neoliberal logics permeating through the service system. As discussed in terms of 
the technologies of subjectivity (Foucault 1979, Ong 2006), self-responsibilization 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002) becomes the disciplinary tool for subjects themselves in 
neoliberal times. They are continuously asked to be “self-motivated, self-reliant and 
entrepreneurial” (Rose 1992, 147). Hana Centers, the main site of this research, are 
organizationally hybrid, as a form of the state’s decentralized governmentality. As 
contracting-out institutions (minganwitak 민간위탁), Hana Centers operate as a mixed 
governmental and non-governmental form of service provision. Banding together with 
popular social enterprise projects, Hana Centers’ transformation is not unfamiliar to the 
North Korean service industry. This is not just limited to the Korean case, but similar cases 
are found in other parts of the world, which shows what were once exclusively state 
services are now outsourced to civil and social organizations (see also, Alvarez, Dagnino 
and Escobar 1998; Kamat 2004; Ong 2006; Postero 2006; J.Song 2009). It is an example 
of the state’s neoliberal partnerships with civic groups for cost-efficiency and privatization 
of public services, which springs partly from historical trajectories of the relationship 
between the state and civil society in South Korea (J.Song 2009). In this milieu, Hana 
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Centers are undoubtedly set up as institutions for resource efficiency, which could possibly 
reduce the cost of material support, institutional mediation processes, and competition in 
securing funding which all speak to the neoliberal arrangement of the national welfare 
service. As a state agency for supporting North Koreans, Hana Centers are positioned as 
local supporting agencies with the goal of “total care” for North Koreans with 
individualized forms of service.6 As a social welfare Center, Hana Centers are not expected 
to engage directly in political issues. Rather, they are to provide “practical” service for 
North Koreans’ daily lives such as support in education, employment, housing and 
psychological health. This project, nonetheless, recognizes how overall changes in Korean 
society regarding the dynamic between civil society and the state in supporting social 
minorities follows a neoliberal trend in the pursuit of “institutional efficiency,” albeit with 
more personalized and micro-disciplinary service practices. Furthermore, it acknowledges 
how all efforts to be efficient as an institution can affect the construction of (new and 
distinctive) North Korean subjectivity which may have unanticipated outcomes at different 
institutions and through different modes of governing.  
Hence, this study also focuses on Hana Centers contributing to formulating 
neoliberal types of “independent” and “self-sufficient” North Korean subjectivity 
particularly in relation to service client-ship – which is driven by market logic. By 
addressing subjectivity and institutional power, the study is aligned with Foucauldian 
discussions on neoliberalism, modern institutions and governmentality. In discussing this 
                                                          
6 It is well-documented in governmental web document in 2010. Total care here means that North Koreans 
can get aid for nearly every aspect of their settling life, such as economic, educational and psychological 
needs so that they do not need to visit other places to receive necessary aid. See the website of Ministry of 
Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000162 accessed in April, 
2013 
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subject-making process, I borrow Ong’s discussion of cultural citizenship as a dialectical 
process of subject-making and self-making in the webs of power (Ong 2003). The overall 
politico-cultural rearrangement of society into neoliberal time and space has contributed to 
creating a new (national) subjectivity of North Koreans as “independent” and “self-
sufficient” citizenry (J.Jung 2010; J.Lee 2015; M.Sung 2010) and these are highlighted 
more in some ways than others which depend on the practices of particular institutions 
from my observation. As an ethnographic study, it also addresses the affective dimension 
of service delivery, which enables us to see across and beyond discussions of 
governmentality. In order to find these convergences of different analytical approaches, I 
focus on the bureaucratic languages such as “professional relationships,” “efficiency,” 
“practicality” or “trust,” and different institutional spaces such as individual counseling 
meetings, programs for volunteers and the clients, and informal gatherings. It will attend 
to how the affective languages are used disparately depending on the “scales” and “levels” 
of institutions - such as national/central vs. regional/local - and at the same time compare 
and contrast how the same term is utilized in delivering different meanings. Contesting 
expectations on and identities of the Centers show the efforts of negotiation and elaboration 
as well as inconsistency and contradiction in both individual and institutional levels. The 
micro-politics configuring North Korean subjectivities and different modes of affective 
expressions are key ethnographic sites for this study to examine translocal and regionalized 
specificities of institutional arrangements.     
 
Chapter organization  
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In the remainder of this dissertation, Chapter 2 will discuss ethical issues such as 
an anthropologist researching institutions in her home country will be touched upon and 
then the methodology this research has adopted will be addressed. Chapter 3 will further 
delve into the historical and policy-based context in which Hana Centers are situated.  
Chapter 4 will analyze how a local Hana Center is managed and administered by state 
bureaucrats on the ground which does not necessarily adhere to the national policy 
statements, but instead shows affective interactions configuring the overall service 
environment and revealing the broader politics surrounding the service industry for North 
Koreans. Chapter 5 will connect a conceptualization of affect to uneven operations of Cold 
War politics. In Chapter 6, I will address the regulating and formulating practices of the 
desirable clientele figure of North Koreans through individual management programs as 
well as the anxiety of service providers in the midst of a competitive service environment 
in the neoliberal welfare regime.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ETHICS AND METHODOLOGY  
Anthropologists have been engaged in topics examining how institutions exert 
power through governments, supranational organizations, NGOs, and various other forms 
of organizations. The engagement of anthropologists with public policy or modern 
institutions starts with an acknowledgement that these powerful institutions are 
increasingly crucial to the organization of contemporary society (Shore and Wright 1997; 
Wedel 2005). In this vein, anthropologist Laura Nader’s famous claim, “study up” has been 
underscored, as she emphasized the urgency of studying up as well as down in the 
discipline of anthropology (Nader 1974). For anthropologists, to “spell out the processes 
of power” (Wolf 1974) and to ask different questions pivoting around power and 
accountability are important to understand a society because doing so develops a holistic 
picture rather than simply featuring those impacted by power brokers.  
Conducting a research on national institutions such as Hana Centers, which have 
served North Korean clients since 2009, is significant for several reasons. To locate the 
matter in its proper context, the Centers were established in the post-Cold War period, but 
by politically conservative administrations (in terms of North Korean matters). This was 
also a period when social welfare was gradually cut back while neoliberal social structuring 
was taking place (Song 2009). South Koreans were no longer as interested in North 
Koreans as they were at the beginning of the national division, and apart from popular 
rhetoric on unification and recoverable homogeneity, South Koreans came to have 
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a weakened sense of homogeneity with North Koreans (Hahm and Han 2000; J.Song 2009). 
Institutionally, Hana Centers are hybrid organizations of both private and public 
institutions and are considered to be better alternative than many social organizations on 
issues of organizational stability and accountability in serving targeted populations in 
recent times. The Hana Center, as a form of both private and public institution, plays a 
significant role not only in the public presentation of the institution, but also in interactive 
dynamics among the service participants. Having a dual identity confuses service providers 
on the ground in understanding the missions and the relevant policy. It also makes it hard 
for the service providers to build internal consensus on what the Centers are supposed to 
do. On the other hand, that ambiguity ironically allows service providers to negotiate their 
scope and kinds of service and to produce their own working knowledge. Another crucial 
property of Hana Centers is that they are associated with different levels of institutions – 
ranging from central and local government, to non-state and non-profit organizations, and 
to individual professionals who are involved with service for North Koreans. Thus the 
service participants – both service providers and service recipients – are aware of the 
position of Hana Centers in the wider assemblage of welfare and service to North Koreans, 
and the service activities taking place in Hana Centers can be understood beyond the 
organizational boundary of the Centers. 
 The aforementioned characteristics of a Hana Center - state and non-state agency, 
nationally set up but locally operating, being situated in intricate organizational networks, 
and a caring institution for North Koreans (a social minority) – are elements to consider in 
probing questions as follows: How do the processes of power, regarding resource 
distribution and symbolic power, work in a variety of institutional scales? How do the 
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everyday practices reveal both the entrenchment of and the breach of larger politics – i.e. 
ethnic/gender politics, Cold War ideology and neoliberal structuring? My ethical 
standpoint in conducting research and analyzing the Hana Center institution stands in 
recognition of its position, particularly within the milieu of service provision for North 
Koreans. Equally importantly, researching this resourceful institution, rather than 
underprivileged populations, requires a different kind of ethical engagement from 
anthropologists.  
        
2.1 ETHICS   
Research in collaboration with the national institution 
Anthropological tradition has demanded that researchers be mindful of ethics and 
methodology as the discipline can be intrusive and revealing of the people or groups on 
whom we conduct research. Doing research in a collaborative relationship with a national 
and legitimate institution challenged me to think of different sets of questions, as the 
institution itself is socially influential and politically significant in the lives of the 
population served and the result of analyzing the institution can be sensitive on the political, 
cultural and social fronts (Gupta 2012; Herzfeld 1992; Hoag 2011).   
Institutions have their own bureaucratic structures, political/ideological 
standpoints, and different kinds of networks in their regions. The institutions of the focus 
of this study are national social centers, which are mostly expected to provide service to 
social minorities in the local communities. Hana Centers are national institutions, but they 
are distinct from other institutions such as research, consultancy or administrative 
institutions. Through my research I could sense the Hana Centers have more authority, 
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legitimacy and power than local NGOs and individual agents in the service network. They 
are also supposed to take care of the underprivileged, marginalized and mostly poor, with 
limited resources from government subsidy; local corporate or independent donations; and 
local volunteer labor forces. Thus, the workers at a Center have their own work ethic and 
a specific mentality as a local social/service provision Center and as a Center nationally 
assigned by the Ministry of Unification.  
Given these particular socio-political characteristics of Hana Centers, I was careful 
not to take the official statement of the Hana Center as a factual description of what the 
Center was actually doing. I also had to be flexible and mindful in establishing my role and 
position vis-à-vis the Center when meeting with my research participants. The gap was 
most significant among the different groups of research participants, such as Hana Center 
workers, North Korean clients, and NGOs or individual patrons. Depending on their 
positions in the Centers – years of working for the Centers, job positions, degrees of 
personal commitment and work history, and types of employment in the Centers - the Hana 
Center workers had differing accounts of their work ethics and their institutions. Their 
perception of me as an external researcher also factored into their descriptions of their 
work, which varied along lines of religion, gender, work hierarchy and accountability. The 
research participants showed me varying degrees of closeness and openness as they talked 
about their commitment and perspectives regarding the Centers.  
Collaborations with the national institution gave me another challenge in 
approaching and building relationships with the North Korean settlers. Since this project is 
specifically designed to examine the institutional engagement with North Koreans in South 
Korea, I purposefully entered the field through the Hana Centers. I met the new North 
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Korean settlers to the region while participating in the Center’s activities, so most of the 
new North Korean interviewees built an institutional relationship with me. However, it was 
not always clear-cut which of my roles I should highlight most in any given situation. For 
instance, when one Center had its group activities, I could briefly introduce my intention 
to participate in the activities throughout and draw a general consensus based on my 
participant observation and potential interviews later. Even though the social worker at the 
Center allowed me to interview the North Korean clients, the clients did not necessarily 
step up to participate in the research. The social worker tried to help me further and 
encouraged the North Korean clients to volunteer for the research. However, their sense of 
keeping their identities safe and my position as an institutionally connected researcher 
could have been a hindrance in setting up a separate meeting for an in-depth interview or 
in participating in different activities at a Center. I sometimes had to compromise by 
interviewing a client for a very short time due to his/her limited hours of involvement in a 
Center. Suggesting research participation to North Korean clients was not as 
straightforward as I thought it would be. Interviewing long-term acquaintances or friends 
is definitely different from conducting interviews with North Korean clients with whom I 
did not have personal relationships but to whom I was introduced by the Center. Since my 
focus was Hana Centers’ institutional engagement in overall service provision, I tried to 
engage with current clients who could provide me with their experiences and reflections in 
the specific time period and the location – people who are in their first year of resettlement, 
the recommended period of service provision by Hana Centers. In any case, I tried my best 
to be transparent and honest about my research intention in explaining informed consent 
and the voluntary nature of their involvements with my research, but it was impossible to 
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explain beforehand every possible situation that could happen because of my dual 
positions. I had to use my “local knowledge” and my familiarity with the North Korean 
service-related field in order to be appropriate and proper with the Center and the clients 
in situations happening in and outside of the Center.   
When I interviewed individual patrons, government officials and NGOs, none of 
whom are directly connected to Hana Centers, I faced different kinds of challenges and 
responses. For instance, some NGO workers responded in a disgruntled manner when 
asked about the operations of Hana Centers. They were not very satisfied with the state’s 
rearrangement of the service agencies aiding North Koreans, since Hana Centers were 
assigned as central organizations in the field with national legitimacy and accountability. 
These issues were touchy subjects to many NGOs, which operate without much support 
from donors or the government; so I had to learn to be adept in expressing ideas about Hana 
Centers without necessarily advocating the Centers unequivocally. I tried to be very 
compassionate concerning how NGO workers might feel facing the shrunken support and 
networking among NGOs due to the concentrated resource endowment and legitimacy 
attached to the Hana Centers. Some government officials whom I met, on the other hand, 
expressed concern and sympathy towards the Centers as they expect the Centers to shoulder 
more responsibility and develop better programs to efficiently use the resources. I conceded 
all their ideas and discussed the matter as someone who was trying to be a better volunteer 
at the Centers while simultaneously serving as a researcher who could benefit the Center 
as a middle-person. I adopted this attitude in accordance with the practice of reciprocity in 
Anthropological studies.  
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Collaborating with Hana Centers by taking an institutional position necessitated 
different kinds of ethical concerns and responses toward diverse groups that I encountered 
in the field. Holding the position of both volunteer worker and researcher was 
advantageous to my being involved with relevant activities outside of the Centers, as well 
as to my being both an insider and an outsider to the Centers at the same time. However, it 
also involved difficult positioning and latent risks in exploring sensitive topics in regards 
to ethical issues, as the Center staff could mistake my volunteer involvement as abusing 
my position for personal research; and the North Korean clients could think of my approach 
as intrusive to the Centers’ staff members.       
 
Informing research participants and representation of the subject  
My position as an anthropological researcher in Korea has yielded some important 
ethical questions, particularly in relation to local knowledge and informing the subjects. 
As other recent anthropologists have done, I encountered a situation where I questioned 
the efficacy and the materiality of informed consent: how could I speak truthfully about 
my position at the Centers? Interpreting and locating informed consent in the context of 
South Korean service provision was another challenge that I encountered. I was required 
to ask institutional workers about their ethical and political standpoints as well to ask for 
concrete examples of how the Centers’ operations actually work on the ground. Since 
asking about a staff person’s political, religious and cultural values and perspectives was 
particularly delicate in the service field for North Koreans, and since some staff members 
expressed discomfort in answering the questions, I had to follow up with service activities 
with them instead of directly asking further relevant questions. Even when they mentioned 
35 
their perspectives and personal thoughts, some workers asked me to keep these off the 
record due to the sensitivity of such topics to the moral and political implications of the 
national institution.  
  To North Korean clients, different issues arose in terms of informing them of the 
research and representing their voices in my paper. Their lack of social knowledge in the 
beginning stage of resettlement put them in a vulnerable position as research participants. 
I tried to be less intrusive and personal with them than with other groups I interviewed, and 
instead I took the stance of an impartial volunteer trying to be helpful both to the Center 
and to the clients by asking them of the difficulties and barricades to finding proper 
services. Fortunately, some North Korean research participants were more-or-less 
informed of South Korean society and of what to expect from the Center because of their 
family members who had settled in the South first. It made my research into their service 
experiences and my reflections upon them easier, although I have to mention the existing 
differences in terms of cultural competency within the group.  
For representation of the subject, I had to decide what to disclose and what not to 
disclose. To begin with, research on North Koreans requires particular caution due to their 
legal status and socio-cultural position in South Korea. It should be noted that North 
Korean settlers’ citizenship is not simply straightforward across the board. They become 
legitimate citizens in South Korea after going through institutional interrogation processes. 
Meanwhile, their status in North Korea is categorized as criminal due to the antagonistic 
relationship between the North and the South. Their legal status in South Korea does not 
provide safety or legitimacy in North Korea or in China. In other words, they are protected 
in their identities only locally. Their identities as North Korean settlers in the South could 
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be used against their remaining family members in the North. Thus it is logical that North 
Koreans would feel insecure and uncomfortable in dealing with their identities and legal 
status. 
 Just like other refugee groups, North Korean settlers in the South have experiences 
of institutional interrogations regarding who they are. This posed challenges to my study, 
as they were sensitive about inquisitions and an interview format. Ethnographers 
researching a social minority should be particularly careful on the issue of representation. 
As Spivak (1988) famously points out in “Can Subaltern Speak?,” cultural, social, and 
political accounts should all be considered in the representation of marginalized 
populations. With a politically charged position in South Korea, North Koreans still find 
themselves positioned oddly within a national, and at the same time, localized Center. 
Whether or not North Korean clients actively participate in the Center’s services, they have 
a somewhat collective understanding and critical stance towards the Centers. In a given 
service site, North Koreans and South Koreans often find themselves misunderstood by 
each other because of different expectations, understandings of institutional help, and 
disparate lifestyles. In this vein, social institutions and research could be the place where 
“epistemic violence” (Spivak 1988:78) takes place against socially marginalized people. 
This study understands the potential risks in interpreting Others’ voices, and the researcher 
herself is situated in power relations which construct and influence the conversations and 
interpretation process between the interviewers and interviewees. Due to this concern, I 
tried to analyze and understand the structure of the Centers which both enables and inhibits 
the agency of North Koreans. I attempted to immerse myself in North Korean settlers’ 
particular culture by living with them and engaging in various types of informal activities 
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and talks in addition to formal interviews. Even though the ethnographic studies may entail 
risks of distortion or exaggeration in representing “Others,” I believe that reflexive and 
dialectic processes are key in producing ethnographic knowledge. With this in mind, I tried 
not to lose sight of the performative as well as the restrictive aspects of speech during my 
interviews. I was careful of my position as a South Korean researcher, staff member, and 
service provider so that I did not construct a particular perspective that would then be 
projected onto the North Koreans, which is aligned with what Haraway (1988) called 
“situated knowledge.”      
For the workers at the Centers and other service providers, I also tried to be careful 
in using their interviews and information as much as I could in terms of distribution and 
representation of the data. Based on my knowledge from previous experiences with GO 
and NGO workers in South Korea, the service institution workers are wary of being used 
and manipulated for research purposes. Additionally, due to the different degrees of staff 
openness about relevant matters and their closeness to a given researcher, representation 
of the institutional workers could be only partial and reflective of the kind of relationship 
I built with each of them. I will try not to dismiss their endeavors and passion in delivering 
the service, but rather I will depict how each institutional worker is positioned in the Center 
differently according to his or her cultural, religious and political values on top of years of 
experience. For the same reason, I will instead pay more attention to how the bureaucratic 
structures are constructed through the participations of the service providers, clients, and 




 2.2 METHODS  
As stated earlier, Hana Centers are established to optimize the efficient distribution 
of resources to North Koreans and to aid in their local adjustment, as the state attempts to 
handle the increase of the population settling in diverse regions of South Korea. In this 
dissertation, I attempt to show how the staff and the specific bureaucratic culture at two 
different state institutions provide their respective services. To represent the dynamic 
process of the actual service provision as well as to situate each Hana Center in a broader 
social and political context, I chose to adopt various kinds of qualitative research methods. 
More specifically, I aimed to scrutinize 1) state policy as well as Hana Centers’ programs, 
2) ground-level service delivery to North Koreans, 3) different scales and localities of the 
service provision, and 4) North Koreans service experiences on axes of time and place. 
 These research interests necessitated processes as follows: 1) the identification and 
analysis of policy documents, photos, video materials and public statements of Hana 
Centers, 2) participant observation in two Hana Centers with active involvement in all 
relevant programs, 3) semi-structured or unstructured in-depth interviews with the Center 
staff and with North Koreans. In addition, I ventured 4) site visits to different regions and 
other Hana Centers and institutions to triangulate the data, 5) brief phone interviews with 
staff at both government and non-governmental organizations, 6) a survey and a focus 
group interview with North Korean program participants, and 7) informal talks at the main 
research sites. This study attempts to grasp the regional micro-dynamics, while being 
attentive to how nationalized policy and governance are interwoven in everyday practices 
of service delivery. It proposes to look into how institutional engagements with a nationally 
constructed arrangement are locally situated, how various affective interactions formulate 
39 
specific service scenes and contribute to the broader realm of socio-politics, and the 
specific kinds of service provider/recipient relationships. To see how a national institution 
works differently depending on the regional dynamics, institutional history, amount and 
quality of resources, bureaucratic culture and political and ethical standpoints, I selected 
two distinctive Centers for the main research sites. I chose Wonju Hana Center and Seoul 
Bukbu Hana Center for my comparative research sites, due in part to my research capacity 
with limited funding and time, but also due to the high potential for comparability between 
the two different service operations.  
The factor of “a city” was taken into a consideration, as it is well known that North 
Koreans aspire to settle in the capital city owing to their preconceptions that living in the 
capital city is equivalent to having a privileged position in society. Owing to this factor, I 
decided to study one Hana Center in Seoul and another in the region outside of the Seoul-
metropolitan area. The table below shows how unequally distributed the population is. 
Seoul only has a quarter of all settlers, but if Seoul and metropolitan area are combined, 
the percentage reaches to approximately 64% of all North Korean settler population.   
Table 2.1 Settlement of North Koreans by region (Ministry of Unification 2015) 
 
The Seoul Bukbu Hana Center serves the highest number of North Korean clients 
per Center and is well-known for its advanced knowledge and practices in providing 
services to North Koreans. The other Center in Wonju, Gangwon province serves a much 










Male 2,255 1,963 719 286 231 167 7,256 
Female 4,493 5,534 1,731 681 756 489 18,764 
Total 6,748 7,497 2,450 967 987 656 26,020 
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Centers in Gangwon province. Wonju is still relatively close to Seoul compared to other 
cities, but nonetheless, the socio-cultural influence of Seoul and the metropolitan area on 
this region is seemingly insignificant. Being surrounded by high mountains, this small city 
appears to maintain its own cultural and socio-economic character. In addition, I had 
already established good rapport with potential research participants located in the city 
before starting the project; and it was still commutable from Seoul within a day, rendering 
comparative research feasible.  
Beginning in August 2013, I divided my week into two segments: 3-4 days in 
Wonju and the remaining days in Seoul. This involved many roundtrips between Seoul and 
Wonju while staying in South Korea. With regular schedules, such as staying in Wonju 
from Sunday through Wednesday and in Seoul from Thursday to Sunday, I arranged 
meetings with social workers, clients, and counselors on top of participating regularly in 
the meetings, workshops and education programs. When I stayed in Wonju, I also worked 
for an alternative school for North Korean youth. The school recently established its new 
location in Wonju after leaving its original home place in Seoul. I had already worked with 
the school and had known the staff and students since 2006; hence, I could easily take part 
in teaching students. I taught anthropology, yoga and English during the day time and had 
much free time in the evening.  By staying at a dorm with students in Wonju, I could get 
closer to them in their daily lives. We would often sit at a table for dinner talk about the 
school, their relationships, or occasionally dorm rules or personal histories, etc. This setting 
also allowed me to follow my young North Korean students’ routines, such as studying, 
hanging out, shopping, cooking and eating, and interacting with one another, thus helping 
me to grasp one part of North Korean settlers’ lives and concerns in the proximity. In Seoul 
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I rented a small studio room which was relatively close to Seoul Bukbu Hana Center, taking 
me about 25 minutes to get there by public transportation. Since I was a registered volunteer 
for the Center, I was expected to visit or call each client at least once a week to make sure 
of his/her well-being in the new place. In addition, the Center held volunteers’ meetings 
once a month, and hosted irregular events or daily retreats which I also took part in 
consistently throughout my fieldwork period of over one year. I was also allowed to do 
participant observations during the initial two-week education/training sessions both in 
Seoul and Wonju due to my flexible schedule and my clients’ and my students’ presence 
in the program. These other meetings and events in addition to my regular visits to the 
Center provided me with a good ground for understanding the dynamics of the Center’s 
work and relationships between the workers and the clients. Written and presented 
materials are also important media in this research, as there are “educational” and 
“training” materials provided for North Koreans in each program to teach them the 
proper/normative ways to enter into the South Korean cultural and social rubric.  
Table 2.2 Summary of research methods and field sites 
Methods Sites and personnel 
Site visits and formal/informal interviews  
A police station in Seoul,  
Daegu Hana Center, Incheon Hana Center, 
Gumi Hana Center,  
Chuncheon vocational school for North 
Koreans, Wonju alternative school for N.K 
youth,  
Wonju collaborative conference on 
servicing North Koreans, a conference on 
North Korean education in Seoul  
Short phone interviews 
NGO staff in Wonju (conservative),  
Hana Foundation staff,  
a police officer in Seoul, staff at another 
Hana Center in Seoul   
In-depth interviews 
37 service providers and recipients in and 
out of Hana Centers    
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Field site  
In addition to the main field sites, Seoul Bukbu Hana Center and Wonju Hana 
Center, I visited several other sites to enrich my data through comparison and contrast. I 
chose Hana Centers in Daegu and Gumi (both in Gyeongbuk province), plus one Center in 
Incheon, all in consideration of their populations served, their organizational history and 
the perspectives of the institutions. Incheon is another big city housing a couple of thousand 
North Koreans; two Hana Centers are in operation there. I visited one Hana Center which 
used to be a religious organization mainly engaged with charity work in the region. It is 
considered good comparison example because it is still located within the Seoul-
metropolitan area, while being a different city. Daegu Hana Center used to be an 
international NGO helping with North Koreans; and is also known as one of the most 
exemplary Hana Centers in the country, utilizing its previous extensive international 
network in advocacy and publication work, and promoting multiculturalism in the region. 
Gumi Hana Center is fairly small as opposed to Daegu or Incheon Center so I chose it as 
another good comparison to Wonju Hana Center in terms of size and population served. It 
has been operating as a regional social Center, thus sharing characteristics with Seoul 
Bukbu Hana Center and Wonju Hana Center.   
Questionnaire survey  
Wonju Hana Center’s after-party of a 
Chinese class with 10 participants 
Participant observation  
Seoul Hana Center - volunteer meetings, 
initial training program, cultural programs, 
excursions 
Wonju Hana Center - Chinese class, 
Korean class, theatrical play class, initial 
training program   
Informal group talk   
Wonju Hana Center’s consulting meeting 
for applications, Wonju Hana Center 
volunteers’ meeting   
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I met public servants in municipal and district governments who are in charge of 
social minorities including North Koreans; and I visited a college, a vocational school and 
an alternative school for North Koreans in Gangwon province. I also visited a couple of 
NGOs and interviewed several staff in hopes of getting an outsider’s viewpoint in terms of 
Hana Centers’ position and operations in the service field.       
Table 2.3 Field sites categorized by organization and city 
City Organization Significance 
Seoul Hana Center Main research site 
Seoul Police station Western part of Seoul, to 
gather information on job 
referencing program 
Seoul NGO for North Korean 
advocacy   
A well-known NGO in 
international advocacy 
Seoul Nowongu district office  The staff in charge of North 
Koreans in the district  
Wonju Hana Center Main research site 
Wonju Alternative school for N.K. The place where I worked as 
a part-time teacher  
Wonju City Hall, municipal gov.  Municipal government to 
gain data about supportive 
programs for North Koreans 
in the region  
Wonju Yonsei University  The university has a program 
to boost global connections, 
and North Korean students 
were invited 
Chuncheon Vocational school for N.K.  A vocational school aiming to 
train male North Korean 
youth in job skills. Still in 
process of recruiting students 
and gaining government 
permission 
Daegu Hana Center Another Hana Center, used to 
be international NGO 
Incheon  Hana Center Another Hana Center, used to 
be religious charity NGO 
Paju NGO for North Koreans cultural 
understanding / manufacturing 
business  
An NGO run by North 
Koreans  
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Gumi Hana Center Another Hana Center, used to 
be social Center   
 
The map below shows the geographic locations of each of the cities I visited. Since South 
Korea is a mountainous country, and roads developed in a more complex way than most 
US cities, travel takes more time than what it normally takes in the US. Paju (about 18 
miles away) and Incheon (about 17 miles) are all in Gyeonggi province, and they were the 
closest cities to Seoul in my research. They each took me about one hour to reach by public 
transportation such as a train or a bus. Wonju is about one hour and a half to two hours 
from Seoul, depending on where I departed from in Seoul. Daegu is about three and a half 
hours away from Seoul by bus (about 150 miles); and Gumi is slightly north to Daegu, 
which took me about three hours from Seoul.   
      
Figure 2.1 Cities visited for the research 
 
- Seoul Bukbu Hana Center (Seoul Northern Hana Center)   
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Seoul is the capital city of South Korea. In the South Korean context, Seoul is more 
than an administrative center. It plays a significant role, not only because nearly half of all 
South Koreans reside in Seoul and its metropolitan area, but also because political, 
economic, social and educational centers are concentrated in this area, even though the 
government has tried to disperse its ministries and governmental departments throughout 
South Korea in recent times. More than a hundred universities are located in Seoul, and 
there are more than ten lines of subways running daily, but still people use terms like “hell-
subway” during the commuting hours. All the big broadcast companies, headquarters of 
organizations, and businesses are located in central Seoul. Scenes of political actions taking 
place in front of the National Congress building, the Blue House, big companies, or other 
political hot spots are almost everyday occurrences in the Seoul landscape. Seoul has 
expanded geographically over the years, and one would need almost two hours to go from 
one end to the other by public transportation. Foreigners make up almost three percent of 
the population of South Korea now, and the number of tourists has been growing; thus it is 
not a rare incidence to come across foreign languages spoken on the street. Not 
surprisingly, newcomers such as North Koreans find it more attractive to live in a more 
diverse, glitzy, crowded and metropolitan Seoul.   
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Figure 2.2 A map of Seoul and the northeastern part of the city in which the Seoul Bukbu 
Hana Center operates 
 
   My primary research site, Seoul Bukbu Hana Center, is located in the northeastern 
area of Seoul. Northeastern Seoul is a relatively underdeveloped area, but still heavily 
populated with many urban poor living in big apartment complexes, as well as middle-to-
upper classes who tend to reside near mountains and less accessible regions. Northeastern 
Seoul is surrounded by mountains and is close to the suburban metropolitan area. Its 
housing and market prices for necessities are relatively low compared to the central Seoul 
area. One is more likely to find older generations passing by and making their livings here 
than to find younger generations. Living in this area normally implies that a person is 
lower-to-middle class rather than middle-to-upper, and residential conditions look much 
humbler compared to well-off regions such as the southern (Gangnam) and central parts of 
Seoul. Owing to these conditions, there are many government-subsidized apartment 
complexes. These subsidized apartments are very attractive options for lower-income 
households, because they rent for only a third or a quarter of the average. There is a very 
competitive market for lower-income Seoul citizens to live in these apartments, owing to 
its convenience as an inner-Seoul city and its relatively comfortable residential conditions 
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at a lower price. North Koreans are usually assigned residence in these kinds of apartments, 
which could appear to be a huge benefit in the eyes of South Korean citizens or immigrants. 
However, North Koreans, as newcomers to the country, charged with hope and new 
opportunity could find the region unsatisfactory, since it is still not “the real center” and 
living in this region automatically positions them on par with lower-class South Korean 
citizens.   
 
Figure 2.3 A picture of Nowongu area (author taken) 
 
Seoul Bukbu Hana Center has been cited as the most developed Center in terms of 
its supporting programs. Because Northeastern Seoul has maintained a concentrated North 
Korean population since mid-1990s, it devised its own programs to support North Koreans 
even before Seoul Bukbu Hana Center was officially designated as the first model Center 
for North Korean resettlement in 20097. The region that this Center serves has the largest 
population of North Koreans among all who have resettled in Seoul. As of December 2013, 
                                                          
7 A news report on Seoul Bukbu Hana Center  
http://www.unityinfo.co.kr/sub_read.html?uid=17856&section=sc4  
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the population was 1,763.8 This region includes six districts in Seoul: Dobong, Gangbuk, 
Nowon, Jungrang, Seongbuk, and Dongdaemun. According to published statistics, 4.3% 
of all North Koreans reside in this part of Seoul, the highest regional density in South 
Korea.9  
 
Figure 2.4 The Seoul Bukbu Hana Center's introduction page on serving population 
 
This concentration is mainly due to governmentally subsidized residences and the 
social networks that North Koreans have previously built with their families and friends. 
Because of its history and service dedication to the North Korean population, many other 
Hana Centers try to learn from this Center’s mistakes as well as its achievements. As of 
2014, Seoul and the metropolitan area host twelve out of a total of thirty-two Centers, and 
Seoul Bukbu Hana Center is one of four Centers located in Seoul.  
 
                                                          
8 Seoul Northern Hana Center (Gongneung Hana Center), 
http://www.gnnkcenter.or.kr/Introduce/Region.aspx accessed in April, 2013 
9 Seoul Northern Hana Center (Gongneung Hana Center), 
http://www.gnnkcenter.or.kr/Introduce/Region.aspx accessed in April, 2013 
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Figure 2.5 Seoul Bukbu Hana Center's webpage 
 
Seoul Bukbu Hana Center has one of the longest histories of serving North Koreans 
in South Korea as it first began to support North Koreans in 2000. The fact that this area 
drew many North Korean settlers to the region factored into the early start of this service, 
and the Center’s conscious effort to help the population played a part in its becoming the 
most active service provider to North Koreans. The Center lists its aims as “1) To provide 
comprehensive service for new arrivals in their initial stage of settlement, 2) To provide 
services according to different needs of age groups, genders, issues etc.,3) To provide 
services in consultation with North Korean immigrants and in liaison with other 
community organizations, 4) To elicit change of perceptions among South Korean citizens 
in order to achieve integration.”10 Thus, the concentrations of this Center are providing 
comprehensive, intragroup, difference-based integration into South Korean communities 
and personalized service in collaboration with other organizations. Compared to other 
Hana Centers, Bukbu Hana Center has quite explicit goals stated in terms of its focus and 
philosophy of service provision. This Center is currently staffed with two counselors, five 
                                                          
10 Seoul Bukbu Hana Center, www.gncenter.or.kr accessed in January, 2015  
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social workers and approximately sixty volunteer workers for the North Korean population 
in the region. I mainly worked as a volunteer - a “settlement helper” - for the Center, 
meaning I was expected to help North Koreans with their everyday errands and guide some 
institutional processes. I was also a participant observer in the initial education sessions 
offered to new North Korean settlers in the region, and I joined in other irregular events 
and activities.     
 
-  Wonju Hana Center (Kangwon Namdongbu Hana Center)  
Wonju is a small-to-mid-sized city in Gangwon province in South Korea. With an 
estimated total population of 300,000, Wonju is located 87 miles away from Seoul. The 
city can be reached from Seoul by either train or bus in approximately one and a half hours. 
Even though it is relatively close to Seoul and its metropolitan area, it provides its own 
distinctive scenery and rich agricultural and mountainous culture. Its main economy is 
based chiefly on the service industry, followed by agriculture and manufacturing. It is thus 
a city geared more to industries for consumption than for production. It is also known for 
its vibrant civil society, especially when the democratic movement was on the rise during 
the 1980s. Even before the democratic movement arose throughout South Korea in this 
period, Wonju had its own strong grass-roots movement of farmers led by Catholic leaders. 
During my period of fieldwork, I heard a lot about Wonju’s “openness” to outsiders and 
“diversity” in terms of residents’ origin. Wonju is not one of the biggest South Korean 
cities, but still it is well-connected with other major cities through public transportation, 
and people can travel to Wonju relatively easily. The percentage of the population not born 
in Wonju is higher than in other cities. Residents who claim Wonju as their natal town are 
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generally aware of the fact that they have many incomers residing in their city and are 
comfortable with that situation. It is also culturally rich; one of the most renowned Korean 
authors, Kyoung-Ri Park claims Wonju as the major home and her workplace for her 
writing. Toji Cultural Center in Wonju commemorates her works and attracts writers and 
artists across the world to the city. Gangwon province, in which Wonju is included, borders 
on North Korean territory, and it has an allegedly similar landscape to the countryside and 
small cities of North Korea. Interestingly, this province also has a long, troubled history of 
provocation such as spy infiltrations into Southern territory and underground tunnels made 
by the North Korean government.  
 
Figure 2.6 The location of Wonju in Korea 
 
However, Wonju is not a major city attracting a large number of North Korean 
settlers. Younger generations would quickly find it boring to live there, without sufficient 
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job options, just as they would any other small-to-mid-size city in South Korea. Older 
generations could find it more comfortable to live in, as it is similar in size to most North 
Korean mid-range cities but still provides convenience for daily living.  
 
Figure 2.7 Wonju Hana Center's introductory webpage 
 
Wonju had a total of 173 North Korean residents as of 2013, when people in their 
40s and older made up more than 60% of all settlers (Gangwon Namdongbu Hana Center 
2013). This is only equivalent to 10% of Seoul Bukbu Center’s targeted population, which 
makes a big difference in their respective service provision. In 2013, the Hana Center in 
Wonju was appointed as the “Gangwon Southeastern Hana Center” by the Ministry of 
Unification, reflecting the slight increase of North Korean population and the activeness of 
the Center’s service delivery. It now serves six cities in the province: Wonju, Hoengsung, 
Pyeongchang, Yeongwol and Jeongseon.11 The Center has been involved in North Korean 
settlement service since the early 2000s, which is a common time frame compared to other 
                                                          
11 Gangwon Southeastern Hana center (Wonju Myeongryun Hana center),  
http://www.mlwfc.or.kr/new/board/board.php?b_id=board2&cmd=view&num=546 accessed in April, 2013 
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Hana Centers. The area that the current Hana Center is nestled in is the place where most 
early North Korean settlers found their home. Among the 173 North Koreans in this city, 
nearly half of the population live near the Center since it is located inside their apartment 
complex. The other half of the population is dispersed throughout the central residential 
area of the city. The Center describes its mission as follows: “We support North Koreans 
in their settlement through initial adjustment education programs, career counseling, 
information sharing for daily necessities and employment support service so that they can 
enter into the labor market and the local community successfully and systematically.”12 
Their mission statement is similar to that of other Hana Centers.      
 
Figure 2.8 Wonju Hana Center (picture taken by the author) 
 
                                                          
12 Gangwon Southeastern Hana center (Wonju Myeongryun Hana center),  




In Wonju, I was mostly involved with the Center as a collaborative observer. I 
would visit the Center for lunch and stay there observing social workers’ consultations with 
North Korean clients in addition to participating in several educational/ training programs. 
The overall environment of the Center was very congenial and less busy than in Seoul. 
Staff would always welcome me and usher me into their offices whenever I visited the 
Center. I was first introduced by the principal of the school for North Korean youths where 
I had worked for a long time, and the staff at the Wonju Center all respected the school’s 
efforts to make an impact on the local community as well as on North Korean youths’ 
education. My background played a big role in our building a collaborative relationship 
with each other. The Center would ask how the school was running and the school would 
get better information regarding the Center through me. I played a sort of “messenger” role 
for each institution, which helped each Center to understand the other’s operations.  
Since both organizations all recognized that the local communities in Wonju still 
needed much help in increasing their awareness about North Koreans and related issues, 
they could be more cooperative than competitive with each other. For instance, in Wonju 
there were only a couple of NGOs involved in North Korean matters, including a Catholic 
church in town and an old grass-roots organization that began by promoting ideas of 
national unification. This situation contrasted sharply with Seoul, where many NGOs, 
countless churches and individuals seek access to North Koreans for valid reasons. The 
Wonju Center also welcomed me as a researcher who was interested in the local settlement 
of North Koreans, a rare sight in a region like Wonju. As opposed to the Seoul Center, no 
other researchers had been interested and involved in the Wonju Center’s work. I was able 
to pass time in the Center by reading relevant publications or newspaper in a casual 
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environment. There were some busy days when clients of all kinds – the elderly, the 
disabled, multicultural groups, and North Koreans – swarmed in at once, but this only 
happened occasionally; it was not a daily scene at the Center. Most of time I was casually 
talking with staff members, helping them with chores, chatting with clients, and having 
lunch with other people. For a more professional engagement, I requested the Center to 
allow me to work as a volunteer teacher or a mentor for younger generations, but there was 
not enough demand. Instead, I was allowed to participate in a Korean class and a Chinese 
class that opened in winter and spring respectively, and I also took part in weekly theatrical 
workshops that ran from January 2014 to August 2014. These different kinds of 
involvement provided me with insights into diverse aspects of the North Korean support 
program and interactions among different participants.  
 
 Sampling strategy of subjects 
For this research, I used non-probability sampling which collects samples based on 
the subjective decision of the researcher. Specifically I employed purposive sampling and 
snowball sampling to better answer my research questions. A purposive sampling is a 
method by which a researcher chooses a sample based on the people whom she thinks will 
be the most appropriate for the study. Since this study particularly aimed to analyze the 
data gained from two institutional sites and their service providers and recipients, there was 
a limited number of people who had proper knowledge in the targeted areas. Hence, it was 
logical for me to adopt purposive sampling rather than random sampling. Snowball 
sampling is based on referrals, which enhances the effectiveness and the chance of 
selection (Bernard 2013). These two forms of sampling were preferred in this research, 
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particularly when I needed to go beyond the two research sites to better situate the Centers’ 
operations in the larger context of institutional support for North Koreans, as well as to 
gain knowledge from older settlers who could take a historical approach to Hana Centers. 
I was able to find the best subjects to develop the research questions and to find new 
significance in the service practices through these samplings, based on the engaged 
research methods.   
As the research required engaged relationships with the institutions, I first focused 
on familiarizing myself with each Center’s work environment and culture. For the initial 
two months, I signed up as a volunteer and received training in Seoul, I focused on finding 
out the different tasks performed by the main staff working for North Korean matters and 
I became acquainted with active volunteers. In Wonju, it took less time to get to know 
everyone, due to the smaller scale and lesser workload of the staff, and to get permission 
to audit or participate in programs.  
After the initial period, I planned a potential interviewee list and sampled the 
research participants in consideration of several factors. Since I intended to be engaged 
with the two Centers for a prolonged time, I focused on building deeper relationships with 
the main staff and volunteers at both Centers. Thus, I was exposed to their work patterns 
and knowledge of their work by participating in activities on top of interviewing. 
Interviews with staff at the Seoul Center were mostly formal, since most of them were well 
aware of how such research was conducted and how they were expected to answer. For 
this reason, interviews did not reveal much of the information I sought, so instead I asked 
the interviewees about the Centers’ public stance and the institutional processes they used 
in performing their jobs. However, as bureaucrats, they could not provide me with either 
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fundamental, philosophical answers or answers regarding how different levels of 
institutional operations work. Sometimes I found my initial questions were too general or 
not directly relevant to their work; I had to be very specific in my questions each time, so 
that they could give me tangible answers. Following is one segment of interviews.  
I: So what do you think about Hana Center’s role in terms of promoting local 
integration of North Koreans in the community?  
SW: You mean, their settlement program? 
I: Not necessarily… I meant the overall impact that Hana Centers in the region have 
on the North Koreans’ lives in the local community.  
SW: I don’t know how to answer to that. You mean my personal opinion or the 
Hana Center’s operations?  
I: (with hesitation) You can answer in both ways.  
SW: What we do in the Center, as you know, we do initial adaptation program, 
employment support, one-on-one consulting with the clients… 
   
This was my second in-depth interview with the social worker at the Wonju Center; 
and since we had built up rapport and a congenial and collaborative relationship, I expected 
more informal, less institutional answers from her. However, she was apparently puzzled 
by my questions and asked for more specific questions directly concerning her own tasks. 
I sensed that it was less a matter of rapport building than characteristics of bureaucratic 
work which troubled her in answering. It was challenging for her to provide me with a 
general answer in regards to the Hana Center’s position, social roles, philosophical 
background and so forth. I found this to be a limiting setup, as I wanted to use in-depth 
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interviews to hear how insiders felt about the overall operations of Hana Center in their 
daily working lives, and how they dealt with institutional contradictions and hurdles to 
accomplish their missions.     
Overall, in interviewing the staff, I found that Seoul Bukbu Center was a little more 
formal and cautious in dealing with me as a researcher and a volunteer than Wonju Center. 
Even though our informal interactions allowed us to converse about more diverse and 
deeper subject matters, it appeared that there was a big gap between our informal talks and 
our formal conversations during interviews with the staff at the Seoul Center. For instance, 
a staff member at the Seoul Center who accompanied me during government office visits 
to register settlers for initial residency mentioned how much her religious faith had helped 
her in her work and how North Korean clients needed the same kind of faith to survive in 
South Korea. However, when I brought this topic up in the interview, she said this was a 
personal matter, so the conversation on faith ended quickly. I learned that interviews with 
institutional workers required a multi-pronged approach, rather than being limiting to 
regular formal interviews. The workers’ familiarity with the interview format, their 
established knowledge of how to give “proper” answers, and their bureaucratic patterns of 
work left little room for more in-depth conversations. These issues, as well as their 
sensitivity toward giving a false impression about the institution, all factored into the 
limited conversations in the interviews. For these reasons, I tried to find other 
complementary standpoints to explore my focus of interest. I conducted interviews with 
staff members at the initial time of contact and again when I was almost finished with my 
fieldwork to see if building rapport with them softened their initial formal and 
representative voice and gave them a less formal but more personal voice about the 
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program. Also, it was beneficial to observe the differences between the structured and 
official talk of the interviews and what the Centers’ staff actually do when they handle 
matters happening in the Center.  
Notably, from participating in the activities that the Centers provided, I recognized 
the need to consider intersectional identities to recruit interviewees and informants. Service 
providers varied in their experiences in the field, perspectives on North Koreans, 
education/training background, work ethic and attitude towards their coworkers and 
clients; as well as in age and gender. The differences were more evident at the Seoul Bukbu 
Center where staff were more diverse and volunteers’ engagement was more active than at 
Wonju Center. I purposely recruited my interviewees based on their age, years of work and 
gender, knowing that these factors contributed to different accounts of their service 
engagement. Table 4 is the list of interviewees for this research, with their occupation, 
national origin, gender, age and place of residence.     
 
        Table 2.4 Interviewee for the research 
No. Pseudonym ID Gender/Age Significance 
1 Kwonho Lee  SW, Seoul M/20s A relatively new 
staff member 




related field  
3 Yonhee Kim V, Seoul  F/60s A member of a 
local church who 
has been working 
with North 
Koreans for 
about 10 years 
4 Jeongil  Kwon V, Seoul M/30s A newly trained 
volunteer 
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5 Hyomin Park V, Seoul  M/50s Has involved for 
a couple years 
6 Siwon Yu V, Seoul F/20s A newly trained 
volunteer 
7 Kyesuk Ha  V, Seoul F/40s Has been 
involved for a 
year 
8 Jeonghee Ryu NKC, Seoul F/20s  My matching 
client  
9 Seryeon Yang NKC, Seoul F/40s Mother of Hakyu 
10 Hakyu Son NKC, Seoul M/20s A college 
graduate in the 
North 
11 Minki Kim  NK, Seoul  M/20s Waiting to enter 
college, 5 years 
of residence in 
South Korea 
12 Minji Kim NK, Seoul F/30s 8 years of 
residence in 
S.Korea 
13 Hyungyu Lee NK, Seoul M/30s Has lived in 
South Korea for 
10 years 




North and South 
Koreans  
15 Sohee Ji SW, Wonju F/30s A social worker 
in the field for 
more than 5 years 
16 Jaesun Lee SW, Wonju F/20s A newly hired 
social worker 
17 Jinseung Kim SW R, Wonju  F/40s Vice president at 
Wonju Center 
18  Hajin Wong T, Wonju  F/30s Chinese class 
instructor 
19 Kyunghe Lim V, Wonju F/50s A volunteer for 
the last couple of 
years 
20 Minkyu Suh PO, Wonju M/40s Wonju police 
officer in charge 
of taking care of 
North Koreans  
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21 Sunha Choi PO, Wonju F/30s Wonju police 
officer 
22 Hee Jin City council 
official, Wonju  
F/40s Involved in 
policy making for 
North Koreans  
23 Jinsil Hyun  NKC, Wonju F/20s Theatrical class 
attendee 
24 Jiwon Ha NKC, Wonju  F/20s Initial adaptation 
program attendee  
25 Hana Kim NKC, Wonju  F/50s Mother of Jinsil  
26 Hyang Choi NK, Wonju  F/30s Has lived in the 
South for 5 years, 
looking for a job  




28 Yeon Cha NK, Wonju M/30s A factory worker, 
Has lived in 
Wonju and South 
Korea for 3 years   
29 TaeJung Lee I, Lawyer, 
Wonju 
M/50s A sponsor for a 
couple of North 
Korean youth  
30 Hyun Cho I, Wonju  M/40s Volunteer 
instructor at an 
alternative school 
for North Korean 
youth 
31 SunJeong Ji NK, Paju  F/50s An entrepreneur 
of an NGO 
32 Inha Kang Staff, Daegu 
Hana 
F/30s Has worked for 
over 10 years 
33 Yerang Han Staff, Incheon 
Hana  
F/20s Has worked for 
over 5 years 
34 Jonghee Yang NGO staff, 
Seoul  
F/20s Has worked for 
the NGO for a 
couple years 
35 Yunhee Kim NGO staff, 
Seoul 
F/40s Has worked for a 
related field for 
over 10 years 
36 Seulki Choi NGO staff, 
Wonju  
F/40s Has worked for a 
NGO for a couple 
years 
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37 Heysun Kim I, Wonju F/50s A neighbor of the 
school for North 
Koreans  
   Total 37 interviewees 
* SW: Social worker Re: Representative V: Volunteer C: Counselor NKC: North 
Korean Clients, NK: North Korean (in general) I: Individual sponsor   
I conducted thirty-seven interviews in total, including two regular staff, five 
volunteers, three North Korean clients, three long-term North Korean residents from the 
Seoul Center; and three regular staff, one part-time worker, one volunteer, three North 
Korean clients, and three long-term North Korean residents from the Wonju Center. As a 
result, the number of people who are either working for or receiving services at the two 
Hana Centers is twenty-four. In addition, to obtain the best data for locating the Hana 
Centers in the service field, I recruited two police officers, one city council official, three 
individual sponsors, five NGO workers and two staff members from different Hana 
Centers. Twenty-five female interviewees and twelve male interviewees participated, 
which shows the dominance of women in the service field and among the North Korean 
population. Twelve people were in their 20s, nine people were in their 30s, eight people in 
their 40s, seven in their 50s and one in her 60s. In the field, professional workers such as 
social workers and general staff at the Hana Centers tended to be young, ranging from their 
20s to their 30s, whereas volunteer workers and counselors tended to be older, mostly in 
their 50s and 60s. North Korean clients tended to be younger rather than older, as these 
people tended to utilize the service more actively than older generations. The age and 
gender differences did make a difference in their service participation, both from the 
providers’ and recipients’ standpoints. Among North Koreans, opinions in terms of 
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institutional service provision and the needs of North Korean communities diverged 
according to their settlement period.  
This recruiting of subjects was based on the researcher’s subjective judgment about 
whom to interview and who would be the best fit for the research. For instance, at the Seoul 
Bukbu Center, one social worker was selected owing to the fact that he was the most 
engaged in assigning and training settlement helpers (volunteers) and was responsible for 
initial adaptation programs for North Korean clients. Volunteers were chosen based on 
their outspokenness and experiences displayed in the ten monthly meetings I attended, and 
I was able to interview only one counselor of the Center owing to her availability and 
willingness. At the Wonju Center, I chose three staff members since two social workers 
were in charge of programs for North Koreans, and the vice president was the first person 
who introduced me to the Center. I couldn't contact many North Korean clients, due to the 
small number of program participants. I chose my interviewees through referrals from the 
Center’s staff and from the school I worked for.  
Those interviewees indirectly involved with the Hana Centers’ operations were 
chosen to triangulate the data. Several non-governmental organizations and individual 
sponsors were chosen to gain knowledge of non-state or non-institutional actors in service 
provision, and several more North Koreans were recruited to explore the mission of state 
service agencies from a historical perspective and to investigate the differences in terms of 
resettlement experiences, aspirations, and community involvement between older settlers 
and newer settlers to South Korean society.      
In addition to in-depth interviews, I conducted many informal conversations with 
Hana Center staff, clients, volunteers, local residents, Hana Foundation staff and police 
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officers. These informal conversations helped me most in triangulating the data. I also 
conducted a short group interview and questionnaire-based survey to gain different 
perspectives and expressions from the clients through diverse methods. I conducted phone 
interviews when the staff and NGO workers could not afford to have separate meetings 
with me, or when they expressed little interest in meeting in person. Interviews with Hana 
Foundation staff and one NGO in Wonju were conducted this way, but since I was not able 
to obtain informed consents on paper, I did not include these people in the interviewee list. 
In setting up each interview, normally I provided each person in advance with an informed 
consent form and a list of the main questions which I planned to ask. I did so to ensure that 
their consent to participate was indeed informed. This also gave interviewees firsthand 
information about what the research focused on and the kinds of questions to be addressed.         
 
 Positionality and different kinds of relationships    
Donna Haraway (1988) asserts that knowledge is situated. In other words, there is 
no “god’s eye” view on any set of phenomena. In particular, researchers, as positioned 
subjects in a certain locale and time within situated relationships, will go into the field and 
find themselves fortified in some ways and limited in others. My position in the 
institutional field was multifold. I was a researcher, a 30-something female graduate 
student studying in the US, a teacher for North Korean youth, a collaborator with the Hana 
Centers, an engaged volunteer and a participant observer of social programs in two 
different locations for about a year. These multiple positions allowed me to have distinctive 
levels of relationships with people involved, and thus to have variegated knowledge and 
perspectives regarding my research subject.  
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For the social workers in the Centers, my position as a volunteer - in a direct 
translation “a settlement helper (jeongchakdowumi 정착도우미)” 13 - invariably helped me 
to participate in all levels of activities which would have been impossible for me to access 
otherwise. As we shared the task of helping clients, the social workers and I were engaged 
in both formal and informal interactions. Our conversations included a range of topics from 
the social workers’ opinions of the Centers’ programs, the institutions and networks, other 
workers, workload, and the tricky nature of responsibility; on North Korean clients; and on 
practical information regarding potential resources in the regions. Through informal as well 
as formal interactions with the staff, I was able not only to grasp the big picture of the 
Centers but also to ruminate on little details that the staff encounter in their working lives.  
When it came to North Koreans, however, the issue of access was a different story. 
Since we would meet as “service provider” and “service recipient” - even though I had a 
low level of institutional engagement as a volunteer - there was always a latent risk that I 
had to face, depending on how the North Korean clients considered the Hana Center 
specifically and the governmental system of support broadly. North Korean interviewees 
who had a favorable opinion about Hana Centers and overall support programs would allow 
me to step into their daily lives where they needed help or tips. As I was officially a 
registered and trained volunteer in Seoul, I could also legitimately ask for their opinions 
on their service experiences. However, if the North Korean clients were not comfortable 
with the service in any one of a number of ways, they could be more blocked-off toward 
                                                          
13 This volunteer system for North Korean settlers was first introduced in 2005 to alleviate the 
heavy workload of police officers who at the time were responsible for North Koreans general 
resettlement lives in South Korea, and to provide North Koreans with more personalized and 
direct care which could possibly accelerate their adjustment process. However, as this research 
also found out, the success of the system is heavily contingent on volunteers’ knowledge, 
responsibility and how they thought about their “volunteerism.”    
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my inquiries and attempts to establish a relationship. Either way, I would only have been 
able to engage with North Koreans as a settlement helper, conversing about different 
services and benefits that they could receive from governmental or non-governmental 
institutions. Because of these factors, I could only meet well-disposed clients who 
frequented the Center and espoused favorable opinions about the Center and the 
governmental service overall. Aware of this bias, I also reached out to North Koreans who 
normally did not come to the Center and did not participate in the activities for in-depth 
interviews. Overall, North Koreans expressed relatively ambivalent opinions about the 
service programs. This was to be expected due to the position of the Center, which strives 
to be seen as a practical and neutral vessel of service to North Koreans, while in actuality, 
it is another intermediary and reflection of South Korean bureaucracy and neoliberalism 
afflicted by fluctuating and often confrontational politics.  
 
- Volunteer – social worker relations in Seoul and Wonju 
As a volunteer in Seoul, I could witness competing idealized notions of the proper 
relationships between the regular staff and the volunteers working for the Center. This form 
of relationship was rather blurry, as there were many factors affecting interrelations. 
Experiences and length of service provision to North Koreans, as well as age and gender, 
could all affect the relationship.  
First, there were clearly differences of age. Among volunteers in Seoul, there 
existed more experienced people in terms of serving North Koreans outside of the Hana 
Centers than within them, and the majority of volunteers were women in their 50s or 60s. 
As time went by, we had more men volunteer in their 30s through 70s, whereas social 
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workers who were in charge of managing volunteers were in their 20s and early 30s. Even 
so, social workers had more legitimacy and authority to handle the issues arising in and 
around the Center; this situation created some necessary hierarchy in the relationship, but 
sometimes it created tensions and contrasting viewpoints. Ideally, the relationship was 
supposed to be complimentary as volunteers and social workers were both engaged in the 
business of helping North Koreans, with clearly assigned roles for each. In actuality, the 
relations were more complex and dynamic. Volunteers had very different backgrounds in 
their religions, ages, genders, classes, education and political stances. There was not always 
a direct correlation between their opinions on North Korean service and their intersectional 
identities, but those factors certainly influenced the dynamics among volunteers and 
between social workers and volunteers.  
As a volunteer, I attended monthly staff meetings with other volunteers and an 
initial settlement program for North Korean incomers. In those encounters, I noticed how 
divergent political ideas and perspectives in gender, age and religions particularly clashed 
in both explicit and implicit ways. There was, however, not enough time for me as a 
volunteer to build relationships with other volunteers and social workers; social workers in 
Seoul were caught up in their daily tasks and other kinds of activities outside of the Center. 
The relationship between volunteers and social workers was rather formal and uni-
directional, for social workers did not have enough time to interact with volunteers. Also, 
volunteers were much busier in their lives than people in Wonju. We often found it hard to 
set dates for outings and socials on top of monthly meetings. I could still sense that social 
workers tried their best to humanize their service and the overall relationships they built in 
their workplaces. However, work-related stresses – mediating volunteers and clients, 
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misunderstandings and miscommunications with North Korean clients and a significant 
amount of bureaucratic paperwork - could easily lead social workers to burn out and could 
hinder them from engaging in the service area in more humanized ways. Also, social 
workers were expected to know everything from politics, to potential job markets, to social 
organizations, to legal issues, and so on. They spent a lot of time learning about these areas 
through education, training workshops, meetings with other Centers’ staff and non-
governmental organizations’ meetings in their off-work time. Due to the demanding nature 
of their work, social workers’ job turnover was high. I witnessed that two out of five social 
workers leaving their positions during one year in Seoul. Social workers in Wonju might 
have had similar difficulties, but they had a significantly smaller number of clients than in 
Seoul, so the work was less stressful work for them. There was also a high turnover of 
volunteers in Seoul, in comparison with Wonju.  
 
-  Volunteer – client relations in Seoul and Wonju 
Volunteers in Seoul were supposed to help clients register with the system as well 
as to help clean their new residences during the first and second day of moving in. 
Afterwards, we were expected to keep in touch with the clients once a week for at least six 
months, mainly to monitor how they were doing. With this amount of contact, volunteers 
usually could not maintain long-term relationships with the clients other than with a few 
North Koreans who desired to maintain those ties. The relationships were mainly oriented 
toward handing out some items that the clients would need; guiding them to local 
administrative offices, the Hana Center, markets and second-hand stores; and visiting their 
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places regularly to see what was needed. Volunteering was a good gateway to connect with 
North Koreans on a regular basis despite my assigned role and position.  
I officially served two North Korean clients at the Seoul Hana Center during the 
period of my stay in South Korea from August 2013 to August 2014. I attended an initial 
two-week education program designed for settlers as well as several irregular events in 
order to meet other North Korean clients in the region. Through this involvement, I 
established rapport with new North Korean settlers in the region and gained multiple 
perspectives on the service activities. Overall, the North Korean clients whom I met 
provided me with good feedback about the volunteer system. It seemed like North Koreans 
received some comfort in terms of building relationships with South Koreans and having 
firsthand help from an individual who lived nearby.  
However, there were also some cases in which either a volunteer or a client 
manipulated the official relationship. I witnessed some North Korean clients acting as if 
their volunteers should fulfill their requests regardless of the time of day. Also, there was 
the possibility of each person thinking of the other as a potential dating partner or as means 
of satisfying curiosity. Sometimes volunteers intruded in the lives of clients to the extent 
that clients barred them from future contact, refusing to answer further questions. In these 
cases, social workers intervened and gave each party some guidelines. However, overall 
misunderstanding or mistrust about the other party still informed some of these 
interactions. My first client did not trust the institution from the beginning, and after 
receiving initial support in cleaning her house and buying groceries and furniture, she cut 
off contact with me and the Center. Even though there was not much interaction involved 
other than helping her move in; make necessary registrations; and fill out documents for 
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housing, utility service, residence and setting up a bank account, she might have felt all the 
institutional involvement was intrusive and unnecessary. This was not very surprising since 
I had previously heard her telling another North Korean client that the police officers and 
Hana Center were usually trying to pry into their lives. There was obviously a sense of 
mistrust between the North Koreans and their South Korean service providers.  
In Wonju, the monthly number of incoming residents was not consistent. Usually 
it was only a few people. Over my seven-to-eight months’ stay in Wonju, there were ten 
people served. The initial program was held sporadically because of this inconsistent 
number. The Center did not need new volunteers to assist social workers, unlike the Seoul 
Bukbu Hana Center, which had high volunteer turnover. Since the Wonju Center had had 
the same volunteers for several years, I wasn’t able to become a volunteer. Instead, I asked 
permission to observe and participate in some meetings of volunteers and other programs 
designed for North Korean clients. Those programs included a standard Korean class (in 
Seoul accent), Mandarin Chinese class, and theatrical workshops. In addition, I was also 
allowed to sit in where general counseling and consulting were taking place, or simply to 
hang out in the Center while other social workers were engaged with their work. I was 
sometimes viewed as a plain South Korean participant to the programs, or a sympathetic 
individual or as a staff member of the Hana Center. Overall, I felt the North Korean clients 
at this Center had a more favorable opinion about the Center and the staff with less of a 
politically entwined sentiment, owing to their relative closeness to the staff.   
   
- Volunteer – volunteer relations in Seoul  
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As previously indicated, there was high turn-over of volunteers at the Seoul Center. 
At every monthly meeting, there were always new faces, and sometimes the new volunteers 
outnumbered the older ones. The work required volunteers to be available during the day, 
so the demographics skewed toward part-time workers, housewives, entrepreneurs of 
various sorts and retired people. The majority of volunteers espoused religious motivations 
for getting involved. There were a total of 60 people registered as volunteers, but active 
ones in a given month numbered between ten and fifteen people. One condition for 
volunteering required availability for at least six months, due to concerns regarding the 
lack of responsibility among volunteers and short periods of involvement. This condition 
also reflects the reality of volunteering in a region that shows a high turn-over of volunteers 
for the Center. Because of the high turn-over and individually designed working conditions 
with clients, it was hard for volunteers to build ongoing relationships with other volunteers, 
unless they had been working together for a long time or they already knew each other.  
In monthly meetings, I observed people clashing over differing ideas about being a 
volunteer at a governmental Center and the Center’s main duties, as well as about their 
initial motivation for involvement and their perspectives on North Koreans. Diverse 
backgrounds were inevitable since there were few limitations to becoming a volunteer, and 
the Center needed volunteers at all times. There was not much chance for me to become 
very close to other volunteers, as all of them were pretty busy, and volunteers’ emergency 
contacts were always social workers, rather than other volunteers. When we tried to build 
a support network amongst ourselves, offering tips and advice, the effort was not sustained.   
Volunteers whom I met for the first time typically asked me if I was also Christian. 
Even though I differ from them in ideas about faith, my research participants assumed that 
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we shared some core values and opened up to me comfortably. Older volunteers treated me 
as a person less experienced in life, so they took an attitude of generosity and guidance 
towards me. Contrastingly, my academic position as a PhD candidate gave some volunteers 
the impression that I was a specialist and a potential policy changer, so that helped in 
building trust between us. Because of my position as a PhD candidate trained abroad, I was 
given more authority in interacting with male volunteers particularly, as the notion of 
gendered hierarchy still exists among older generations.  
In sum, the aforementioned multiple positionalities created through different 
significations and relationships are the bases to analyze affective relationships that arose 
in the institutional spaces that this study has taken as the main research sites.         
 
2.3 DATA ANALYSIS   
I used both deductive and inductive data analysis for this research. I used deductive 
research methods when I first investigated how the institutions promoted their ideas and 
planned actions for their service delivery, as well as how the central government proposed 
the Hana Center project and developed its programs. Then I applied inductive analysis 
mainly to interpret the data on micro-practices of the Center and interactive service 
operations to formulate theories connected to larger socio-political ramifications.  
I set up initial categories for research questions as 1) institutional changes over 
time, 2) the geopolitical importance of the Centers, 3) the impact of overall neoliberal 
restructuring of the society with regard to social welfare programs, 4) intersectional 
identities of service providers and service recipients, 5) micro-practices of each Hana 
Center, and 6) local specificities of each Center’s service operation. I followed these 
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categories in sketching and locating the significance of the establishment and operations of 
Hana Centers in my initial period of fieldwork. Then I zoomed in on the specifics of service 
delivery, particularly focusing on the both inter-group and intra-group interactions between 
the service providers and the recipients, as well as interactions among service providers 
and among service recipients. When I reached an overall understanding of the social, 
historical and political significance of the Centers, I focused on the gaps between the stated 
intentions of the Centers’ policy and the actual operations of a Center. When I found a 
certain theme arising frequently, I probed it through participant observation and interviews. 
When the fieldwork was done, I transcribed all the interview data and reviewed the 
transcripts multiple times to identify any new categories that might emerge and need 
reorganization. As inductive research, I categorized groups of interviews by code words 
that appeared often and attempted to formulate theoretical frameworks, a common process 
in ground theory methodology. Those code words have multiple meanings which needed 
“a thick description” (Geertz 1973).   
I performed content analysis on the different sorts of data collected and created 
categories to structure the data: audio and video sources of the Hana Centers’ introductory 
materials, public materials published both in print and on websites, audio-based interviews, 
note-based interview data, field notes, notes of group meetings and informal talks, site visit 
notes, phone interview notes, class and education materials, and conference publications. I 
sorted these materials into broader modes of data as follows: archival sources in print and 
on the web, audio recordings, visual recordings, and personal field notes of all sorts. These 
data were all utilized in analysis.    
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For archival sources, I paid attention to their particular characteristics as 
institutional materials. Commonsensically, bureaucratic operations are based on 
documents and legal statements, in a Weberian sense. But these are not just media of 
bureaucratic operations; they “are constitutive of bureaucratic rules, ideologies, 
knowledge, practices, subjectivities, object, outcomes and even the organizations 
themselves” (Hull 2012). The documents mediate, lead people to actions and sometimes 
transform and modify the meanings that they are supposed to carry (Latour 2005). In 
analyzing the materials published by Hana Centers and their advisory institutions such as 
the Ministry of Unification and the Hana Foundation, it is important to note this 
ethnographic study is not merely to identify what a document is. I will look at how the 
users of the documents appropriate them to mediate their actions, how different genres and 
forms of writing/documenting are employed in the Centers, and how these documents are 
“performing” in the actual groundwork of the institutions.  
    Thus to analyze the written data, I paid attention to 1) the different technologies 
adopted in formulating documentation, 2) how different genres and forms of published 
materials were aligned in their institutional settings, and 3) how these published materials 
attempted to represent their institutions and operations. Later I will explain how these 
representations are distorted and used by the service participants.    
  To analyze the interview data, I was able to quickly categorize sections of 
interviews into bigger groups following the pre-established categories of the research. 
After the initial categorization, I broke the transcriptions down into smaller groups to 
further interrogate the data. Particularly in the second stage of categorization, I aimed to 
find both explicit and implicit expressions manifest from the data on micro-practices of the 
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Center such as daily routines of service delivery, interactions among service participants, 
intersectional identities of service participants, and the conflicting ideas between service 
participants and the processes of negotiation and compromise. This process can be 
identified as thematic analysis which focuses on the content of narratives and on identifying 
patterns within data, which can interpret various aspects of the research topic (Braun and 
Clarke 2006).   
 
Summary  
This chapter described the methods employed in the research. I adopted archival 
research, participant observation, in-depth interviews coupled with a questionnaire survey 
and informal talks to triangulate the data. Research participants were recruited via non-
probability sampling using both purposive and snowball sampling through referrals and 
subjective decisions based on participant observation. Analysis is based on the methods of 
grounded theory, content analysis, and thematic analysis. The following chapters will detail 
the results of the research.
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICY ANALYSIS ON NORTH KOREAN SUPPORT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURES OF HANA CENTERS  
In this chapter, I will first map out how settlement support policy for North 
Koreans has changed over the last 60 years in South Korea, and I will describe the 
political and social significances of the policy changes. In the second part of the chapter, 
I will elucidate the organizational and service-operational location of the Hana Centers in 
the whole assemblage of service provision to North Koreans. This will lay the 
groundwork to examine the Centers’ ethical and disciplinary operations that are in line 
with broader politics – ethnic homogeneity, post-Cold War politics, neoliberal 
restructuring of social welfare – discussed in the earlier chapter.    
 
3.1 THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S POLICY CHANGES REGARDING NORTH KOREAN 
SETTLERS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE   
In the anthropological framework, policy is something to be questioned and 
contextualized, rather than be taken for granted as a mere conveyer of truth. 
Anthropological research regarding policy have dealt with topics such as the methods by 
which organized powers are implemented, or the ways in which actors participate in the 
process through social institutions and policies. As policies “encapsulate the entire history 
and culture of the society that generated them” (Shore and Wright 1997:8), they need to be 
assessed and analyzed in the social, political and cultural contexts. Albeit their purpose is
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to promote efficiency and effectiveness of actions, they are fundamentally political as they 
are “masking the political under the cloak of neutrality (Shore and Wright 1997,8).” In this 
section, I will approach policy on North Koreans in multiple temporalities and scales, 
acknowledging that the study of policy “incorporates the full realm of processes and 
relations involved in the production of policy” (Wedel 2005,34).  
As I touched upon earlier, the South Korean state has shifted its rhetoric and policy 
in defining North Korean settlers since the founding of the nation in the 1950s. As this 
study focuses on a much later period of North Korean settlement – particularly after the 
greater settlement began in the late 1990s – I will not inspect the policy, legal processes, 
social practices or political imaginary of the earlier period in detail. However, it should be 
noted that this historical legacy has persisted in discourses, people’s consciousness and 
different kinds of social/state practices, all of which permeate neutral welfare agencies such 
as Hana Centers; and I will incorporate this legacy into my analysis later.  
The socio-political treatment of North Koreans can be divided into a few significant 
periods by the terms used to define North Koreans. When ideological and political 
competition between the communist and the capitalist systems shaped national politics and 
social consciousness extensively, the North Korean regime and its people were generally 




The term Bbalgaengi ( 빨갱이 Reds) was often used to refer to North Koreans 
instead of calling them “North Koreans” (the common form for referring to national 
citizens), and the penetrability of the communist Reds was real in South Koreans’ 
imaginations ( S.J. Lee 2005). As a consequence, the exceptional people who moved to the 
South mainly for political reasons were recognized as “heroes (yongsa 용사)” who turned 
to the “humane” and “warm” (capitalist) South. They were treated in a special manner by 
the administrations of the time, being granted higher social and economic status in the 
South. “The warm Southern state” was the common epithet the Southern society used for 
itself, implying an alternate form of authority to the cold Northern state.  
The kind of North Korean settlement since the mid-to-late 1990s has been 
qualitatively different from the previous migration from the North to the South. If the high-
profile politicians, diplomats, and expatriates searching for political exile in the South 
comprised the majority of settlers before the 1990s, the recent migrants from the North are 
contrastingly characterized as low class, less educated and originating from the border area 
Figure 3.1 A propaganda poster commonly used in earlier times 
79 
between North Korea and China. Many factors contributed to an abrupt and notable North 
Korean defection in the early to mid-1990s: the global spread of a post-Cold War 
atmosphere, significantly reduced support from important allies such as Russia and China, 
the rise of the Chinese economy, the North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung’s death and socio-
economic crises due to natural disasters and a famine in the North (Choi 2008; K.Lee 
2003). However, the majority of these defectors stayed in the vicinity of the national border 
between North Korea and China, owing to their inclination to be close to their land, families 
and friends (Good Friends 1999; K.Lee 2006; I.Yoon 2003). A smaller number came to 
South Korea in hopes of gaining citizenship and the social benefits that went along with it 
(B. Chung 2006; I.Yoon 2003). Because of the nature of migration, the more male-
dominated migration before the late 1990s contrasts with the feminization of the movement 
after this period. Women, who comprise the majority of border-area traders and have 
primary responsibility for their households and childcare, were the first to arrive during the 
North Korean migration that began in the mid-1990s (K. Lee 2003). The size of the 
movement has also changed: each year, the number of people coming to the South has 
numbered in the thousands. As a consequence, the number of North Koreans residing in 
South Korea has reached 28,000 as of 2014 (Ministry of Unification 2014.12), whereas 
there were only about 1,000 settlers from the North before 1998. Among North Korean 
immigrants, women make up 70%, a trend which has been consistent since the early 2000s. 
North Korean settlers have been referred to as North Korean defectors (talbukja 탈북자), 
North Korean immigrants (talbukijumin탈북주민), or new settlers (saeteomin새터민) 
since this period.  
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Table 3.1 Number of incoming North Koreans (Ministry of Unification 2015) 
 ~1998 2003 2008 2010 2012 14.12 Total 
Male 831 474 608 591 404 304 8,251 
Female 116 811 2,195 1,811 1,098 1,092 19,267 
Total 947 1,285 2,803 2,402 1,502 1,396 27,518 
Female % 12% 63% 78% 75% 72% 78% 70% 
The migrants to the South in the early-to-mid-1990s did not receive as many social 
benefits as those who came before or after them. During this “window” period, the settlers 
were not seen as valuable ideological/political subjects, nor as socio-political subjects or 
intermediaries for the prospective unified Korea. They were taken as “the underprivileged 
(saengwhalbohodaesangja 생활보호대상자)” by the society, which placed them in the 
same social status as other social minorities of the South. Even though the political rhetoric 
and the legal definition of North Korean settlers in this period were replaced by the new 
Kim administration with a more compassionate appellation of North Koreans as exponents 
of unification, the view of North Koreans as “socially marginalized” and “poor” was not 
uncommon, and it particularly emerged in conjunction with the neo-liberal economic 
policy and the social welfare regime for the population.   
The facilities, services, and institutions assisting settlement began to demonstrate 
significant transformations in the rhetoric of their legal statements as well as in the quantity 
and the quality of accessible services, after the first presidential victory of a rival political 
party in 1997. It is no exaggeration to say that the North Korean settlement service area 
has exploded since the late 1990s, as the state began to recognize the role of North Koreans 
as unification intermediaries.14 With a milestone shift in the domain of South Korean 
                                                          
14 B. Chung (2009) and J. Jung(2010) also demonstrate this change in policy and perspective. 
With the new Act in 1997, each adult was provided with 36,960,000 won (approximately US$ 
36,000). In addition to this, social workers and policemen were assigned to each North Korean in 
order to effectively help North Koreans’ secure housing and employment. See also, Ministry of 
Unification http://unikorea.go.kr    
81 
politics, economy, and socio-cultural recognition of the Northern regime, diverse kinds of 
social institutions and individuals commenced supportive activities for North Korean 
settlers inside and outside of the nation. Hundreds of regional and 
international/transnational civil groups, religious institutions, social and educational 
centers and even corporate companies have tried to join in the service of supporting North 
Koreans, with diverse practices and perspectives. In this way, North Koreans were made 
into an “object of knowledge.” 
  Table 3.2 provides an at-a-glance summary of major policy imperatives regarding 
North Korean settlers since the early 1990s. This study focuses on the period from the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration to current times. The Kim administration is an important period 
for examining how institutional service assemblages have been formulated and have 
shifted, as national leaders concocted different political, social and moral dispositions 
which helped to formulate a new type of North Korean subjectivity.   
Table 3.2 Relevant laws and policy changes 







Act on the 




<Service provision to people in need> 
Initial resettlement support: 8.6-15M won 
Employment: Training, referrals  








<Unification policy based support> 
Initial resettlement support: 33M won 
Establishment of Hanawon resettlement Center  
Residence protection (up to 5 years)  
Employment protection: job training program, 











 Housing: Public housing  




Initial resettlement support: 19M, selective 
support for those in training, certificate, long-
term employment   
Employment support: 1st year 0.5M, 2nd year 
0.7 M won.  
Customized settlement support: School 
establishment 
Regional and NGO participation: Expansion of 




Establishment of North Korean Refugees 
Foundation, Hana Centers and preschool for 
North Koreans, expansion of employment 
program   
Park Geun Hye  
(12~present) 
Enhanced protection of North Koreans’ 
revenue, employment and education   
As stated above, the Kim Young Sam administration was the first to enforce the 
legal processes of North Koreans from a perspective of them as “people who lack abilities 
to make a living on their own” (in Korean, the term used is “saenghwalbohodaesangja”  
생활보호대상자) so they were categorized as people in need. The Kim Dae-Jung 
government introduced more extensive programs of support, facilitating a new role for 
North Korean defectors as “unification protagonists (tongileuijuche 통일의주체)” 
following his proactive political standpoint towards unification. Accordingly, the new law 
allocated a large sum of money for a “resettlement fund” to support housing, education and 
work in the state’s budget. During the Roh administration, this service took a neoliberal 
turn aimed at helping North Koreans to become more “self-sufficient” as a form of 
“productive welfare” for service recipients (B.Chung et al. 2006; Sun et al. 2005), an 
approach that is aligned with the administration’s overall welfare policy turn regarding 
social minorities. The government’s welfare paradigm focusing on productivity highlights 
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incentivized types of support meant to increase employment. Specifically, the government 
reduced the resettlement fund – which is given to all incoming North Koreans 
unconditionally and equally – by 53% while expanding incentive programs in job training 
and employment. Later the Lee administration continued to focus on North Koreans’ 
economic independence and self-sufficiency through support in employment and 
education. What is unique about the Lee administration in terms of serving North Koreans 
is that it shifted toward an entrepreneurial type of welfare, epitomized as a “social 
enterprise” project.15 This term signifies that the government delegates and privatizes the 
welfare responsibility of the state to the non-state area and encourages competition in social 
service for minorities. Not surprisingly, many NGOs with unstable financial structures 
applied to participate in this project, and they hired North Koreans following the project’s 
propositions. Each year, these NGOs have to submit documentation to qualify for the next 
year’s funding, while also struggling to make enough profit and achievement in the hybrid 
market-civil sphere (C.Park 2011). This means that the NGOs registered as social 
enterprise organizations need to attune their organizational structures more closely to the 
government’s ideas imposed by the contract 16 . As a result, not only North Korean 
                                                          
15 The Lee administration promoted “social enterprise” projects as an alternative economic 
system to serve social minorities in general. It launched the project for North Koreans as 
specifically through “North Koreans’ stable adjustment through economic stability” (Ministry of 
Unification 2011). For this project, the government allocated 287 million won (approximately 
0.3M USD) to set up “a support center” and 738 million won (approximately 0.7M USD) for 
those social enterprises for North Koreans. This amounts to almost one third of all government 
subsidies money to support all NGOs and NGO-related projects in 2011. (For more information, 
see the website of the Ministry of Unification, 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000346&boardDataId=BD00002
17017&CP0000000002_BO0000000033_Action=boardView&CP0000000002_BO0000000033_
ViewName=board/BoardView accessed April 2nd, 2013)    
16 The standards for selection as a social enterprise are accountability of the agency (20%), 
presented outcome of the project (30%), plans for the project (40%) and the strong will of the 
organization (10%). The enterprise must employ North Koreans at a minimum rate of 30% of the 
84 
employees, but also civil groups are made to be more competitive and marketable actors 
by following the state’s neoliberal governance. The NGOs are pressured to become more 
(bureaucratically) organized and outcome-oriented, to secure stable funding. It is expected 
that the change in the nature of state-civil organization relationships will affect North 
Korean subjectivity through management and regulations of the service programs. Another 
point to note in the settlement policy of the Lee administration and the following Park Geun 
Hye administration is the promotion of equal distribution of migrants across the settlement 
region in order to lessen the concentration of migrants in the Seoul-metropolitan area. By 
giving more incentives in settlement and job placement outside the Seoul area, the policy 
ensures that other local Hana Centers see small but steady increases in number of incoming 
settlers. The figure below is similar to the one above, but it offers more details regarding 
the settlement policy change since 1997. As an official document outlined by the Ministry 
of Unification, the figure demonstrates that there were no significant changes other than 
the increased focus on employment and education for the settlers.  
 
Figure 3.2 Settlement policy change since 1997 (Ministry of Unification 2015) 
                                                          
entire staff for a large agency, or 50% if the organization has fewer than 10 staff members 
(Ministry of Unification, the notice board, 2011).    
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As figure 3.2 shows, the changes directly related to Hana Centers are the settlement 
helper system and counseling system, which were first proposed in 2004 as personalized 
services for North Koreans. Hana Centers, or the comprehensive local settlement agencies, 
were proposed and tested in 2009 and were implemented across the nation in 2010.     
The following table 3.3 shows the comprehensive contents of the service program 
for North Koreans provided by the central government. This service package was first 
introduced and implemented during the Kim Dae-Jung administration, and it went through 
several minor changes over the period as I described above. The categories of service are 
as follows: settlement fund; residence; employment; general welfare (including health care 
and education service); and personalized services such as counseling, settlement helpers, 
and police officer appointment.   
Table 3.3 Settlement support system (Ministry of Unification 2014) 
Category Item Description 
Settlement 
Support 
Initial Financial Support 7M won (KRW) per household 
Encouragement Support 
Max. of 24.4M won for vocational training, 
certificate achievement and employment 
Additional Financial 
Support 
Max. of 15.4M won for senior citizens, 
disabled and long-term medical treatment 
Residence 
Housing Placement Introduce rental apartments 
Residential Supply 
Support 
13M won per household 
Employment 
Job Training 
100,000-200,000 won per month during 
vocational training (by Ministry of Labor) 
Employment Support 
(Provided to employers) 
Half of the wages (less than 700,000 won) 
are subsidized for up to 36 months. 
Job Security Officers 
55 designated Centers provide job 




For the recipients of Minimum Living 
Standard (420,000 won per month for each 
household) 
Health Care 
No payment required from the most in-need 
healthcare recipients 
Special Pension 
National pension is paid for those aged over 
50 and less than 60 upon entering the South. 
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Special Admission to 
College 
Applicants admitted as a special admission 
case. 
Financial Aid for 
Education 
Registration fees exempted for secondary 
educations and national university, 50% 




One or two assistant(s) for each 
household’s initial settlement (1,300 
assistants nationwide) 
 
211 residential security officers, 55 job 
support officers, approx. 800 personal 
safety officers 
In this extensive service package for North Koreans, the Hana Centers are in charge 
of implementing nearly all the described service processes. For instance, when a North 
Korean is released from Hanawon (the initial settlement agency), a designated Hana Center 
is required to pick up the client and drive him or her to the local city/district office for 
registration in the system before sending the client home. The counselors and settlement 
helpers moreover provide services from the Centers as well as assisting clients to apply for 
a matching fund or specific service programs offered either by the Centers or by external 
sources. Most service provision to North Koreans is now operated through Hana Centers. 
One peculiar characteristic is that Hana Centers have dual identities as service agencies: 
government and non-government. Upon appointment as a Hana Center, each Center is 
expected to follow the supervision of the Ministry of Unification and its service contractor, 
the Hana Foundation. The shift of a civil organization to a state agency can not only change 
the service programs but also shift its institutional values and missions. At the ground level 
of service provision, this change appears to be even more challenging and confusing than 
written policy statements suggest. 
  In the next part of the chapter, I will describe the specific ways that Hana Centers 
are set up according to the government-led service provision, and how the vertical 
(hierarchical) and horizontal (associative) governance of Hana Centers operates through 
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organizational structures. I will also demonstrate that the self-claimed neutrality of the 
service provision for North Koreans is an invalid statement: by explicating the particular 
ethical and regulatory agenda that the supervision agency presents, and how Hana Centers 
mediate and process the particular socio-political agenda in delivering service to North 
Koreans.       
  
3.2 THE ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONS OF HANA CENTERS IN THE WEB OF SERVICE PROVISION   
If service provision to North Koreans can be viewed as points of arrival and 
departure along a trajectory or pathway, the Hana Centers are in charge of the last stop of 
service to North Koreans in the South. Hana Centers were established first in 2009 by the 
government to delegate the supportive role of local settlement of North Koreans to local 
institutions following the special act regarding North Koreans in 1997. Hana Centers were 
established to bring coordination of resources through efficiency and neutrality, with a 
hope to lessen over-competition and fix the problem of poor resource management. With 
qualities such as being locally based, politically neutral and professionally operated, Hana 
Centers are expected to facilitate a successful North Korean settlement through 
personalized and efficient service programs (S.H.Kim et al. 2010; Y.H.Kim 2009; H.S.Kim 
and Choi 2011). Chronologically, the Hana Centers’ service is located at the end of the 
whole service process for North Koreans’ settlement, where localized, divided labor and 
individualized service activities are performed. The institutional set-ups for North Koreans 
are depicted in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3 The flowchart of service delivery17  
The state-sponsored service provision for North Korean settlement involves the 
following: Once North Koreans arrive in South Korea, the National Intelligence Service 
and the National Police Agency examine them to screen out all except “pure North Korean 
defectors” (i.e. those who are not political spies, Chinese, Korean Chinese, or other 
foreigners) and to classify each North Korean defector by his/her political involvement in 
the North. Screening is also used to gain current information on the North Korean regime 
and its society for the purpose of “national security.” The screening process has been 
criticized for its unfavorable treatment of North Koreans, and North Korean settlers 
commonly report it to be a distressing experience. After this screening, North Koreans are 
transferred to and housed in the government resettlement Center “Hanawon” for 12 weeks. 
The education and training at this Center are intended to help ease North Koreans’ 
adjustment to the South. Hanawon programs include basic social orientation, vocational 
training and career advice, educational programs for youth, and medical services (Ministry 
of Unification, web source 2015).18 During this initial stage, state agencies try to classified 
defectors and place them with appropriate types of care. After this period, North Koreans 
                                                          
17 Source: Jeongchakjiwoneopmu silmupyeonram [정착지원업무실무편람 Resettlement Task Catalog], 
Ministry of Unification 2012 
18 Ministry of Unification “Support System” http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3039  
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are finally transferred to regional settlement agencies, Hana Centers, where they meet 
assigned policemen, settlement helpers and social workers to go through various kinds of 
service registration and applications.  
The more dynamic picture of Hana Centers’ location in the web of official service 
to North Koreans is as follows.  
 
Figure 3.4 The organizational position of Hana Center 
Seeing the success of some model Hana Centers in 2009, the government quickly 
expanded the system nationwide. As of 2014, Hana Centers have opened in thirty-one 
locations. Though the appointment of Hana Centers is new, the agencies and personnel are 
not new service providers. The majority of Hana Centers throughout the nation have 
previous experience providing service to North Koreans.  
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Table 3.4 Organizational history of Hana Centers 
Province/city  Hana Center Organization   Significance  
Seoul  Eastern Red Cross Seoul branch  
. Western Social Center  
. Southern Social Center  
. Northern Social Center  
Busan Busan YWCA  Christian NGO 
Incheon Southeastern Social Center  
. Bupyeong Social Center  
Daegu Daegu North Korean immigrants support 
Center 
NGO (international) 
Daejeon Daejeon Social Center  
Ulsan Ulsan Social Center  
Gwangju Western North Korean immigrants support 
Center 
NGO 
Gwangju Northern Red Cross Gwangju/Jeonnam 
branch 
 
Gyeongki Eastern Social Center  
. Central Social Center  
. Western Social Center  
. Northern Counseling education Center for 
youth and parents 
Education agency 
. Southern Cultural Center for adolescents NGO 
. Northwestern  Woorim welfare  
Gangwon Eastern Self-help Center  
. Western Jayoo Chongyeonmaeng Political organization 
. Western Social Center  
Chungbuk  Chungbuk Red Cross   
Chungnam Northwestern Ssangyong welfare Center  
. South-central  Jayoo Chong  Political organization 
Jeonbuk  Jeonbuk YWCA Christian NGO  
Jeonnam Jeonnam Red Cross   
Gyeongbuk  Eastern Social Center  
. Northwestern Center for immigrants  NGO 
Gyeongnam Eastern Red Cross   
. Western Red Cross  
Jeju Jeju Red Cross    
 
As Table 3.4 reveals, Hana Centers have diverse histories, as many used to be local 
social Centers run by the Red Cross; faith-based organizations; or, in rare cases, political 
organizations. For instance, Wonju Hana Center was a Buddhist-based social Center 
serving the local population, whereas Daegu Hana Center was an international NGO 
helping North Koreans in the region from a humanitarian perspective and Seoul Bukbu 
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Hana Center used to be a local social center. The service was operated based on different 
religious, political and ethical standpoints: but their being “social centers” seems to be the 
main incentive for the government to designate them as the main service agency for the 
North Korean settlers.  
 
Semi-governmental and semi-civil Hana Centers – In pursuit of flexibility and efficiency    
By definition, a Hana Center is an institution that contracts for services 
(minganwitak민간위탁) and that definition serves as its identity in both its governmental 
and non-governmental functions. It is expected to operate in a flexibly efficient way, taking 
benefit from both its designations – civil and state – in delivering service. As expected, 
Hana Centers cannot be homogenous agencies, as they maintain their own traditions and 
customs of service operation, philosophy, networking, and work relationships. In addition 
to the heterogeneity the organization possesses due to the Centers’ diverse histories and 
institutional structures, the staff members of Hana Centers across the country also have 
diverse perspectives and work experiences, as they all worked for North Korean settlers 
before the organization was appointed to become a Hana Center.      
Because Hana Centers contract for services, they are expected to follow the same 
basic structure: the central government plans and supplies the service activities and funds, 
and the civil organizations provide service content - preferably in person and in a 
designated local area. Banding together with popular social enterprise projects that began 
during the Lee administration, the Hana Centers’ transformation is not unfamiliar in the 
North Korean service area. Instead, Hana Centers are the actualization of the government’s 
strategy of utilizing preexisting local resources and networks rather than providing direct 
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government service to North Koreans (Ministry of Unification 2013). As we see in the 
background histories of each Hana Center, most Centers are equipped with knowledge 
about resource management and networking, and also about service delivery to North 
Koreans in the local area. Despite the diversity of their organizational histories, the Hana 
Centers by and large maintain networks to maximize their service efficacy; and find 
resources to operate on their own. With the benefits they receive as civil organizations, 
Hana Centers can flexibly utilize local networks and resources. On the other hand, since 
they have become national and government organizations, they can assure accountability 
for their clients. Sociologist Jin Woong Kang (2011) asserts that the organizational form 
of governing represents a change from the hierarchically controlling and politically intense 
style to a more “cooperatively disciplinary” style between the government and civil society 
in dealing with North Koreans. In its treatment of North Koreans, the administration is 
characterized as rational yet humanistic, despite micro-regulatory aspects (J.W.Kang 
2011,192; See also S.J. Kim 2012). According to Kang’s observation, the example of the 
Hana Centers can be seen as a cooperative operation between the state and non-state actors, 
yet accommodating different dimensions of disciplines. While the assertion that Hana 
Centers’ operations are “cooperatively disciplinary” is disputable, what the state does 
pursue is efficient use of government revenue, cutting down social costs by co-opting civil 
resources, and increasing a bureaucratic structure focused on consulting and supervising. 
This trend of the government’s co-optation of civil force is not uncommon in the current 
international arena (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Clarke 1998; Harbeson, Chazan 
and Rothchild 1996; Kamat 2004; Ong 2006; Postero 2006), owing to the shrinking sector 
of government welfare service to minorities and NGOs’ transformation favoring stability 
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and security over challenging the system. The South Korean case of refugee resettlement 
agencies displays these sorts of features, particularly in the post-IMF period,19 with its own 
historical relationships between the state and civil society (Joo 2007; H.R. Kim 2000; Koo 
2002; Kim and Moon 2000) and the recent governments’ attempts to reduce welfare costs 
for social minorities (E.Kim 2009; J.Song 2009).  
 
Organizational structure of Hana Centers : vertical and horizontal governance      
Each Hana Centers’ operation is theoretically up to its autonomous capacity and 
resources, but in large part, they all have to follow the supervision of the Ministry of 
Unification. The Ministry of Unification and the regional/local governments have the 
voting power to designate an organization as a Hana Center: and the Ministry of 
Unification, or more specifically the Hana Foundation, is in charge of conducting the 
evaluation and supervision of each Center. The Ministry of Unification then delegates most 
of the administrative tasks to the Hana Foundation, which is a partnership institution that 
serves as both a civil and state agency. Nominally the headquarters and supervising agency 
of all Hana Centers, the Hana Foundation promotes itself with a specific kind of moral and 
operational outlook. Its main operations are listed as 1) initial resettlement support, 2) self-
sufficiency and independence support (employment support), 3) educational support and 
research, 4) networking and raising awareness, and 5) administration. Its organizational 
attributes as both state and civil agency disclose seemingly dissonant elements in the 
display of its identity: campaigning, organizing activity-based advertisements for civil 
                                                          
19 Ministry of Unification (2012) has publicly announced Hana centers are established in a form 
of active “public and private partnership.”   
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support, awareness and fund raising at one end; and carrying out legal and administrative 
tasks at the other.  
The emblem of the Foundation includes components proposing warm interest and 
care, freedom and peace, and unification as its values. These values are iconized in the 
shapes of a heart, a dove and the Taegeuk  (태극)mark20. Such affective description of the 
agency is exemplified in its representative materials, such as pictures of government 
officials’ helping activities, formal and informal meetings, and civic-participatory events.    
 
 Figure 3.5 Hana Foundation Emblem (Hana Foundation 2015) 
 
In addition, the Foundation established its brand as “ChakHan” (착한) which 
generally means “good” and “nice/kind” in Korean; but the Foundation created a new 
meaning of “settling in South Korea” by intentionally using Chinese characters. Chak (착) 
means “settle down,” and Han (한) means Republic of Korea. As the word commonly 
entails a moral capacity in Korean, it tries to draw public support by applying neutrally 
good morality to both the service providers and their clients. In other words, the Foundation 
deliberately applied this brand to the service area to give itself a positive image with 
                                                          
20 Taegeuk usually signifies Korean nation, or the Korean state.  
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morally good service intentions, and to give North Koreans a harmless image, by calling 
them “good” and “well-settled” people. Thus the North Korean subjectivity highlighted 
here is that of well-settled, successfully-adjusted people who follow ethical and social 
principles, as well as the political and economic norms of South Korean society. By calling 
them “good,” the Foundation aims to wipe away the negative images of North Koreans as 
former citizens of a communist country, poor and disadvantaged and thus possibly 
generating social problems. Therefore, it has to dress the North Korean image as a morally 
harmless and unthreatening figure while nevertheless relying on an incident that is yet to 
come: national unification. Since national unification has been consistently equated – via 
highly emotional rhetoric - with moral “goodness” for the Korean nation, it does not need 
further explanation to the public. National unification still denotes something that must be 
desired and pursued in order to recover ethnic homogeneity in South Korean society 
(Grinker 1998). Thus it accentuates North Korean subjectivity as a future-oriented human 
resource for national unification. The people whom the Hana Foundation advertise as 
“successful” resettlement cases are North Korean entrepreneurs, young North Koreans who 
succeeded in graduating from good colleges, and those who overcome all the difficulties 
of settling in South Korea.  
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Figure 3.6 Introduction of Hana Foundation's "ChakHan" brand21 
Here in this introductory image, the Foundation refers to these exemplary North 
Koreans as “good neighbors” who are in the process of preparing for unification.22 I have 
translated the flow of sentences as follows: 1) North Koreans are a valuable resource to 
prepare for practical unification in the future, and 2) we have made many brave attempts 
so far, by focusing on the self-sufficiency and independence of North Koreans rather than 
on material support. 3) For North Koreans to play the role of a bridge to a unified Korea, 
we need to support them to be successful in their own right. However, it depends on us “to 
make them either North Koreans dwelling in the past or the protagonists for future 
unification.”  
These remarks are linked to an employment site and regional career fair. Clearly, 
this representation emphasizes economic independence, as the method by which North 
                                                          
21 North Koreans as "good neighbors" (Source: http://www.koreahana.or.kr/goodstory.do accessed in March, 
2015) 
 
22 In the introduction of its logo, the Foundation even mentions North Koreans as “us” a designation which 
is even more radical than “neighbor” or “brother.” The logo is “From Brethren to Us (dongpoeseo wooriro 
동포에서 우리로)” as it signifies North Koreans as part of “us.”  
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Koreans can become useful human resources for national unification. This representation 
also tries to convince its audience of the need for South Korean service providers to make 
concentrated efforts in helping North Koreans to become employed. This rationale is 
common in institutional engagements with North Korean settlers; they underline 
employment exclusively without mentioning all the other aspects of life, namely politics, 
social systems and culture. As a whole, institutional support has reduced direct support for 
North Koreans in terms of material and cash benefits, while the budget has ballooned to 
finance establishing support Centers, recruiting counselors and social workers, aiding 
social enterprises and providing job training to give North Koreans self-sufficiency. 
Through this new method of oversight by discipline and consultation, the state aims to 
create a morally good subject of a capitalist society who does not make trouble and who is 
employable, culturally well-mannered, and independent.  
The strategies that the Foundation takes for “contributing to the creation of a 
unification environment and self-support of North Koreans” are “outcome and future-
oriented service provision through selective and concentrated effort,” “client-centered, 
customized support,” and  “increased efficiency through collaboration with other agencies.” 
These terms represent the obvious trademarks of a market society and the neoliberal style 
of government, which stresses self-sufficiency, is client-based, outcome-oriented and 
striving for efficiency. In a nutshell, the Foundation presents itself as an efficient, outcome- 
and future-oriented agency pursuing the creation of “good” North Koreans who will 
become self-sufficient through the South Korean service providers’ warm hearts and care.   
Since the year 2011, after changing its organization from an aid association (Hoowonhoi 
후원회) to a foundation (Jaedan 재단), its financial and functional operations have 
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changed to those of a more formal state agency. The organization consists of seven 
departments; management, planning, networking, self-sufficiency support, living support, 
education development and finance departments. The organizational budget is now 10 
times the size it was before (Ukorea news 2012).23 With approximately 28 billion won (28 
million USD), it is placing one fifth of the Ministry of Unification’s annual budget on 
resettlement support for North Koreans. It is safe to say that the Foundation has made large 
gains in authority and legitimacy from the government in its service to North Koreans over 
the years.  
  Structure-wise, there are several departments in the Hana Foundation to supervise 
and manage the evaluation of each Hana Center, to provide education and training 
materials, and to network with various kinds of institutions. The Living Support department 
at the Foundation trains and appoints the counselors for Hana Centers, and it is in charge 
of those counselors’ employment, an element of potential conflict with the local Hana 
Centers. The Networking department is in charge of convening regular meetings of the 
representatives of each Hana Center, and of providing training materials and manuals. The 
Management department superintends Hana Centers’ financial planning (Foundation 
2015)24. Additionally, as the website says, Hana Center is designed to act as a national 
platform actualizing a “collaborative model” in the service area with diverse actors:25 
governmental ministries, Hanawon, Hana Centers, The Republic of Korea National Red 
Cross, NGOs, The Committee for 5 Northern Korean Provinces (ibuk5dowiwonhoi  
이북 5 도위원회), The National Unification Advisory Council and the Presidential 
                                                          
23 http://www.ukoreanews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=281 
24 The Hana Foundation http://www.koreahana.or.kr/eGovHanaOrg.do  (accessed 2015-03-10) 
25 The Hana Foundation http://www.koreahana.or.kr/eGovHanaMOUInfo1.do (accessed 2015-03-
10) 
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Committee for National Cohesion. As the characteristics of these institutions infer, they 
are of diverse levels and types: governmental, non-governmental, volunteer-based NGOs, 
community-based NGOs, social centers and governmental settlement centers. 
Additionally, all of them have significantly different histories, and their functions and 
populations served are distinctively disparate.   
Through these operations, each Hana Center is under the supervision of the Hana 
Foundation and the Ministry of Unification; and each also works collaboratively with 
local/regional governments for its regular funding, evaluation process and resource 
utilization. Local/regional governments usually assign a person whose primary 
responsibility involves increasing employment and oversight. However, the personnel who 
are in charge of these tasks normally do not develop close personal relationships with North 
Korean settlers in the region. The staff in the local governments – municipal or district 
office – exhibit high turnover, which does not guarantee the most knowledgeable and 
efficient service provision to the group. Moreover, during my fieldwork, I learned that the 
range and the contents of the service provision are up to a city mayor or provincial 
governor’s “enthusiasm and interest.” High- profile officials who are interested in offering 
more benefits to North Koreans and who are genuinely concerned about the social issues 
related to their lives in South Korea are likely to give more support than others. Thus the 
local governments’ operations on North Koreans are contingent upon high-profile officials’ 
wills and opinions rather than on policy, paperwork, and legal stipulations. Nevertheless, 
local governments are still supposed to work in collaboration with Hana Centers. 
Particularly when a Hana Center has a reputation of being professional and efficient, a local 
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government will show more cooperative gestures and become involved with service 
activities.  
The funding for a Hana Center comes from several sources, mainly the Ministry of 
Unification, local and regional governments, and other donors. The Ministry stipulates the 
size of funding as around 0.2 billion won (approx. 200,000 USD) for each Hana Center. 
The appointment of Hana Centers is also under the government’s custody. The conditions 
of appointment as a Hana Center are based on several categories: the previous experience 
and achievement of the organization, the quality of the staff and education facility, and the 
overall networking and access to resource from the local communities. The Ministry of 
Unification lists the qualifications for the appointment as follows (Ministry of Unification 
2015).  
 
Table 3.5 Qualifications for Hana Center Assignment 
(1) Previous experience and achievement  
 *at least a year of consistent experience and outcomes  
(2) Interest and experience of the representatives about North Korean resettlement 
service  
(3) Quality of staff and volunteers (minimum 10)  
(4) Financial stability and ability to secure funding  
(5) Educational facilities (training space, counseling office, conference room, restroom 
etc.)  
(6) Access to educational facilities (by public transportation)  
(7) Collaborative ability to recruit resources in the local communities  
(8) Efficacy and comprehensiveness of service planning  
(9) Potential of the regional/local government for collaboration and interest  
This contract of designation is valid for three years, after which each Center is 
obliged to be reevaluated. Hana Centers are expected to follow certain policies and 
restrictions that the central government imposes, even though Hana Center staff do not 
necessarily see themselves as employees of governmental agencies. Although no policy 
studies have addressed this issue yet, the workers’ identity of Hana Center staff is a 
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complex issue, because providing service to their clients involves both political and ethical 
dimensions, as I will deal with later in this dissertation. The three-year contract was 
intended to guarantee quality and competitive service to North Koreans using local 
resources, which tend to fluctuate according to circumstances. Thus, each Hana Center is 
expected to work hard to achieve certain standardized goals, and at the same time to ensure 
the Center’s funding and operational stability. However, this form of contract and the 
designation as a Hana Center itself can lead to complications issues several areas of service 
operation: conflict between the national supervising agency (such as the Ministry of 
Unification/Hana Foundation) and the Center in terms of staff hire, foci of service 
provision, and work hierarchy; the identity of workers and the representation of the Centers 
to the clients as both governmental and non-governmental agencies (which can be a point 
of misunderstanding and conflict); the relationships with local/regional governments, 
NGOs and other individual actors; and internal conflict among the workers.   
Therefore, each Hana Center is obligated to undertake all of the following:  
1) Take part in the regular meetings with other Hana Centers under the supervision 
of the Hana Foundation  
2) Turn in monthly/yearly reports to the Hana Foundation, local/regional 
government, and the Ministry of Unification  
3) Collaborate with police officers/Hanawon/municipal and district government’s 
assigned workers for North Koreans  
4) Take part in a consortium (local committee) meeting   
5) When hiring staff and making position changes, use  a different hiring system 
for counselors and social workers  
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  The standardized supervision and appointment by higher level institutions can 
make each Hana Center susceptible to tight budgeting, heavy documentation of work and 
scheduling conflicts. Furthermore, the Center’s own missions and agenda must yield to the 
standard evaluation criteria.  
On the other hand, Hana Centers are supposed to serve as a local polestar where the 
information and networks of all the service actors are concentrated and distributed at the 
same time. The kind of horizontal governance is put stress on Hana Centers’ operations, 
since they are the epitome of “local governance,” which implies particular socio-cultural 
values: being democratic, autonomous, and providing equal participation for all the actors 
rather than having a top-down and hierarchical management. From an economic 
perspective, Hana Centers’ local governance serves to reduce the state’s cost for 
administration and resource management. With the Hana Centers’ local knowledge and 
wider networks in their individual regions, this management structure connotes better 
resource recruitment and efficient operation. In the service area for North Koreans 
particularly, where over-competition; redundant service activities; and manipulation by 
ideological, political and religious interests have been identified, the qualities of being 
local, practical-needs based, and better connected with local resources are particularly 
appealing in the recent welfare governance of South Korea. As it is shown in the categories 
for appointment, the organizations that Hana Centers deal with are central government 
ministries, local government such as provincial/municipal/district governments, police 
departments, Hanawon, the Hana Foundation, and non-state and local/trans-local service 
providers such as welfare Centers, schools, district offices, NGOs and churches. The scope 
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of actual “networking” can be immensely wide, as the Centers are commissioned as semi-
state agencies specially designed for North Korean resettlement.     
Therefore, the dual organizational positions of Hana Centers as government and 
non-government organizations continually pose questions, conflicts and confusion in 
service provision, while they do serve certain purposes. The way each Center manages 
these dual positions in its daily interactions with its clients, supervisory institutions, and 
partners draws us into a distinctive phenomenon taking place in current-day Korea. The 
ambiguous and ambivalent identities of Hana Centers ironically provide them with rich 
sources for the actors in service provision to enact their own mediation and elaboration of 
desired social agenda, through affective and equivocal works. The next chapter will 
illuminate how the affective dimension of service provision to North Koreans is presented 
through day-to-day service operations.
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CHAPTER 4 
AFFECT-LADEN SERVICE DELIVERY FOR NORTH KOREANS IN HANA 
CENTERS’ PROGRAMS 
As examined in the chapter 3, the Hana Centers are hybrid state, civil society 
organizations. They are also local as well as trans-local (national) agencies. The mixed 
characteristics of the Centers give rise to distinctive dynamics in the delivery of services, 
particularly regarding their affective and symbolic representations. This chapter will 
discuss how various forms of affective interactions become present through a specific 
mode of governing and a mode of interactions between the service providers and the 
recipients. The modus operandi of Hana Centers, individualization and standardization of 
services, set forth particular dynamics of affective interaction and governing. These 
affective elements are also entangled with the imaginaries and practices of “the national” 
and “the local” institutions, as each institution brings to the fore different foci in their 
service provision. The two main operational modes, however, do not necessarily function 
in opposition to each other. The following discussion will demonstrate how the seemingly 
contrasting modes of service operation work together in actuality, and eventually serve 
broader interests and politics of the state.      
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4.1 HANA CENTERS’ MODUS OPERANDI: STANDARDIZATION AND INDIVIDUALIZATION 
The establishment of Hana Centers was a result of the critiques about the North Korean 
service area: overlapping and disorderly arranged service contents for North Koreans, poor 
resource management, over competition and lack of efficiency. Since the mid-1990s, the 
North Korean service area has been saturated with many forms of service, material support, 
human resource investment and NGOs’ figure prominently. Hundreds of regional and 
transnational NGOs flocked to “rescue,” or “support” North Korean defectors in and out 
of the South Korean territory arguing with a voice of humanitarianism and call for brotherly 
love. The NGOs authorized by the government and registered as relevant agencies for 
North Koreans number more than 50, as of 2012. As Korean anthropologist Byung Ho 
Chung depicted the situation, the amount of support provided to North Koreans is 
“unprecedented for any refugee group in the world” (B.Chung 2009,10).  
For solving the problems of disorderly, inconsistent and overlapping service 
delivery, Hana Centers were set up to perform as the regional polestar to concentrate the 
services and centralize communication among different actors. With organizational 
stability and accountability as national service agencies and with locally-based knowledge 
and resources as local agencies, the Centers are supposed to provide the idealized services 
with their loving care for North Koreans. As is known by the scholarly and policy work, 
North Koreans are also the subjects who need thorough care due to being complete 
strangers to the country and being “deprived of psychological capacities” to become 
responsible citizens (Sung 2010, 127). Each North Korean individual needs to be handled 
in a careful way, as their human capital, mental and physical capacity and migration 
backgrounds are all different from each other. This is what Foucault deemed “care of the 
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population” (Foucault 1991) that has to be performed in an individualized way to increase 
efficacy and efficiency. As reviewed earlier, integrating North Koreans to South Korean 
society has been performed rather complicated and ambivalent ways as previous 
scholarship has discussed (Bell 2013; Choo 2006; B. Chung 2006; J.Jung 2010; H.Lee 
2012; J.Lee 2015; Sung 2010; I.Yoon 2011). On the policy level, however, the Centers are 
called to provide “total care” for North Koreans, aiming for a full integration into society 
in an efficient and prompt manner.26   
 To achieve these goals, Hana Centers operate according to two main organizational 
logics: 1) taking care of North Koreans with individualized, localized delivery attending to 
their needs; 2) standardizing service provision to North Korean clients on a national level. 
These two poles of operational development are designed to concentrate services into the 
Hana Centers for efficient local resource management, as they reduce unnecessary steps 
and service items. Individualization of care means that South Korean providers categorize 
the client's needs in order to provide optimal services. Standardization signifies that the 
state tries to reduce gaps in resources and rationales among the different regions. 
Continuing from the last chapter on the institutions’ dual identity as both state and civil, I 
will look into how the modus operandi of standardization and individualization works and 
fails in the institutional context.  
Furthermore, I will attempt to link these operational logics to both the affective and 
symbolic expressions of service delivery. Continued from earlier discussions on affect, I 
follow Spinoza’s idea of affect and Deleuze and Guattari’s development of the theory, 
viewing affect as constitutive of bodies that are to affect and to be affected, where 
                                                          
26 Ministry of Unification, media briefing  
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1557&mode=view&cid=14036  
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interactive and connective dimensions are underscored (Anderson 2009; Clough 2007; 
Massumi 1995; 2002; Seyfert 2012). In this sense, bodily experiences are constantly 
defined and reconstituted through various forms of affective interactions, such as non-
cognitive components (Thrift 2000), atmospheres (Bredekamp 2010; Brennan 2004), 
psychological dimensions or something beyond human senses (Bennet 2005). As Thrift 
(2008) suggests, this study delves into the points where various technologies and affective 
interactions are combined and made visible in the institutional space. In doing so, this 
chapter particularly focuses on how the specific governing at Hana Centers can be 
addressed in the framework of affect. The study also suggests to see the space of 
interactions between the service providers and recipients not merely imagined as a 
unidirectional governing imposed on the population, but as an open-ended space where 
new entities and new configurations of power are constantly constituted.    
  To analyze these focal points, I will investigate 1) bureaucratic statements and 
official policy to enhance efficiency and organization; 2) the delivery of affective service 
at Hana Centers to pursue the goals through programs; 3) affective rhetoric and practices 
of Hana Centers' everyday operations; and 4) lastly, what the institutional politics and 
practices mean to a larger discussion of ethical and technological powers. 
  
4.2 SERVICE PROGRAMS AT HANA CENTERS  
Service provision at Hana Centers is comprised of three different elements: a local 
social adaptation program (initial education program), a counseling/settlement helper 
system, and other welfare services, such as housing, employment, education, medical 
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support etc. Below I describe what each element is and how Hana Centers implement the 




Local Hana Centers are in charge of North Koreans’ initial settlement in the region, 
which first starts with guiding the clients to their houses. Centers compile all clients’ 
information in terms of incoming and outgoing population to predict flows of people to 
better tailor future services.  
For delivering the service, the Centers usually circulate information relevant to 
North Koreans’ social needs in the realms of education, medical services, or job options. 
Also, a large part of a Center’s service activities is helping clients apply for matching grants 
and scholarships provided by diverse kinds of organizations – churches, local NGOs, local 
government, etc. The Seoul Center provides information and receives applications online, 
whereas at the Wonju Center the clients usually call the social workers and visit the Center 
for help filling out the forms and making sure the process is done right. A typical scene 
would involve a couple of North Koreans coming to the Center and to consult with social 
workers when filling out institutional forms. The social workers would walk each client 
through the process and make sure to have the administrative documents filled out correctly 
so that the clients receive the right kinds of benefits.  
  Among these aforementioned services, employment support is most highlighted 
in public representations at each Center. Given that the majority of scholarly and policy 
literature discusses the problems and challenges North Koreans face when it comes to 
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working, it is predictable that government Centers would focus on employment support 
programs (Park and Yoon 2007; Sun et al. 2005). The government runs a separate 
department and a webpage for job seekers and openings, showing a concentrated effort to 
support North Koreans’ employment.27 Career support programs are comprised of four 
main parts in overall settlement support packages: 1) job training and introductions through 
individual consultancy or job fairs 2) the Ministry of Labor engages in linking the clients 
with job training Centers and bridging career programs 3) assigning 55 specialized officers 
to local employment support Centers to guide North Koreans in finding jobs and 4) the 
government subsidy of North Koreans’ salaries (Hana Foundation 2014).28 Employment 
support programs are also where the neoliberal mantra of self-sufficiency and self-reliance 
is the most highlighted. The Hana Foundation describes career support as “an 
individualized job training and bridging career program to encourage North Koreans’ self-
sufficiency and self-support.” This presents the state’s belief that North Koreans’ self-
sufficiency is best achieved by placing them in jobs. This makes more sense to the 
bureaucratic apparatus, since jobs are computable and assessable; not to mention that North 
Koreans’ participation in economic activities means generating profits. However, job 
training for North Koreans receives criticism, because programs are limited and only 
include computer-related certificates, training for driver’s licenses, and caretaking or 
cooking certificates. Nevertheless, the financial rewards of employment look quite 
appealing to North Koreans. Subsidized job training and employment seems to work for 
                                                          
27 The webpage is http://www.nkrf.net/customer/info02.jsp   
28 Hana Foundation, introduction of career support system. 
http://www.koreahana.or.kr/eGovHanaInst3.do  
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some clients, if not all. These programs are expected to expand further, as they seem easily 
measurable and appealing to government officials than other programs.  
Invariably, I heard that the Centers’ foremost task was to inform the clients of job 
opportunities and provide them with enough resources to help with employment. Even 
during my interviews with staff at the Seoul Bukbu Center, this assistance was regarded as 
natural and necessary. However, while the Centers present employment support as the 
foremost urgency, the Wonju and Seoul Bukbu Hana Centers’ approaches are different. 
The staff’s response and their presentation of important issues show this distinctiveness, 
and they were unexpected since I considered them to be armed with the rhetoric that the 
state stresses over and over.   
 
 “Park: I know you guys are mostly focusing on employment and job training 
programs. 
Staff: (with a smile) That’s what the Ministry of Unification cares about.  
Park: You mean, the Ministry of Unification only? Not the Wonju Center?  
Staff: I’d say yes... (with a laugh) I cannot speak for other workers, but if I can speak 
out of years of my experience, I think the psychological condition and cultural 
adjustment are the most important things, if they (North Koreans) are planning to stay 
here longer. Even those people who have been staying here and working longer still 
have problems and conflicts with people because of the cultural understandings.”  
 
The staff at Wonju talked to me in an honest and personal way when I asked about 
operational aspects of the Center’s service delivery. This was quite different from the Seoul 
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Center, where the staff members told me that employment and initial education program 
are their top priorities. In the Wonju Center, the employment element was still deemed 
important, but it was rarely a central agenda during my formal and informal interviews. In 
the Center’s published material, it also stipulates that the primary goal for North Koreans 
to achieve is, “being a desirable and proud citizen of the community.” One instance also 
shows the Wonju Center’s focus as being citizens who can live harmoniously with locals.   
 
“I kind of gave a hint to the speakers who are invited and have been working stably 
for a long time, by asking them to deliver a message like ‘you cannot just live by settlement 
subsidy from the government. To hold up the dignity and be proud, you should find a job 
and continue working in one place.’ Also I ask them to give the audience more concrete 
examples” - a social worker at Wonju Hana Center    
 
This staff member asked invited speakers to speak more forcefully on the 
importance of being employed for a North Korean to be a good and dignified citizen of the 
community, which is related to a moral aspect of the citizenship, rather than an economic 
citizenry. This staff also expressed the limits of the scope of service provisions that Hana 
Centers can provide, and she believed that the Hana Center’s services need to be geared 
towards psychological and ethical operations, such as giving North Koreans motivation, 
and encouraging them to become fully integrated citizens in the local society. Apart from 
giving clients detailed information and knowledge about career, education, or more capital-
building categories, the Wonju Center tries to devise programs in a way that their clients 
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feel comfortable, motivated, and competent in the city. Living comfortably and blending 
well with community members are taken more seriously in a small community like Wonju.   
I participated in some programs at Wonju Hana Center, such as Korean and Chinese 
language classes and theatrical play workshops. According to the staff at Wonju Center, 
Korean and Chinese language certificate prep classes were designed for North Koreans to 
be equipped with the proper standard Korean language to understand the society and to 
communicate well, and to feel self-esteem through preparing for a certificate of the much-
needed foreign language. The theatrical play workshops designed by the Center focused 
on creative and interactive dimensions, rather than “practical” and material help. The 
workshops, however, were not popular and eventually did not last for long. They were also 
at the danger of being cut off from the main programs for North Koreans owing to the 
uncertainty of government funding. The most wanted class was Chinese language class – 
North Korean clients were passionate, and engaged participants, which certainly seemed 
to boost their self-esteem and confidence. I could observe that Wonju Center’s staff were 
particularly interested in raising self-confidence, increasing the chance of interacting with 
South Korean neighbors, and in increasing cultural knowledge. They rejoiced when the 
clients’ turnout was good but lamented about the closure of certain service programs to 
satisfy the nationally standardized evaluations, which determine the continuation of 
funding.   
 Wonju Hana Center’s service programs and the foci in service delivery are 
examples of localized services for North Koreans. In terms of devising programs, Wonju 
Hana Center focuses more on the cultural and psychological integration of North Koreans, 
rather than information offering and skill acquisition, whereas Seoul Hana Center focuses 
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more on increasing employment and advertising job opportunities. This can arguably be 
attributed to two different localities in relation to proximity of “the Center” and the size of 
the target group for services. The Seoul Center has to offer programs applicable to higher 
number of North Korean clients, while the Wonju Center can afford to be more liberal 
designing programs owing to the small resident population of North Koreans. The 
proximity to the central government, and the organizational position that the Seoul Center 
possesses seem to create more pressure to the workers to meet the standards and to be 
representative of the Hana Centers across the country.   
 
Settlement Helper / Counseling  
 
“You are asked to follow the state’s policy and the Center’s instructions and respect 
their supervision and opinion: a settlement helper’s tasks are closely related with 
human rights, national policy and inter-Korea relations, so that the activities need to 
comply to the national policy and rules, processes and standards of the Centers.” 
(Ministry of Unification, Manual for Settlement Helpers 2010,14)   
 
The settlement helper system is one of the core practices for the “individualized 
care” that the Ministry of Unification purports to achieve, but is implemented on a national 
scale. It started in 2005 with a nationwide call to support North Koreans more personally 
and locally (Hana Foundation 2011). All Centers are encouraged to provide a civil 
volunteer workforce, therefore, it is part of standardization of the service provision by the 
state as well. Under the supervision of Hana Foundation, some NGOs were chosen to be in 
114 
charge of recruiting volunteers to help North Koreans settle in the region. The settlement 
helpers are called to serve national purposes: be mindful of human rights, fraternity, inter-
Korea relations and national policy and rules. These rather grandiose statements are hard 
to explain, as they do not specify the elements of each agenda. 
  Seoul Bukbu Hana Center voices similar assertions on the roles that settlement 
helpers are supposed to play, as it introduces settlement helpers mainly as local guides who 
can assist North Koreans in the community.29 Below is the first page of the guideline, 
published by Hana Foundation. This exemplifies what the settlement helpers are supposed 
to bear in mind when dealing with North Koreans. 
 
1) I will support North Koreans in enjoying freedom and living with hope as 
democratic citizens who fulfill their social responsibilities and duties. 
2) I will try hard to enable South Korean citizens to accept North Koreans as neighbors 
without prejudice.  
3) I will help North Koreans very closely to grow as desirable citizens of the society, 
with hope and dreams.  
4) I will make an effort for South and North Koreans to accept differences and 
accomplish the integration of Korean ethnic nationals.  
5) I will work for national and ethnic unification with brotherly love.  
6) I will work for world peace and the happiness of humankind by practicing 
humanitarianism.  
                                                          
29 Seoul Bukbu Hana Center’s introduction of settlement helpers 
http://www.gnnkcenter.or.kr/Business/Incomer.aspx  
115 
7) I will practice and learn to love North Koreans for their resettlement here in South 
Korea.  
 
In this oath for settlement helpers, both affective and ethical dimensions of ethnic 
homogeneity, fraternity and humanitarianism are displayed. Even though the settlement 
helpers are expected to provide warm and humane caring for each individual North Korean, 
the rhetoric has a strong sense of nationalism and depicts South Korean service providers 
as dutiful citizens. To make North Koreans well-integrated and desirable citizens, 
settlement helpers need to have “brotherly love” and a “humanitarian” mindset without any 
prejudice. This echoes the Hana Foundation’s public rhetoric that “we need to guide them 
well to be good citizens.” The oath shows specific socio-cultural values that North Koreans 
need to embody through the intervention of service providers: responsibility, freedom, 
democratic citizenship, hope, and dreams. These are significantly capitalist South Korean 
values, which Center on individual responsibility, positivity and autonomous effort. Words 
such as "freedom" and "democratic citizens" deliberately indicate counter-values to those 
of communist North Korea, with its presumed surveillance, regulation, and stiffness. In 
this oath, North Koreans are already imagined and presented as homogenized subjects, 
whose construction of subjectivity is subject to socio-political powers of capitalism, anti-
communism, ethnic nationalism, and the South Korean version of democracy. In this way, 
North Korean issues are invariably cast as ones that need state intervention and institutional 
engagement, rather than merely being an issue of local integration. Apart from the 
introductory and general remarks about North Koreans as “us” and as part of the same 
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ethnic group, these statements show, ironically, how different North Koreans are from 
South Koreans.  
 In 2012, the Hana Foundation handed its consignment power over to the individual 
Hana Centers. Other than social workers and counselors, settlement helpers are the 
institutional workers – albeit unpaid – who work most closely with North Koreans and 
contribute to carving a specific North Korean citizenship. They are asked to adhere strictly 
to Ministry of Unification and their Hana Center’s instructions and supervision, as they are 
also representatives of governmental service provision. The Hana Foundation also 
underlines that settlement helpers are expected to 1) build a collaborative relationship with 
the police officers who are in charge of “protecting” North Koreans, 2) solve residence-
related issues, and 3) provide information on the local community and guidance for new 
community members (Hana Foundation 2011:56). These statements are more “neutrality” 
centered remarks as they, at least on the surface level, do not embed value-oriented 
assertions. In several kinds of published materials, the state invariably expresses the 
expectation that settlement helpers will play the role of close caretakers who can guide 
North Koreans’ local lives.   
Represented below is the settlement helpers’ training material. Training materials 
include institutional dos and don’ts, specifically in terms of what areas the semi-state 
institutions must focus on, and how such institutions choose to distribute resources for 
service providers and recipients. In each Center, these training programs are required and 
regarded as essential steps for both regular and voluntary service providers to recognize 
the Center’s main provisional programs of care and to identify the scope and limits of 
service activities. A training book describes the settlement helper system, and a small 
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plastic-coated memorandum details the specific tasks needed on the first and second day 
that a client moves in. Additional guidance and training were provided during monthly 
meetings. The orientation meetings covered many topics. The first meeting was an overall 
introduction to the imagined characteristics of North Korean settlers, while the others 
focused on other topics, including things to be wary/watchful of owing to “cultural 
differences” between the settlement helpers and the North Korean service recipients. In the 
orientation material that the Seoul Bukbu Center provided, things to be wary of are 
categorized as follows:  
 
Table 4.1 A guideline for settlement helpers 
1) Personal info and security 
2) Religion  
3) Job  
4) Expect to be stood up for an appointment  
5) Encourage them to be self-sufficient  
6) Play the role of friends or family members  
7) In viewing North Koreans  - it’s wrong to view them as inferior to South Koreans 
8) Keep track of monthly reports  
9) Financial interactions are prohibited  
10) In case any particular things happen 
11) Responsibility.  
The list can be grouped into sections that exhibit three different dimensions. The 
first three categories give information on subjects to be aware of. The next four are cultural 
lessons to help service providers understand North Koreans’ behavior. The final four are 
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mostly about bureaucratic processes and duties. Jobs and religions are characterized as part 
of “private lives,” and settlement helpers are expected to merely relay information as 
“information transporters.” The last four categories, 8 through 11, point to what settlement 
helpers are expected to do for the bureaucratic operation of the Hana Center as an 
institution.  
Digging into the details, the first part of the manual for settlement helpers has an 
informative tone. The helpers' job is “letting North Korean clients know” about kinds of 
things, in terms of jobs and religions that are categorized as “private lives.” Settlement 
helpers were expected to simply relay information as “information transporters.” They 
were not to encourage North Koreans to join any specific religious groups or participate in 
any security-compromising activities, particularly those related to helpers’ personal 
opinions. Categories 4 through 7 present more social and cultural guidelines for settlement 
helpers to follow, but they also show selected characteristics of North Koreans to be 
corrected. Settlement helpers are supposed to take active roles in teaching cultural and 
moral lessons. The last four categories, 8 through 11, point to what settlement helpers are 
expected to do as part of the bureaucratic operations of the Hana Center as an institution. 
Settlement helpers need to keep track of monthly reports, reporting any problems directly 
to the social workers who double as the settlement helpers’ supervisors. Settlement helpers 
are asked to be part of the bureaucratic system, making detailed written records of their 
activities with North Koreans. Compared to the previous items, these categories are 
conveyed in a drier, task-oriented tone, describing what to keep up with in terms of sorting, 
recording, reporting, and getting feedback in the institutional setting.  
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Overall, settlement helpers play the role of intermediary between locals and the 
institutions, simultaneously fulfilling the role of a civil and a volunteer staff person. The 
way each Hana Center adopts this state rhetoric and runs the settlement helper program is, 
however, dependent largely upon the local institution. Each Center has its own way of 
operating this system, and the effectiveness of the volunteer system depends on several 
local factors. For instance, the Seoul Bukbu Hana Center emphasizes the settlement helper 
system more than the Wonju Hana Center, as the Seoul Bukbu Center has a much larger 
North Korean population to cover, and the tasks tend to be more open to the public, more 
specifically, volunteer force.30 The program's effectiveness is also related to the availability 
of local resources, such as potential pools of volunteers, active involvement of civil or 
religious organizations, and the overall efficacy of the Center’s other assisting activities.      
Seoul Hana Center uses the manual in its one-on-one orientations, but does not 
stress the points made in the manual, particularly regarding any moral or ideological 
statements. Quite the opposite: the Center channels settlement helpers’ attention into 
practical areas, such as helping to clean the clients’ houses, ushering them to administrative 
offices etc. The kind of statement found in the oath, such as democratic citizens, freedom, 
humanitarianism and ethnic homogeneity is already value-ridden as discussed earlier. 
These have been read as “codes” to distinguish the capitalist/democratic South from the 
communist North, in modern Korean history. As they can provoke unnecessary arguments, 
the “impartial” institution avoids raising these issues unless the circumstances required it. 
Later in the dissertation, I will show how these principles were sporadically referenced and 
                                                          
30 To be more specifics, Seoul BukBu Hana Center has served almost 2,000 North Koreans with 
about 60 volunteers, and Wonju Hana Center has served 200 North Koreans with 15-20 
volunteers. (Seoul B. Hana Center http://gnnkcenter.or.kr/Introduce/Region.aspx )    
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cited during monthly meetings of settlement helpers, and became points of conflict. The 
state intends to solidify a national identity as a capitalist democracy, which seems to 
conflict with what Hana Centers purport to enact: morally good, neutral and practical 
agency with motherly care. These contrasting messages permeate into the ground level of 
service provision, which leaves workers with ambiguity about the rationale of their 
services. 
The way the Centers arrange pairing a settlement helper with a client is in 
considerations of gender and age. The setting is considered optimal if the assigned 
settlement helper is the same gender as but older than the client – which reflects a cultural 
politics of age and gender in the service area. Due to this arrangement, the settlement 
helpers often tell the clients to call them as mother, father, older brother or older sister, 
which allows a service landscape of filled with tropes of familial and pastoral care. In 
comparison to the national level of /love rhetoric presented by the Ministry or Hana 
Foundation, the local Hana Centers utilize more of “motherly” love than “brotherly” love, 
predicated upon uneven gender roles in the service and volunteer workforce.    
  Monthly meetings of volunteers were held in Seoul Center as the experienced 
frequent volunteer turnover. Volunteers exhibited diverse demographics in terms of age, 
gender, social position, education, and purpose for volunteering. A majority of the 
volunteers, however included middle-aged women. In each meeting, diverse motivations 
ranging from a religious purpose to a particular personal history were expressed. Some 
people told the group that the pastors at their churches emphasized the importance of 
serving North Koreans and encouraged them to participate in the Centers’ activities. Some 
were exposed to stories about North Korea during their military service. Other cases 
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showed that they had separated family members in North Korea. A few expressed research 
interests, and others mentioned TV programs about North Koreans as their motivation. 
When the meetings were not specifically themed, conversations centered around what the 
settlement helpers experienced while interacting with North Koreans and the way to solve 
issues. In most cases, volunteers shared their “difficulties” in dealing with North Korean 
clients. Difficulties were generally categorized as cultural differences, trust issues, and 
distance between service providers and recipients, which signal the affective dimensions 
of challenges that volunteers faced, as well as physical burdens in service provision. The 
Center constantly emphasized the importance of engaging as a cultural teacher, mentor, 
and quasi-family member or friend while maintaining a professional relationship. 
However, in addition to interpersonal problems coming from many different matters, 
settlement helpers appeared to have issues that the Centers try to avoid: ideological, 
politically intricate and religiously related topics. I could observe these issues were not 
resolved even among the staff, which is reflective of how politically and religiously 
entangled the North Korean issues are. Even though the Centers emerged as “new” 
agencies with idealized missions on the policy, the ground level operations reveal the 
Centers are not free from enduring problems. The main difference, however, was that 
settlement helpers were charged with handling the complex issues born out of the 
contradiction in operational logic, delivering affective care while maintaining their 
distances as effective bureaucrats.  
  In Wonju, the Center did not provide such detailed documentations of what 
settlement volunteers need to do or not do. The settlement helpers in Wonju were also 
supposed to provide emotional and moral support, playing the role of quasi-family 
122 
members with “motherly” or “parental” love.31 However, all the administrative works 
involving visits to other social institutions or registration were social workers’ tasks, not 
settlement helpers’.32 Generally, all the task assignments and updates were handled directly 
between social workers and the volunteers as needed. This was due to the experience level 
of the volunteers – the majority had at least couple years of involvement, and some had 
nearly 10 years –, and the small size of the target population. The meetings were held in an 
informal and friendly manner, ending with lunches or dinners together, which I felt was 
very different from Seoul.   
  As such, settlement helpers in two Centers were assigned different positions and 
tasks – the foci and the operational procedures diverged depending on the Center’s local 
situations even though the Hana Foundation and the Ministry of Unification attempted to 
build standardization into the system. The standardization of the system is stressed in two 
ways – one as ideological and the other as evaluative. Ideological standardization still 
required affective interactions with North Koreans, and this was expressed in the guiding 
materials for settlement helpers published by the Ministry or Hana Foundation. The 
language utilized in the Centers, however, demonstrated divergent presentations. The 
Ministry or Hana Foundation present democratic, free, responsible North Korean 
subjectivity with South Koreans’ brotherly love, whereas local Hana Centers generally 
focuses on the operational behaviors such as punctual, participatory subjectivity with 
motherly care. Evaluation criteria, clients’ checkup report and rewards system for the 
                                                          
31 It is common in Korean culture for close relationships to borrow familial terms, such as aunt, 
mom, father, uncle, and older sister or brother.  
32 This was also the case in two different Hana Centers in other cities that I visited. I analyze this 
as institutional structural necessity, which is needed when social workers cannot provide direct 
service to all the clients owing to the disproportionately large client population. In addition, it can 
be a result of each Center’s history of serving North Koreans.   
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settlement helpers are common throughout the Centers, but the ways each Center positions 
and assigns settlement helpers are quite distinctive.   
  Counseling service is an area where the urgent need is underlined by the Ministry, but 
also is the most troubling part in the Center’s operations which I could witness during the 
fieldwork. The counselors are still assigned and hired by the Hana Foundation – previously 
by the Ministry of Unification – not by each Hana Center, which causes friction with other 
staff in the Centers’ day-to-day operations. In terms of division of labor and staff 
accountability at each Center, counselors told me that they were situated in an odd position. 
The staff also expressed a similar opinion. Even with the best intention from both parties 
– Hana Center staff and the counselors – there could always be misunderstandings and 
conflicts in administering specific tasks. The factors such as age gap between social 
workers and counselors, political views and religious intentions could all be points of 
conflict, in addition to differences in their job positions and tasks. Counselors tended to be 
much older than most of social workers, and I could observe some counselors express their 
religious and political opinions overtly in the education programs whereas social workers 
tried hard to mitigate expression of their opinions. The issues of disagreement were 
addressed several times over formal and informal interviews with the social workers and 
counselors, but the staff members overall appeared to deal with the issues by avoiding 
them. This case also shows incongruity between the state’s pursuit of standardizing the 
service and each Center’s own operational and philosophical inclination.     
  
Local Social Adaptation Program   
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Seoul: This program was started as a demonstrative project in 2009 for North Koreans’ 
early self-reliance and self-support through matching career and employment support 
and counseling. We support acquisition of knowledge in economics, law, and medical 
treatment, and encourage field experiences so that they can settle in the region without 
difficulties. 33 
 
Wonju: The systematic local guiding education for 3 weeks and case management for 
a year will enable North Koreans to enter the labor market smoothly and to strengthen 
the competency and collaborative capacity of local government and non-governmental 
organizations. This will create a local settlement system with low cost and high 
efficiency as we prepare for the increase of the North Korean population.34      
 
The initial training program, or local social adaptation program (jiyeokjeokeung 
gyoyook 지역적응교육) that each Hana Center must provide as part of the national plan 
for North Koreans’ local settlement lasts 70 hours, over a two-week period. As exemplified 
in the statements translated and reproduced above, each Center explains the goal of 
education for local adaptation through both its public websites and brochures. This is part 
of the standardization of the service delivery to North Koreans throughout the country, as 
the Centers are expected to deal with certain sets of topics over the 2-week education 
period. In performing the program on the ground, however, each Center has its own 
emphases. While the Seoul Center highlights the Center’s activities on self-reliance and 
                                                          
33 Seoul Bukbu Hana Center’s introduction of the program  
34 Wonju Hana Center’s introduction of the program  
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self-support, Wonju emphasizes the initial education program as “strengthening the 
competency of local government and non-governmental organizations.” Both Centers 
highlight career seeking and employment as important components for North Koreans’ 
resettlement, and the Wonju Center particularly mentions “low cost and high efficiency” 
and collaborative efforts with local government and NGOs in accomplishing tasks. The 
Seoul Center focuses on more bureaucratic and professional support programs, whereas 
the Wonju Center highlights characteristics of a typical NGO such as “low cost and high 
efficiency” and collaborative activities between the Center and multiple institutional 
agents.  
The basic programs are organized into five areas: career and job search support; social 
adjustment; emotional stability; education preparation and management; and guide for 
living in local communities. Each category has some detailed subcategories included in the 
training. These items are designed to convey what is considered important for North 
Koreans to achieve in adjusting to and successfully settling into the new communities. The 
explanations are simply descriptive overall, regardless of their subjects.  
I participated in the local adaptation program at Seoul Center. They ran from nine in 
the morning until around five in the afternoon every weekday for three weeks. The social 
worker told me that this regular schedule was designed to adjust the North Korean clients 
to standard working hours. At the session that I participated in, the total number of the 
trainees – North Korean settlers to the region – was 11. The clients looked simultaneously 
excited and nervous. I was already familiar with some of them through the very first day’s 
introduction, when I helped with cleaning houses, registering the residences with the local 
government, and buying daily necessities. We greeted each other in class. The social 
126 
workers who helped with the first day’s chores smiled and greeted the clients with friendly 
remarks. While we sat at a round table, some clients asked social workers questions 
regarding cell phones, basic livelihood subsidies, bank accounts, and public transportation 
services. Overall, it was a congenial environment, where social workers and all the other 
staff made an effort to make friends with the clients, in both formal and informal settings. 
The clients also looked lively and somewhat excited. When the first session started, they 
were given a souvenir coffee mug with a heart-shaped decoration saying, “We root for you, 
who is the only one in the world!” and the director and the vice director of the Center 
introduced themselves with cheerful remarks. The clients were also given several books 
and handouts to be used throughout the training programs, conveying various kinds of 
information.     
      
      
Figure 4.1 Souvenir cup and education materials 
 
On the first day of training, the Center provided guidelines for classroom manners and a 
list of activities planned for the entire training period. These rules of conduct centered 
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around punctuality, consistent attendance, concentration during the session, and being 
considerate of others.   
 
 
Below are listed the specific guidelines for classroom manners.  
[Guidelines for classroom manners] (from my field notes)   
(1) The program begins at 9:30 AM everyday. Be sure to be on time.  
(2) Don’t be late or absent. If you cannot make it, you need to contact the office or the 
assigned teacher (social worker). Rules: Being late by 1 hour will be counted as one 
absence, 3 instances of lateness or early departure will be regarded as one absence, no 
exceptions.  
(3) Turn off cell phones or set them on vibrate before the training. Use break time for 
phone calls.  
(4) Leave your personal work at home.  
(5) Be confidential with sensitive information of others.    
Figure 4.2 Presentations on classroom manners 
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These categories are centered on disciplining North Korean bodies by means of 
teaching socio-cultural manners that North Koreans are expected to follow. These are the 
by-products of what staff and the broader literature had discussed in terms of North 
Koreans’ maladaptive and problematic behaviors: they are condemned as forgetful, tardy, 
and inconsistent. Social workers tried hard to get them to understand how important these 
rules were to observe. Above all, punctuality and consistent attendance were the most 
emphasized categories, and social workers mentioned these rules several times, even 
during sessions on different topics. In other words, this conduct is the fundamental 
comportment that all participants are supposed to observe, regardless of the contents of 
their studies. Suggestion of how one conducts oneself is underlined constantly (Foucault 
1982), with social workers’ passionate and encouraging remarks. There was even a 
monetary reward system for punctuality and consistent attendance, given as a stipend at 
the end of the program. Because of their measurability and traceability, attendance and 
punctuality became the criteria for standardized evaluations. Unsurprisingly, this monetary 
reward system applied to all the Hana Centers. Along with coming to the Centers at a 
regular time and behaving in accordance with the rules, the North Korean clients needed 
to arm themselves with cultural knowledge on various areas of society before actually 
“going out to society.”   
There were also schedules for visiting relevant administrative offices, banks, 
groceries and popular local places which are designed for North Koreans’ affective 
learning of local society. Those visits were arranged by the Centers with collaborative 
performances among different service actors. However, not all the service providers clearly 
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knew what their tasks were in terms of service provision to North Koreans. Normally those 
agents in different institutions expressed the difficulties to draw a clear picture of tasks. On 
the other hand, I found North Korean clients to be willing participants, but it was not 
uncommon to hear their complaints about the training program being a “waste of time.”  
 
“There is so much unnecessary education, and I told social workers about this. But all 
they said was that the programs were already designed by an upper institution, so they 
had no choice but to operate those as a regional Center. I think what you should do is 
training us in the field right away, rather than seating us in the office for couple weeks 
for useless education. Cell phone operation? Going to get groceries together? Do you 
really think people who crossed many boundaries and made it here don’t know how to 
do those things?” – North Korean male in his 30s, Wonju   
 
In the short period of time, it is more likely that the Centers can only provide a 
limited scope of knowledge and small range of services. The initial training programs are 
designed to provide general knowledge as the Seoul Hana Center explains, “We support 
acquisition of knowledge in economics, law, and medical treatment, and encourage field 
experiences so that they can settle in the region without difficulties.” In this context, 
teaching clients to embody the traits of capitalist citizens and to acquire general knowledge 
about the South Korean social system appear to be the most critical goals for the initial 
education program. Sociolinguist Allan’s work (2013) depicts a problem of institutional 
programs for migrants in Canada in quite a similar fashion to this study. The English 
program designed for the migrants with goals of enhancing communication skills and 
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professional development only depoliticizes and decontextualizes the structural and 
discursive barriers, while requesting them to become ideal worker-citizens. In the ground 
level service at Hana Centers, social workers and volunteers try hard to engage with their 
beneficiaries by ways of encouraging and dissuading certain attitudes as well as 
establishing close personal relationships with the clients. However, the affective service 
delivery in the caring institution was not always successful in sending out the intended 
messages. North Koreans who just resettled in the regions might care more about making 
their lives back to “normal” as quickly as possible, through learning the “real” society. To 
them, the “educational” period of a couple months to several at Hanawon followed by 
another month of local education program at Hana Centers can be tormenting and tedious, 
or even remorseful. The mandatory processes for North Koreans illustrate that South 
Korean governance of North Koreans are centered around shaping an efficient, punctual 
and economic subjecthood, through close and affective types of care promoting behavioral 
and attitudinal changes. However, the state’s intention of creating the new subjectivity of 
North Koreans through standardized programs and individualized care does not seem to be 
effective, but rather, it more likely generates anger, frustration and distance between the 
North Korean service recipients and South Korean service providers.  
 
4.3 MEANS OF AFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE  
In this part, I will show how affective languages and practices emerge in different 
locations of Hana Centers’ administrations, not only in the programs described above. The 
dual identity as both state and civil agency, and the dual locality as translocal and local 
organization give each Hana Center room for its own elaboration and creation of a desired 
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agenda, as well as cause conflicts and confusions. Also, the operational bottom line of 
standardization and individualization intensifies certain affects as “assets” more than 
others.  
Seoul Bukbu Center, for instance, created the motto “SMILE” for serving North 
Koreans. SMILE stands for Sensitive, Movable, Impressive, Limitless and Energetic. 
Surely, there were intended goals in establishing this logo associating it with a social Center 
for the minority: smile, being kind, treating them nicely. The use of affective methods 
adopted by caring service agencies is not a new strategy, as these service programs entail 
human needs in the realm of psychological and physical health as well as economic 
support. As several anthropologists already explored, operations of governance are not 
merely sites of optimization and control, but they are social fields where political and 
cultural elaborations take place (Aretxaga 2003; Mazzarella 2010; Shoshan 2014). The 
affective style of governance displays uncertainty, heterogeneity and elaboration, which 
are related to the complexity of North Korean refugee subjectivity in relation to the South 
Korean service regime. In this part of the chapter, I will address the ways that Hana Center 
workers try to maintain positively affective attitudes through the service operations, under 
the contradictory organizational structure. I will also probe into some cues of why North 
Korean clients still feel they are misunderstood, distanced and misrecognized even after 




 “A settlement helper referred her client to a job placement, but it did not work out 
very well, so it put the settlement helper in a difficult situation. Thus it is always best 
to ask the social workers at the Center and let the Center take care of it.”35  
 
Intentional distancing is one of the most valued assets that both volunteer and 
regular staff are (surreptitiously) encouraged to perform. In this statement specifically, 
settlement helpers are advised not to build deeper relationships with their clients. The 
reasoning is that North Korean clients could take advantage of support and possibly do 
harm to settlement helpers. The solution set up by the Center is “to ask social workers and 
let the Center take care of it.” Distancing is also translated into the term “professional 
relationship” between the clients and the service providers. This professionalization of the 
process is premised upon a notion of North Korean’s dependency.    
 In Hana Centers, professional relationships are expected in all interactions: 
between social workers and volunteers as well as between service providers and clients. 
Training programs and monthly meetings for settlement helpers present which codes of 
conduct are more important in interactions.   
 
“It is good to help them out of an innocent intention, but it will make North Koreans 
depend on you and this will end up being negative to them. Furthermore, it can come 
back as a big burden to settlement helpers, so it is better to guide them to do it on their 
own…”36  
 
                                                          
35 The Seoul Bukbu Center’s orientation material for settlement helpers 
36 The Seoul Bukbu Center’s orientation material for settlement helpers 
133 
In this specific situation, self-sufficiency is a trait needed to block the possibility of 
“North Koreans building dependency” and thus “being a big burden to settlement helpers.” 
It implies the importance of maintaining distance when dealing with North Korean clients, 
and simultaneously demonizes the qualities of dependency and accepting help. This is 
again echoed in the “professional relationship” touted by the manual (Ministry of 
Unification 2010, 15). This type of relationship implies establishing boundaries with 
clients, responding to only certain categories of their needs, and avoiding emotional 
attachment so that the clients do not come back with exorbitant requests. Thus settlement 
helpers, social workers, and counselors all need to make a concerted effort to make North 
Korean clients self-reliant, encouraging them to learn lessons in a “professional 
relationship” that avoids mental and physical overburdening.  
 
“You can just think of it as a professional relationship. Between the settlement helpers 
and clients, between the social workers and the clients, and also between the settlement 
helpers and the social workers, it should run by that idea. No personal interests should 
be involved. You can handle pretty much all the occasions through the perspective of 
professional relationship.” – a social worker, male in his 20s, Seoul  
  
In ushering them into the new capitalist society and equipping them with cultural 
and moral norms, institutional workers are asked to teach North Koreans to be self-
sufficient. Under the category of self-sufficiency, what is emphasized for settlement 
helpers is proper distance from the clients. This distancing stands at odds with the Centers’ 
mission as being caring and personalized service agencies. However, when staff are asked 
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to deal with the complicated issues regarding North Koreans – muddy ideological politics, 
unquestioned ethnic homogeneity, a call to be efficient and competitive, there is not much 
choice other than distancing themselves from the clients and also from their co-workers. It 
is related to the preexisting notions of North Koreans’ “dependency” on institutions and 
support programs, social workers’ experiences of burn out, and mistrust about North 
Koreans being “unpredictable” or “bizarre.”       
The strategy of distancing emerged in the relationships between the counselors and 
social workers as well. As previously pointed out, owing to the different hiring system, and 
the conflict between the call for national standardization in service and the call for 
localizing the service, the mentality of the staff members in the Centers is directed towards 
consciously or unconsciously ignoring the potential tension.  
 
“That has been criticized so far… It is a problem I cannot deny. However, I will just 
focus on my work and will not mind about the politics there. If you have to think about 
even that element, you cannot really work here.” – a counselor, woman in her 50s, 
Seoul  
 
 “We had to fire him. He just didn’t know anything about the local situations. As we 
heard, he used to work as an intelligence agent and is now retired and found the job as 
a counselor. We couldn’t really trust him and we used to have a lot of conflicts… As 
he had some sexual harassment issue with one of our clients, we just fired him.” – a 
vice director, Wonju  
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As the counselor at Seoul Center talked about the issue of emotional and physical 
drain as a counselor for North Koreans, she admitted the difficulties in dealing with the 
different expectations of the workers and a confusing division of labor in the Center. The 
vice director of the Wonju Center told me about the incident regarding a counselor in the 
past. Considering the fact that the counselor used to work in a national intelligence agency, 
his socio-political stance was more likely to be against the North Korean regime and its 
people following the old Cold War ideology.     
Under the greater theme of “efficiency” and “neutrality” in running the 
organization, Centers’ staff utilize and internalize the discourse of “professional 
relationships” to create distance from coworkers who potentially have disparate political, 
religious, and ethical perspectives, and from clients who are imagined as demanding 
subjects. Distancing is one of the affective means by which the service workers can handle 
any vexing socio-political tensions that might arise through the service provision.    
 
Erasing the complexity   
There were usually comments on North Korean clients’ characteristics in the Centers: they 
were neither punctual nor responsible in keeping appointments. For instance, the Seoul 
Center cautioned volunteers to expect to “be stood up” for appointments and not to be 
discouraged from continuing to help. According to the Center’s reasoning, North Koreans' 
behaviors need to be corrected in the long run, but regarding the early period in their 
resettlement, service providers are advised to be patient and congenial. In dealing with 
these cultural and moral “problems,” service workers are asked to enact paternalistic care 
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as if they are “parents,” since North Koreans “do not know things yet.” The manual goes 
on to say,   
 
“North and South Korea developed differently in every aspect of society – politics, 
institution, ideology, and society… Owing to these differences, settlement helpers must 
inform North Koreans of local culture, customs and life overall, as they would face 
heterogeneity, antagonism and mistrust in the South” (Hana Foundation 2011,57).  
 
Apart from the sustained reiteration of “the sameness,” the Foundation recognizes 
the obvious differences in different social contexts. Settlement helpers are expected to be 
aware of the clients’ experiences of antagonism, heterogeneity and mistrust. They are also 
in charge of informing North Koreans of local culture, customs and everyday life. 
However, it does not specifically address how and when these differences emerge, and how 
the experiences of mistrust and antagonism can affect North Koreans’ lives negatively. The 
matters are now all collapsed into a big theme of de facto “differences,” which paralyze 
further discussions by making them as differences in “every aspect of society.” In 
alignment with the unquestioned and unelaborated logic of sameness, the point made here 
regarding differences operates in the notably same way. By simplifying the complexity of 
becoming a certain subject in a new society, the national agency does not promote 
understandings based on more careful interpretations of culture (Geertz 1973). Just as 
anthropologists have to approach a certain cultural behavior in the perspective that it 
embeds deeper meanings and consists of complex symbols so that a researcher has to be 
more descriptive and interpretive, workers who provide services to different kinds of 
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people need to approach the matter more interpretive and descriptive ways, rather than 
being objective and technocratic. The perspectives shown in the materials of the national 
agency, Hana Foundation, however, merely gloss over North Koreans’ “differences” or 
“difficulties.” North Koreans’ dispositions, multiple positions in the society and their 
claims are understood simple and flat, as they “don’t know things yet.” The descriptions 
never go deeper and thicker than the immediate emotional and perceptive responses. This 
comment is followed by a request for settlement helpers to be “kind neighbors, relatives, 
and friends, who can open their hearts and be sensitive guardians.” They are supposed to 
provide pastoral care, with qualities like patience, generosity, tenderness, and acceptance, 
whereas North Koreans are imagined to be less adult, less independent, and less 
responsible.   
In the meantime, North Koreans are susceptible to criticisms in the context of their 
institutional participation – not showing up, not trustworthy, likely to betray us, easy to 
detach themselves from people (especially guardians or settlement helpers), only attending 
to financial and material gain, oblivious of the social system, or stuck in a more traditional 
ideology – all attributed to either their having been refugees or their North Korean-ness. 
These negative expressions are found frequently in the Centers’ day-to-day life. Hence, it 
is quite clear that these comments are inconsistent and disorderly as they are instantly made 
as expressions of emotional distress. For instance, the common connotations of North 
Koreans being “too cunning” in gaining their interests does not cohere with their being too 
“oblivious.” Leaving the place and people easily doesn’t necessarily match with 
“traditional” or “backward” behaviors. This mixture of logical nonsense still thrives in the 
service industry through the Centers’ programs and interactions with the clients, even 
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though it tends to be hidden from any public statements. By depicting North Koreans’ 
predispositions thinly and attributing them to coming from “totally different society,” the 
Centers do not appear to make progress in gaining North Koreans’ emotional trust. Service 
providers do care, with an individualized care in their best capacity, but at the same time 
they elusively express pity and mistrust – although it being subtle and unconsciously 
expressed – which can be interpreted as condescending and paternalistic.     
 
In this chapter, I unpacked two distinctive operational logics that Hana Centers 
adopted nationwide: standardization and individualization of the services. However, 
regional performances of Hana Centers are distinguished from the national policy and 
statements, which shows the ambiguity and contradiction in their identities of being both 
civil and state organizations, and the elaborations in their locally adjusted service 
provision. In this space of ambiguity and ambivalence, affective service operations emerge 
as different kinds of governance. However, they can cloud the complex workings of the 
politics and does not advance the mutual understandings between South Korean service 
providers and North Korean clients.
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CHAPTER 5 
COLD WAR, TRUST AND PROTECTION IN INSTITUTIONAL SPACE    
In this chapter, I will discuss how undercurrent politics of Cold War and division politics 
are relevant to the ground operations of the services provided to North Koreans in South 
Korea. Hana Centers and other government service agencies continue to try to convince 
the public of the irrelevance of politics to the welfare services provided to North Koreans: 
instead, the practicality and political neutrality of services are often accentuated values to 
maintain institutional accountability and legitimacy. Drawing on the discussions of affect 
in institutional spaces in the previous chapter, this chapter will delve into affective 
interactions in relation to larger political and cultural practices and discourses presented 
with the terms like “trust” and “protection.”    
 
5.1 MEANINGS OF COLD WAR IN SOUTH KOREA IN THE 2010S   
The Cold War has been explained predominantly as a historical event, which was only 
associated with two major power blocs and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. 
With the culminating event of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the world was 
ready to set out on a new era of diverse relations of power rather than the bifurcated contest 
of world powers. Heon Ik Kwon (2010), however, suggests a perspective of “relation-of-
domination” (2010, 2) to view the Cold War in more diverse and interpretive ways. As he 
challenges the notion of a global Cold War, Kwon stresses the multiplicity and plurality of 
its nature. In discussing the origin and the end of the Cold War, it is
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 important to acknowledge that it “entails the unequal relations of power among the 
political communities that pursued or were driven to pursue a specific path of progress 
within the binary structure of the global order.” (Kwon 2010, 2) Tracing the uneven 
trajectories of the Cold War in different places in the world necessitates undoing the uni-
lineal analysis of it merely as the contest of power. 
  Many scholars in political science and North Korean studies also presumptively 
assume the Cold War is a finite event and primarily focus on how North Korean regimes 
responded to the loss of their biggest allies – the Soviet Union and China – and how North 
Korea has continued to survive in a post-Cold War period as a communist nation. In a 
majority of the literature, North Korea is portrayed as choosing to fight against the now 
unified liberal world, highlighting the “closure” of their society to the rest of the world. 
The US plays a major role in crafting the depiction of North Korea as a uniquely bizarre 
and irrational state that doesn’t follow the “global flow” of culture and politics – which 
justifies US exceptionalism and its ruling power over “rogue” nations or politico-religious 
groups. The dominant news coverage has dealt with North Korea in connection with 
nuclear weapons, terrorist attacks, and human rights violations, in addition to eccentric 
exchanges of power. In this regard, US politics in regards to North Korea still stand in the 
shadows cast by the Cold War plot, which highlights moral and ethical supremacy, 
demonizes the “other,” creates fear among the public and justifies expansion of military. 
For this reason, it is not totally uncommon to connect post-colonial critique with Cold War 
practices (Christina 2003; Greg and Klein 2011; J. Kim 2010).   
In America, the Cold War played a significant role in formulating a romantic model 
of the family, exhibited by the blossoming white middle-class home culture and the rise of 
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baby boomers (De Hart 2001; Kuznick and Gilbert 2001). Cold War practices drew the 
American focus “homeward bound” (May 2008). Family life represented a liberal, free, 
democratic state of capitalist society that was placed in opposition to the picture of 
hardheaded, cold and unfeeling communist society.  
Everyday practices of the Cold War era in both private and public spheres are more 
complexly deployed in South Korea. Owing to the proximity of military confrontation and 
its geographical vicinity, the fear of its counterpart was more intricately developed and 
enhanced in its level of tension (Kwon 2010). For instance, in the South Korean context, 
the word “Cold War” is not explicitly expressed or discussed but it is unquestionably 
entangled with everyday lives as well as the real politics. Indeed, a so-called “Red 
Complex” has brought devastating social, political and cultural consequences to South 
Korean society (J.M. Kang 1997; H. Kwon 1999; H. Son 1991). Hyuk Bum Kwon (1999) 
analyzes the political culture of South Korea as an “anti-communist circuit,” which yields 
automatic associations of certain political events with the frames of binary and antagonistic 
political claims. His analysis embeds an argument of hegemony, which highlights the 
participation of the general public through everyday life practices, rather than seeing it as 
a far-flung political contest between the two powers. Soo Jung Lee examined the everyday 
experiences of the Cold War through the narratives and experiences of separated families 
by national division in South Korea. Through the years, the families’ telling or not telling 
of their experiences were closely contingent on the political climate of the period. The 
feelings of shame, fear, antagonism and hate are not only present in these families – albeit 
in a severe and extensive degree within them – but also in the general public, as the 
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depiction of communist “others” and fear-generating, propaganda education and public 
advertisement have been explicitly present.   
Recently, military confrontations between the North and the South are suggestive 
in proving that the fear against each other and the antagonistic politics are alive and well. 
The shelling of an island adjacent to the North and the South border area and the shipwreck 
dispute of Cheonanham  천안함 incident in 2011 and 2012, respectively, show how current 
politics might well be affected and divided by Cold-War instilled politics and military 
settings. Quite unnervingly, the series of spying accusations by progressive politicians and 
political parties have disrupted South Korean society with the enlivened Cold War spirit 
and deeply divisive politics. Words such as “spy (gancheop 간첩),” “North Korean 
sympathizers (jongbuk 종북)” and “red (bbalgaengi 빨갱이)” frequently dominate mass 
and social media, particularly in the current Park administration 37 . Because of these 
political events and schemes, North Korean settlers have never been free from being 
accused, or suspected of spying or any relevant crimes. The spy accusation of refugee civil 
servant Yoo Woo-sung in 2013 through 2014 shows that North Korean settlers are still 
susceptible to public suspicion and political schematization. Undeniably, it is still fair to 
argue that the Cold War has not ended in South Korea. Rather, it has been and will always 
be used in any circumstances possible, to create an “enemy” for convenient political and 
ethical gains. In the next section, I will discuss how the discourses of “protection” are 
                                                          
37 http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0922997591&code=11121400&cp=nv “jongbuk, 
nonexistent in a dictionary” (Kookminilbo 2015.3.17) 
http://www.newminjoonews.com/sub_read.html?uid=9422 “the Grand political party’s claim on 
jongbuk is reactionary politics turning the time back to 1960s” (Newminjoo 2015.3.31)   
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directly and indirectly circulated regarding national security that fears North Koreans are 
still enemies, not the unification heroes.      
 
5.2 “PROTECTION” IN ADMINISTERING NORTH KOREANS     
The South Korean legal system for North Korean settlers shows paternalistic rhetoric in a 
welfare frame, yet a dubious stance towards the group. “Protection” is a term worth 
drawing attention to, as it has multiple connotations. The arrival and settlement process 
listed by the Ministry of Unification is described in Table 1. As it frequently uses the word 
“protection (boho 보호) it addresses the needs of screening, interviews and asylum housing 
for North Koreans.  
 
Table 5.1 Resettlement Support Process (Source: Ministry of Unification, 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1441 accessed in March, 2015) 
1 Request for protection 
and transfer to South 
Korea 
- Upon request for protection, report and notify 
the situation to appropriate government 
agencies  
- Accommodate refugees in foreign diplomatic 
offices or temporary shelters in a host country  
-  Negotiate with the host country and support 
the immigration of refugees after verifying 
their identity 
2 Joint interrogation - Upon entrance, conduct joint interrogation 
with appropriate government agencies, 
including the National Intelligence Service 
- After interrogation, transfer refugees to the 
custody of Hanawon, the education center for 
social adaptation 
3 Decision over protection - Decide through deliberation by the 
Consultative Council to Deal with Dislocated 
North Koreans whether to grant the refugees 
protection 
4 Hanawon  - Education for social adaptation (12 weeks) : 
Relieving cultural difference, psychological 
well-being, and basic vocational training 
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- Transfer refugees to their residence after 
registration of family relations and 
arrangement for housing 
5 Residence support (five 
years) 
- Vocational support: vocational training, 
employment incentive, employment subsidy, 
etc. 
- Educational support: special admission and 
transfer to schools and support for tuition 
- Apply special cases for basic livelihood 
security (social security) 
- Support workers system: community services 
(local governments), employment 




- Designate and operation regional adaptation 
centers (Hana Center)  
- Hana Foundation (governmental funding): 
Provide information on everyday life, 
psychological and career counseling services, 
and education to help refugees adapt to their 
community 
- Manage volunteer settlement helpers 
As table illustrates, North Koreans must undergo different kinds of interviews and 
screenings. The process lasts anywhere from one to several months, depending on the 
complexity of an individual’s case or any involvement in political activities in North Korea 
and China. Some Korean-Chinese are occasionally excluded through screening, which 
underscores the value of automatic endowment of South Korean citizenship. Under the 
thematic use of “protection,” they are imagined firstly as victim subjects who have been 
stateless and now granted their lawful status in South Korea. Since they went through 
hardships crossing multiple boundaries without any protective legal means or status, they 
are deemed to be the rightful citizens based on the premise that they are also of Korean 
ethnicity to be guided into the new society. This “protection” secondarily implies that 
North Koreans are suspicious subjects, necessitating regular monitoring. It is accompanied 
by intensive interviews in which North Koreans are interrogated for any signs of spying 
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activities or political suspicions that might affect the “national security” of South Korea. 
Even after this process of heavy scrutiny when coming into South Korea, each North 
Korean is assigned a policeman who will watch them in their everyday life and ask them 
what they are doing during their lifetime. Following the pervasive image of the North 
Korean regime as a bizarre and irrational authority in the post-Cold War space and time, 
North Koreans are undoubtedly imagined as political subjects who reside in a by-gone-
era’s social system of communism, embodying an even more eccentric ideology of “Juche 
(주체).” Those who defected or were imprisoned are also seen as witnesses to the bio-
political power of the irrational authority, and are supposed to be saved, but any and all 
races of communist influences must be undone. Thus, these victims need to prove 
themselves completely disconnected from and concerning with these communist, outdated 
and belligerent communist orders.  
North Koreans, on the other hand, interpret the “protective” maneuverings as 
surveillance, expressing helplessness and feelings of disempowerment by the very act of 
“protection.” These are presented in the bureaucratic forms of “institutional protection,” 
“report,” “mandatory meetings,” and “visits,” which put North Koreans in an ambivalent 
position as institutional clients explicitly and as potential threats implicitly.  
    
Q: So you are not on good terms with the policeman now?  
A: Precisely not. The new one just asked me about all these pestering questions like 
what I did today or yesterday.. He asked me also about any relations with Yoo Woo-
sung thing, and it made me enraged. Now I’m a resident of 10 years living here. I don't 
know how North Korea is doing now, and I’m a very different person from what I was 
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ten years ago. I don't even have many ties left in the North.. I told him not to call me 
often anymore. Just ask formal questions and that’s it about us, I said.  – S.H., North 
Korean male in his 20s, Seoul  
 
However framed these “regular calls” or “meetings” are, policemen are 
institutionally obliged to inspect North Koreans’ day-to-day lives. Even though an 
individual North Korean as a service recipient would argue and resist against the disruptive 
operations of policemen and information agencies, there are not many ways to avoid the 
regular check-ups. The policemen are to “protect” North Koreans from potential threats or 
harms, possibly from both the North and the South owing to their sensitive political status, 
but their tasks are more often than not closely related to surveillance in the frame of national 
security. No other multicultural or social minority groups will be assigned a policeman 
entrusted to protect and watch them. Even with all this rhetoric about difference, unification 
protagonists, and “the new neighbor” to South Koreans, North Koreans are still political 
subjects with red print on their bodies.   
Hanawon and Hana Centers are agencies designed to help North Koreans to adjust 
to a different society quickly and efficiently. Hanawon is a particularly unique 
governmental institution in that it provides only for North Koreans among all the other 
foreign citizens in South Korea. As discussed briefly in previous chapters, its missions are 
to wash away “cultural difference (heterogeneity),” to build “psychological stability,” and 
to offer “career guidance” to North Koreans. Hana Centers’ emphasis on providing “good,” 
“practical” care to reach these goals in local areas presents something far from bold Cold-
War rhetoric. However, these institutions cannot be considered purely neutral and practical. 
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They are officially in collaboration with the NIS (National Intelligence Service) and the 
National Police Agency, which conduct intense interviews and unnerving screenings to 
“identify” North Koreans. The fact that the centers are linked to these agencies can allow 
the clients to have different interpretations about the purpose and meaning behind the Hana 
Centers.   
    
5.3 AFFECTIVE OPERATIONS OF “TRUST”    
 
“The Trust Building Process on the Korean Peninsula is a policy aimed at building 
trust between North and South Korea based on ensuring reliable national security, 
establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula and laying the groundwork for eventual 
unification… by establishing a firm stance on national security that does not allow 
military provocation from North Korea, South Korea aims to uphold peace and 
encourage the North to be open to building mutual trust.” – Ministry of Unification, 
announced in 2012.  
 
Recently, trust has gained salience in conjunction with the larger discourse on unification 
due to the current Park administration’s policy of “Trust Building Process on the Korean 
Peninsula ( Hanbando sinroeguchuk proseseu 한반도신뢰구축프로세스).” With the 
word “trust” representing the capitalist ideal of exchanges and mutual benefits based on an 
equal level of power, the politically-conservative South Korean government announced 
“trust” as a core value in its unification policy, highlighting national security. Trust 
becomes a viable option only if North Korea does not create any disruptions between the 
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two countries. It is conditional, as it accompanies strong national security, which ironically 
implies an increase of military force against North Korea in case North Korea “disrupts the 
peace.” The term “peace” here is also a partisan word implying a critical stance to the North 
Korean government’s closure to the (capitalist) world and an accusation against North 
Korea for its military provocations. Ironically, but not surprisingly, the discourse of trust 
here is based on the competition for power, a capitalist idea of benefits and exchanges, and 
a mistrust in North Korea after all.   
Trust at nationally circulating discourses, however, is cast back to discourses on an 
institutional-interpersonal level. At Hana Centers, trust is addressed quite often, but not 
necessarily with a precise implication. The term “protection” is employed to signify a legal 
definition and used by higher-level institutions, whereas the term “trust” is used to refer to 
operations performed by a lower-level, small scale and local institution like Hana Center. 
Within the frameworks of organizational research in disciplines such as business 
management, social work and organizational sociology, trust is a word used frequently in 
regards to social institutions providing various services to clients. Anthropologists have 
discussed trust in association with social values, knowledge, moral crises or political ethics 
(Jimenez 2011; Strathern 2005; Power 2004). Here I will take a look at how trust is framed 
and performed in the area of the social institutions charged with serving North Koreans. 
As opposed to a discourse of “protection,” trust signifies more interpersonal and mutual 
relationships based on a premise that participants are equal in their social positions.  
As the current service regime requires service workers to be more personal and 
affective, words such as “relationships,” “trust” and “case management” (as opposed to 
group training/education) were familiar terms to be cited and heard. Although trust is 
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mostly used to address organizational challenges and difficulties in building relationships 
among service participants, it has multiple layers of meaning depending on the context in 
which it is spoken.  
For North Koreans, trust is more closely related to their migratory life experiences 
as undocumented migrants, refugees, and new South Korean citizens. Having crossed 
many kinds of boundaries, North Koreans have to face the different levels of their legal 
status, to manage their livelihoods, and to comprehend drastic shifts in cultural frameworks 
to make sense of the world. In such socially and politically vulnerable positions, trusting 
people can lead to either fatal or life-saving choices. Anthropologists Daniel and Knudsen’s 
(1995) work exhibits critical issues regarding mistrust that refugees could experience on 
structural and personal levels. On arriving in South Korea, North Koreans are put into a 
system that categorizes, diagnoses, and regulates them through interrogations, trainings, 
and counseling. In drastically different social settings, they have to learn new ways to cope 
with things, as the previous cultural practices they have trusted do not work anymore. As 
North Koreans experience institutional processes at a greater intensity during their initial 
settlement, various kinds of contacts with institutional workers occur, which accompany 
affective interactions. Trust, mistrust, avoidance, blaming and exhorting can happen in the 
course of training, counseling, and reporting activities. On stepping into South Korean 
territory, North Koreans are asked to change their identity from clandestine to legitimate 
South Korean citizens, to be adjusted to subjects who deserve special “welcoming,” and 
simultaneously to prove themselves as capable of unlearning their communist ways by 
becoming good capitalist-democratic citizens.  
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In the rest of this chapter, I will explore how different ways of negotiating, 
strategizing or reacting are presented in the institutional settings of the Hana Centers, 
focusing on the theme of trust. I will set up an argument around three different sets of 
relationships: 1) mistrust between North and South Koreans at the site of service provision 
and consumption; 2) trust and mistrust among North Koreans; and 3) regulating actions 
among South Koreans. As it is expected, the matter of trust entails tensions of power 
relations, confounding assumptions that trust is based on the notions of equality and even, 
beneficial exchanges. I will also address how it is possible and impossible to build trust in 
the very context of the antagonistic political culture of the Cold War. Particularly in the 
relations of institutional engagement, this will bring light to a discussion of how 
bureaucratic operations of a national authority are intersecting with the personal 
relationships and the ideal of desirable citizenship.   
      
1) Mistrust between North and South Koreans  
From the point of first encounter, South Korean service providers and North Korean 
newcomers find each other having different expectations and experiences with regards to 
social institutions. Social workers commonly interpret North Koreans’ “misbehavior” as 
their lack of understanding of social norms as well as old habits from the North.  
 
“At first they have a different ideology and expectation. They kept demanding 
things from us, and regarded us as labor party members…38 For instance, if they are fired, 
they blame us for that. They believe we should be able to control whatever and whoever… 
                                                          
38 referring to North Korean labor party members, who are positioned in the high rung of the 
society  
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so even if we explain, it is hard to get them believe… But now as we have more younger 
generations coming, and they already have information with them through SNS (Social 
Network System) or other social media, it is gradually getting better, I think…” – a social 
worker, Wonju Hana Center   
 
  From the social worker’s perspective, North Korean clients do not understand what 
it means to help and receive help from volunteers or any institutional workers in the first 
place. Basically, North Korean clients would misunderstand “how the system works” in 
South Korea. To the South Korean social workers, the Hana Center is seen as a 
governmental center with a centralized authority to distribute all the social necessities and 
have a control over the other legal, political or economic matters. As North Korean clients 
are accustomed to the old practices of the North, the Hana Center has to do everything for 
them. Young North Koreans are believed to be “better” because they are exposed to foreign 
media and are better informed of the capitalist social system. These kinds of rough 
analogies of linking misunderstandings with the people’s habits and practices of the North 
are not uncommon. Usually around Hana Centers, these kinds of misunderstandings and 
cultural differences are often framed as the clients’ “high expectations” of the institution 
as an all-powerful authority. The comments also reflect the workers’ feelings of being 
overwhelmed, as they think they are expected to provide their North Korean clients with 
“total care” and as they experience the frustration of being “less than perfect” in the 
services they provide. The need to control the clients’ claims to a reasonable extent is often 
attributed to the undesirable qualities from the North – viewing a social institution as “the” 
institution, having grown up in a highly controlling society, uninformed of other possible 
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societal forms, etc. However, this kind of misunderstanding and mistrust can arise from 
North Korean clients’ need to feel legitimate rather than from their communist North traits. 
North Koreans could have difficulties in figuring out how the social institutions make use 
of their information and how they can be inserted into a system to their benefit. Being 
somewhat aggressive or exhortative can come from different intentions: negotiation 
strategy, confusion or desperation. However, those actions are interpreted as “North 
Koreans’ traits,” and the different perspectives from both sides often end up creating 
mistrust at Hana Centers.  
 
“A: Actually they don’t understand the settlement helper system. If they are ‘helpers,’ 
it is just about helping, right? But they seem to feel uncomfortable. They think 
settlement helpers are the watchdogs, so trusting them fully does not seem to be easy... 
Probably it is because they used to live in a highly controlling and suspicious society, 
so everybody is watching each other and suspecting each other… I suppose it can be 
hard for them to adjust to a society of more freedom…” – a social worker, Seoul Center  
 
“They don’t really understand what counseling means... Particularly those who are in 
the initial period are even worse. Even though we introduce this service in the training 
sessions, they don’t seem to remember anything about counseling… It is really hard 
to counsel North Koreans, compared to South Korean clients, because they don’t have 
wide enough social network and simply live alone, which exacerbates the symptoms… 
To build trust, it seems to take almost a year which is much longer than their Southern 
counterparts.” – a counselor, Seoul Center   
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To understand a segment of cultural practices, it is essential to be immersed in the 
society as a whole. Quite naturally, North Koreans cannot be very adept in dealing with all 
kinds of relationships and tasks that arise in the center. However, to gain the trust of North 
Koreans is challenging for the service providers, due to as South Korean service providers 
would think North Korean clients’ unwillingness and stiffness in collaborating with, and 
responding positively to, South Korean service providers. In these talks, South Korean 
service providers express disappointment with making the North Korean clients understand 
plain things, such as their role as “just helpers” or “counselors.” They also express 
displeasure in failing to get recognition for their efforts and in taking a longer time to gain 
the trust of North Koreans than South Koreans. These things appear to be basic social 
knowledge and manners to the workers, thus generating friction and irritation with the 
workers. The workers feel it is hard to respond to North Koreans’ needs, due to the 
characteristics that originate from North Korea. To South Korean service workers, North 
Korean society is a highly controlled society, where individual freedom is hijacked and 
everyone is suspicious of each other.  
 
 “They don’t listen to us. They instead go for their friends and sorts… They create 
stories, and my client just swings back and forth following her friends’ stories… Even 
if I told her to follow this and that, she just decides to do things beyond my 
imagination. I have no idea why they trust only their North Koreans but not us!” – a 
settlement helper, female in her 50s, Seoul Center  
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The settlement helper’s story is rather accusatory, suggesting that North Koreans 
are not collaborative enough, and do not make efforts to mingle with South Koreans. 
Instead, they will rely on their friends and families and “create stories.” The settlement 
helper’s good will and intentions are not read by North Korean clients, and this frustrates 
her. On this level of service exchange, the South Korean service providers appear to have 
more say in what North Koreans are supposed to do to adjust to the new society. They also 
have more knowledge of their native society, so naturally have more power in handling 
things. This kind of mistrust and distance from each other creates more gaps between the 
two agents. Even after the official end of the Cold War, South Koreans imagine North 
Korean society as a perpetually totalitarian, inhumane, cold and unlivable place. As Cold 
War practices have been in existence for a long time, South Koreans are not entirely 
stripped of antagonistic, enemy-generating and Red complex politics and mindsets. In the 
course of building a close relationship with each other, South Korean service providers 
often hold paradoxical positions and sentiments about themselves as well as their North 
Korean counterparts.    
 
A: He recently got a smart phone, as he says that he needs to call his sister in North 
Korea so with his old phone he cannot connect… So I asked if that is even possible, 
and he scorned me, and I… cannot even understand how that is possible.  
Q: Yeah… with brokers and everything, right? 
A: Yes, it seems that they need to pay a lot for those. I don’t really get it… how is it 
possible? The network is all state sponsored connection, isn’t it?  
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Q: I think so… and what do you think about that? Do you think the South Korean 
government needs to block it entirely? 
A: Ah… Honestly, I don't know… I can’t really say anything about it. I only know 
this person superficially. We’ve known each other only couple months… I don’t know 
what to say… if a bad person comes and doing a spy thing, what should we do… but 
I believe he is not the one... I hear him criticize the North a lot.”   
- a settlement helper, male in his 50s, Seoul Center  
  
The volunteer worker expressed his perplexity about what to do as the center’s worker. 
The person he is responsible for is clearly doing what is, in a traditional sense, considered 
as “spying” activity. Contacting with someone in the North is still strictly prohibited by the 
South Korean government. The general public does not even imagine that it can be 
possible, so this volunteer’s surprise is not a strange response. What is present in this 
conversation is the volunteer’s hesitation and empathy towards his client, which is 
simultaneously accompanied by suspicion and fear. He is firstly astounded by the actions 
of his client, which cannot be imaginable to an average South Korean in terms of its risk 
to an individual and the loose border control of the state (even virtually). His talk also 
shows an ambivalent stance on where to draw a line between private and public, in terms 
of how the state is supposed to respond to these kinds of acts. Thus, he is still debating his 
stance on the matter between the very personal concern for the North Korean’s keeping 
familial ties and the national concern of information leakage or collaborating with the 
Northern government. His evaluation on the person finally is founded in the weak idea of 
“I hear him criticize the North a lot.” His beneficiary’s hatred and criticism of the Northern 
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regime is proof of anti-North and anti-communism which is considered to be safe – the 
only viable political opinion to take, in his perspective – in the South.      
    As more and more global and transnational activities take place even in North 
Korea, as a practice of “time and space compression” (Harvey 1989) these accounts are 
expected to happen more often than not. With the development of communication and 
transportation, North Koreans utilize the technology to be connected with their loved ones 
or to serve other kinds of purposes. We now see how forms of globalization associated 
with digital technologies and communication systems is happening in the cultural-political 
stage of the Cold War, which is conventionally deemed to exist in two different times and 
spaces (Holm and Sørensen 1995). Both states now have looser control of information 
flows between their people. In the South, it cannot regulate all the activities, since it houses 
almost 30,000 Northerners. However, this kind of transborder activity embeds risky 
consequences, as it sometimes becomes a sensitive political target, used as a claim for the 
need to enhance national security.39   
   
“That’s not rare (referring to the recent spying accusation of a high-profile North 
Korean defector) I heard from my investigator friend that a lot of people in South 
Korea are actually spies. Probably even the one living next door…! North Koreans are 
                                                          
39 The recent accusation of high-profile North Korean defector’s espionage shows how the 
complex politics around North Korea and defectors can bring about social turmoil at almost any 
time. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-south-korea-high-profile-defector-
is-accused-of-spying-for-the-north--by-his-sister/2013/05/18/71aac366-b3cc-11e2-9a98-
4be1688d7d84_story.html (Washington Post, 2013.05.18)  
Korean media has dealt with this incident for a long while, speculating on its different contexts 
and backgrounds. The spying accusation in 2013 through 2014 in South Korea was rather an 
outrageous political schematization, as it shook the political arena involving the presidential 
election in 2012 and overall NIS authority. 
http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=115413 (Pressian 2014.3.14)  
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out of question. He said almost two out of ten are actually spies. I think we should be 
really careful in accepting North Koreans and should do stricter screenings, accepting 
only those who can benefit us….. We give and give them everything like Hana Center 
and stuff, but what good is it when these North Koreans do not fight for us, but instead 
fight for them (North Korea) when a war break out? You know, they should serve as 
mercenaries for us! If we continue building the system like this, they will all desert us 
and follow the other side. We are literally making the enemies within..” – an individual 
sponsor and lawyer, male in his 50s, Wonju  
  
A lawyer who has been helping North Korean youth in the city expressed his fear 
and concern of North Korean spies, quoting his investigator friend’s words. He seems to 
firmly believe there are frequent spying activities going on, with a sizable number among 
the North Korean population - a “two out of ten” ratio. He even has doubts about his own 
North Korean beneficiary, and insists that the country should not accept all the incoming 
applications of North Koreans but instead it needs to selectively choose the people. In 
actuality, the state has a system of screening North Koreans to sort out Korean-Chinese 
and political spies in the initial period of settlement. However, even after a long time of 
relationship building, mistrust of each other clearly remains, likely stemming from old 
Cold War type suspicions and the sentiment of hostility that has been nurtured through the 
period. Furthermore, he criticizes the system for making North Korean clients turn their 
backs against “us,” as the institutional services do not play a proper role in making them 
into loyal South Korean citizens. He accentuates the point by using an example of a war-
time scenario dealing with a mercenary, which points to his ideas of North Koreans’ 
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rightful functions in South Korea as foreign citizens. Fearing and scorning North Koreans 
in South Korea based on the notion that Northerners can always turn into our “enemies,” 
as they are strange, communists, and untrustworthy, is still present in the site of service 
provision.   
In the initial encounters between North Korean clients and South Korean service 
providers at Hanawon and Hana Centers, where the first steps toward trust and relationship 
building should take place, suspicions of and fears about North Koreans in large are 
intermingled with sympathy for an individual beneficiary. This may have affected the 
actual operations of service delivery, as the volunteer at the center was rather hesitant about 
giving the North Koreans many benefits, and the lawyer becomes highly critical about 
Hana Centers’ operations, as suggesting that the overall support system will eventually 
create “enemies within.”   
Another important thing to note is the fact that the institutional markings of each 
North Korean including medical diagnoses are another subset of Hanawon and Hana 
Centers’ service provision. The center categorizes each North Korean client by their family 
relations, marriage status, social status/position in North Korea and psychological 
problems. Some clients will receive “specialized care” or follow-up consultancy depending 
on both mental and physical conditions and the potential closeness to the North Korean 
regime. The Center also checks the family history and the individual’s history such as their 
army service, labor party membership or other sorts of experiences. Whereas the public 
presentation of the education programs is “educating and facilitating earlier settlement of 
North Koreans,” it also accompanies diagnosis, categorization, surveillance and 
subjectification of a kind, based on the both explicit and implicit suspicions of the people 
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as potential enemies. These figures are well experienced by North Koreans, and they 
express their anger or a sense of deep mistrust towards the system as a whole. The morally 
good and practically helpful images that these institutions attempt to establish set up 
expectations that are often unmet by the North Koreans who engage with these institutions.   
 
“You know they are just scared of us being the “trouble makers” of the society. We 
should just live quietly following whatever South Korean society would want us to do. 
What constitutes our lives here is based on three things - North Korean nuclear 
weapons, North Korean human rights or North Korean sympathizers. Other than 
those, we are of no worth and they don’t really care.”  - a North Korean male in his 
20s, Seoul    
 
2) Regulating other South Koreans – political culture, anticipating the unexpected     
When I visited a police station hoping to get more information on their collaborative 
activities with a local Hana Center in Seoul, I was faced with enhanced screening upon 
entering the station and followed by interrogative inquisitions. As opposed to how the news 
coverage presented the event that I found relevant to this research with photograph of 
smiling faces among policemen and Hana Center staff, the checking and screening 
processes to get to the main office were lengthy and arduous. The police officers were all 
suspicious of me as a researcher and a volunteer at the Hana Center, asking identity-related 
questions while keeping my ID card in their hands. Even when answering my questions, it 
seemed they were suspicious of my research intention and any potential connections that 
might be of concern. I also felt that I was threatened, and could at any time be in a risky 
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situation, as I felt I was being interrogated to prove my “innocence” only by establishing I 
was anti-communist and anti-North. This experience automatically made me ponder how 
North Koreans would feel after all the processes of official interrogations and regular 
“check-ups.” I was questioned and suspected in my intention, even as a South Korean and 
merely because I was asking about North Korean defectors’ support services.     
Under the institutional system of the Hana Centers, citizens who participate in the 
service industry are expected to provide practical and physical service free from political, 
economic or religious interests. Particularly as a governmental institution, a Hana Center 
should present itself as a neutral agency, which is only supposed to take care of the urgent 
economic and physical/psychological wants of those in need and North Koreans. Being a 
civil and governmental institution at the same time does not make a huge difference, 
considering staff members at Hana Centers already identify themselves as non-
governmental (mingan) institutions. Whether it is a civil or state force that is engaging in 
the North Korean service industry, the operations should focus on treating either physical 
symptoms and psychological anguish or economic needs. However, even in this space 
dedicated to neutrality and impartiality, the antagonistic political culture of the Cold War 
permeates through the unclaimed territory. The interactions between volunteer workers and 
staff at the Seoul Center show how tensions and conflicts can be always deeply engrained 
in the sites of this “neutral service” industry.   
 
“V1: When things go wrong, they will blame us, so I would just guide them and let 
them know that if you have a job earning more than this, you will not be able to receive 
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the governmental living subsidy anymore. So they go for those job places where they 
can earn cash, you know.  
V2: I don’t think that is the right thing to do! We shouldn’t tell them the loophole and 
how to avoid those jobs paying more than a certain amount. They are legitimate 
citizens, and we cannot tell them to abuse the law and the system!  
V3: I agree with you.  
V1: But honestly, they need to pay a lot of money to their brokers, they need to save 
their families in the North and in China! We should understand that part… I am just 
concerned with their survival in the beginning...  
V3: As a good citizen, you cannot do such things. Of course a volunteer worker at a 
national center cannot even think about doing that. Brokers or whatever is not an issue 
to talk about!   
SW: I don’t think you can say it is not an issue. It is a very important matter to them.” 
 
This segment of conversation reveals tensions, the conflicting ideas and different 
positions that each conversant has. It also involves emotional reactions attached to national 
security as well as what it means to be good South Korean citizens. When one volunteer 
mentioned she had to give advice on the best way to get state benefits, the other two male 
volunteers were almost enraged, thinking the settlement helper encouraged the North 
Koreans to manipulate the system. As a volunteer, he or she as a volunteer cannot even 
mention the “broker” system, which is a necessary component for North Koreans to come 
to South Korea and to be in touch with their loved ones in North Korea. The overwhelming 
emotions towards each side reflect the fear and anger about the broken unity in a political 
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perspective as well as in values of normative citizenry. As a “legitimate” and official 
volunteer, one cannot be a model of welfare dependence, a system abuser, or a threat to 
national security. The pressure of homogeneity or conformity is what aggregates a certain 
group in such service groups, since service providers at a national agency need to 
demonstrate unified and homogenous ideas in regards to national security and democracy, 
particularly in the context of a truce situation between North and South Korea. The social 
worker then intervened with a rather factual and neutral statement such as “that is a very 
important matter to them” and gave the advice to “hand over the case to the Center” so that 
social workers could take care of it. As social anthropologist Heon-ik Kwon (2010) asserts, 
Cold War society forces people to think in a binary framework formulating a sense of 
“either/or.” In this setting, people are divided into and are pushed to homogenize with 
either one group or the other. If there is anything in another person inconsistent with one’s 
own perceptions and expectations, he or she would feel threatened in their value system 
and react in highly emotional ways. There are not enough negotiations or compromises in 
this regard, so this results in rifts, chasms and ongoing conflicts among group members.   
Anti-North Korean and anti-communist stances, having a good heart or a dedication 
to serving others (i.e., being a devoted Christian), being a good law-abiding citizen and 
being a good model to North Korean clients are qualifications expected of volunteers that 
they mentioned above. These expectations are the constructed boundaries that Hana 
Centers knowingly or unknowingly set up through their service provision, as a neutral and 
practical service agency. The Hana Center as a state institution needs to present itself as 
impartial, as serving those in need, and as an order keeper. In an antagonistic political 
geography, it still tries to maintain its neutrality and practicality of welfare but oftentimes 
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it faces conflicts between political stances. In the Habermasian sense, this “civil sphere” is 
supposed to be a place where people can freely express their ideas apart from the state or 
market’s force, with all different ideas and perspectives clashing, sharing and being 
negotiated for public good. However, in a society where a Cold War spirit is still factored 
in, this concept of model civil society doesn’t reflect the realistic struggles and the resonant 
structural violence.  
 
“You know… we are living in a lawful society. We are living in a democracy. So when 
we tried to put Lee Suk Ki40 into jail, it took a long time. You know he is a total freak, 
promoting North Korean agendas and such. Those spies are still receiving decent 
treatment from the government!” – a settlement helper, male in his 50s, Seoul    
 
This settlement helper’s account on a “spy” case, which happened in 2014 when a 
progressive party’s politician was accused of espionage for North Korea and was jailed 
later on, reflects existing Cold War politics among the general public and in the actual 
political arena.41 He was interrogated, and the whole political party was forcefully shut 
down, which had not happened since a non-military government seized power. The sudden 
shift in politics and social atmosphere to another “red hunt” in recent years shows how 
susceptible South Korean politics are to the antagonistic Cold War style of governing, 
                                                          
40 A politician of the former United Progressive Party in Korea, being accused of his espionage 
for North Korea 
41 In 2014, there had been whole political conflicts between the ideologically contrasting political 
powers in South Korea. It ended with the state’s disbanding a progressive political party, which 
had not happened since the democratization of the country.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/asia/south-korea-disbands-united-progressive-party-
sympathetic-to-north-korea.html?_r=0     
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whenever it is needed for its political gain. As long as the divided political system exists, 
this kind of collective suspicion over another group with oppositional perspectives will 
revive (ChoHan and Lee 2000). The way that hegemony works, the general public takes 
sides and firmly believes their own perspective is right, and in this antagonistic setting, 
being opposite means to be an enemy which will threaten values, community and life. This 
sort of backward politics seems to have become exacerbated after the two consecutive 
administrations of the progressive government took power. Many conservative civil forces 
have appeared since Kim Dae-Jung’s administration, creating a different political 
geography as a result.   
As such, there are many situations where various kinds of conflicts and clashes 
emerge, but overall, the volunteers and social workers tend to agree on the potential 
conflicts. These volunteers and social workers identify themselves more as “service 
providers” who need to keep their “neutral” stance rather than act as activists of sorts. In 
constructing the normalcy of the institution, social workers discourage volunteer workers 
to express political statements or religious beliefs. Volunteer workers also participate in 
constructing this normalcy as well, as they try to avoid situations where they might be held 
accountable, share “practical” difficulties in the meeting, or discourage other volunteers 
from being engaged in unlawful activities and expressing their own perspectives in terms 
of political stances or religious beliefs. The cases described above show how the 
practicality and neutrality of Hana Center’s public motto could be easily fractured by the 
complex nature of the issue in South Korea. In addition, those qualities required for service 
providers in the current time are not neutral but also invested with values, as they are asked 
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to tend to only specific issues – such as physical and psychological health, and economic 
well-being – in pursuit of a healthy capitalist citizenry.   
 
3) Mistrust and trust among North Koreans  
North Korean settlers are known to have a small network of friends and family 
since many of their relationships have been broken or lost along the way, or they have not 
been in a friendship-conducive atmosphere while in China or in other countries. In addition, 
because of their previous experiences of life-threatening incidents and series of betrayals, 
they built mistrust rather than trust in relation to strange people, or people who approach 
them offering “help.” Stigmatization and social discrimination in China and South Korea 
do not help North Koreans to trust each other, so most of my interviewees and research 
participants are open and share their personal matters only to a few close friends or relatives 
but do not seem to be interested in expanding their scope of friendship or in joining larger 
North Korean communities.      
New relationships can be developed in the common institutional spaces such as 
international prisons in Thailand, Hanawon and Hana Centers, but these relationships can 
always turn into unstable ones due to physical difficulties – sudden departure and 
separation, unexpected accidents – or any personal matters. When North Koreans come to 
South Korea, they sometimes find themselves in different positions and aspirations from 
their fellow North Koreans. They also learn how South Koreans treat them as “Others” and 
often view them as poor, communist and belligerent. In the space where governmental and 
non-governmental institutional intervention is prevalent, it can be harder for the group to 
formulate eclectic communities with their own diverse knowledge and experiences. 
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Congregating with other North Koreans is not a desirable activity and is frowned upon by 
South Korean neighbors, institutional workers, and even other North Koreans. This can 
bring about challenges in building lasting and trustworthy relationships among North 
Koreans. Rather, they tend to despise their fellow North Koreans and distance themselves 
from “those stereotypical North Koreans.”    
 
“Sometimes I meet the classmates of Hanawon, for their weddings, or their children’s 
birthdays, something like that. But I feel there’s a gap as big as one between the sky 
and the earth. If one doesn’t interact with the outside (meaning South Koreans), he is 
no different from the time he was in Hanawon. They just watch TV, drink every night, 
so it’s the same. I don’t hang out with them often because you cannot learn anything 
from them. They are all the same.” – a North Korean male in his 30s, Wonju   
 
A sense of “no benefits” from a relationship with another North Korean is quite 
detectable among North Koreans. Even though it is true that when one wants to integrate 
more into the other society, he or she might go out with the local people rather than people 
from the same background, in North Koreans’ community, there exists a sense of contempt 
and disdain.      
North Koreans see themselves in a similar way to how South Koreans see North 
Koreans, and it is performed both consciously and subconsciously; as Frantz Fanon (1952) 
earlier explained the mind of the colonized re-inscribing that of the colonizers. Being 
divided in their self-perception, they try to adjust themselves to become the majority, or 
the colonizers. In a similar way, North Koreans grow to aspire to economic wealth and the 
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capitalist consumerist culture – sometimes even while they were in North Korea and China 
– and try to become more like South Koreans as desirable capitalist citizens. When they 
settle in South Korea, they feel this even more acutely, as they face social discrimination 
and stigma towards the North Korean regime and people. On the other end, it adds to North 
Koreans’ unwillingness to be service recipients, which inevitably marks them as North 
Korean.   
 
“We cannot know all the North Koreans who are actually living here. We have 
education programs for those who first registered here and decided to settle, but there 
are not many things to do for those who moved later into this region and do not say 
anything to us. There are also some cases where North Koreans reject our service as a 
whole, saying they don't want to be called North Koreans and don't want their kids to 
grow up as North Koreans, so they tell us not to contact them at all.” – A social worker, 
Wonju Center  
 I was able to observe that among North Korean clients coming to the Center there are 
people who do not want anyone to recognize them or get close to them. In the classes that 
I attended, they did not hang out with other North Koreans or get to know more about each 
other; instead they just attended the programs and left. Overall, there is a sense of 
“uselessness” and “risk” in socializing with other North Koreans. Consequently, building 
communities through attending programs and social events was not effective even with the 
social workers’ efforts to help them build their communities. North Korean service 
recipients looked as if they felt the need to tackle the problems alone or to solve them 
within a very small community of their own.   
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“Some of these guys just call you and say, ‘Do you recognize me?’ or ‘Do you know 
me?’ and I would say, ‘How can I know who you are, you are not even introducing 
yourself!’ And then there was a mid-aged man who called me and said, ‘I heard your 
mom is beautiful. And I am interested in your mom.’ I carried on a conversation with 
him for a while, but hung up on him a short while later because I thought it would be 
no good.” – a North Korean female in her 20s, Wonju   
 
North Korean women, in particular, tend to receive such phone calls or messages 
in SNS by North Korean men, in an attempt to approach them as potential love interests or 
for other personal reasons. These kinds of in-group activities further make North Koreans 
not trust each other and make the settlers in their earlier settlement period have the 
impression that all others are the same. Even before introduction of a variety of convenient 
means of communications such as smart phones and other technological advancements, 
there was a wide amount of open sharing of contact information among North Koreans. 
When they stayed in Hanawon, they could meet lots of people who were housed together, 
and on an occasion, they could get information on their families or friends from whom they 
were parted involuntarily. With the development of social network service media (SNS) 
and other multimedia, North Koreans can access other people more easily, but most people 
seemed to be disturbed by strangers contacting them. Because of the frequency of the 
strangers’ contact, some people change their numbers and block some contact’s names and 
details. Due to their inability to protect their identities from the state or state institutions, 
they demonstrate concern about the vulnerability of their information. The hostile and 
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discriminatory social environment that North Koreans have to encounter in the South 
doesn’t help the situation. Their hesitation to be open about their identity and to be 
connected to other North Koreans can be the natural outcome of their vulnerable position.   
North Koreans are imagined as a homogenous group as they are “all the same” and 
“have nothing to learn from.” Social discrimination is based on a homogenous and 
pejorative depiction of the group, and it is logical that North Koreans themselves do not 
want to associate with the negative images of themselves. This homogenization gives rise 
to mistrust within the group.  Even though South Korean service workers complain about 
North Koreans’ dependence on their peers, North Koreans do not think their fellows are in 
any way beneficial or good for their adjustment to life in the South. This leads North 
Koreans to be in a peculiar position, where South Korean service providers do not 
understand them well and often are dubious about North Koreans. On the other hand, North 
Koreans want to keep their peers at a distance because gathering in groups reinforces the 
negative connotation. Furthermore, North Koreans are considered to be maladjusted so that 
nothing could be learned from a relationship with their peers. 
 
 In this chapter, I examined the ways which discourses of “trust” and “protection” 
are situated in diverse social contexts. “Trust” and “protection” are common terms for 
considering the institutional involvements of refugees, particularly in relation to different 
scales of institution and modalities of significations. Trust and mistrust appear in the lack 
of mutual understanding between the agency workers and the refugees, in the perpetual 
overflow of new information that refugees have to face through extreme uncertainty in 
their lives, and in the systematically identity-neutralizing establishment of refugee camps 
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and asylums (Daniel and Knudsen 1995). The previous chapter discussed that the social 
workers’ affect-laden interactions with North Korean service recipients erased the 
complexities of North Korean subjects in addition to distancing. This chapter showed that 
this phenomenon is reproduced by North Korean themselves as they regard other fellow 
North Koreans as “all the same.” The South Korean case is unique because the topics of 
trust and protection are even more politically charged due to ongoing political tension 
between the two countries and are perpetually embedded in the everyday life of South 
Korean society – outside the settings of camps or asylums: languages of trust and protection 
saliently emerge in various levels of institutional intervention in the treatment of North 
Koreans; suspicions and mistrust in popular media and in service areas appear 
unexpectedly but assuredly. In addition, the underlying tension between the warm, 
humanistic interactions related to ethnic homogeneity and the aggressive antagonism from 
the Cold War spirit often yields intricate and contradictory practices and expressions from 
the service providers. Due to the sustained memories and experiences of the Cold War, the 
policy making processes, service operations and everyday interactions render distrust and 
suspicion to be intensified in some institutional relations more than others, which speaks 
to the multiplicity and relational characteristics of the Cold War. This chapter analyzed 
how discourses and practices of trust and protection are enhanced and materialized in 
particular locations that pivot around the scales of institution in South Korean resettlement 
system for North Koreans. 
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CHAPTER 6 
NEOLIBERAL ARRANGEMENT OF HANA CENTERS AND NORTH KOREAN 
CLIENTELE SUBJECTIVITY   
Earlier in this dissertation, I showed how Hana Centers’ workers mediate, expand 
on and optimize major operational logics through affective and localized governance. In 
this chapter, I will examine the intricate relationships between the neoliberal arrangement 
of Hana Centers’ service delivery and North Korean refugee-clientele subjectivity. In 
relation to institutional engagement, North Koreans form a specific kind of subjectivity – 
which echoes neoliberal governance of the Korean welfare regime. As a contemporary 
form of governance, Wendy Larner (2000) has categorized scholarship of neoliberalism 
into three types; neoliberalism as a policy framework, it as an ideology, and as a perspective 
of governmentality. In her analysis, literature that deals with neoliberalism as a policy 
framework sees market-oriented operations are favored in a post-welfare state, while the 
decline of the welfare state is attributable to globalization of capital. In this body of 
literature, characterizations of neoliberalism is based on five values such as “the individual; 
freedom of choice; market security; laissez faire, and minimal government.” (Larner 2000, 
7) Larner poses a question of how the scholarship can account for the success of 
neoliberalism in implementing policies and individual subjectivities when the policy 
agenda is based on weak empirical data and absence of intellectual endeavor. Scholars who 
have examined neoliberalism as an ideology highlight its complex nature, as they assert 
that neoliberal configurations are the articulations between “hegemonic and oppositional 
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claims.” (Larner 2000, 11) Based on Gramscian and neo-Marxist perspectives, the scholars 
of this stream have examined how groups of people resist and respond to the process of 
restructuring, with particular political identities. Scholars who discuss neoliberalism 
through the lens of governmentality, on the other hand, distinguish government from 
governance, as they trace new specifications of governance which Larner identifies as 
“market governance.” (Larner 2000, 12)   
 Following Larner’s categorization, this section will deal with two streams of 
scholarship on neoliberalism; 1) how the policy framework works to engender neoliberal 
welfare, and 2) how the lens of governmentality aids in understanding the new North 
Korean subjectivity.  
First, I will analyze how Hana Centers, as semi-state North Korean resettlement 
agencies, adopt neoliberal policies and operations using market-oriented language to 
minimize the cost and responsibilities of welfare. In this analysis, I will assert that Hana 
Centers do not necessarily represent one coherent entity of neoliberal governance, but 
instead, the governance is configured through seemingly inconsistent and contradictory 
operations and values. Hana Centers perform the state service of promoting of North 
Koreans’ self-sufficiency and responsibility, but they do so by using the ideals of fraternity, 
familial care, and motherly love.  
Secondly, I will draw attention to North Korean subjectivity. In the Foucauldian 
sense, contemporary post-welfare societies give rise to the “responsibilization of subjects,” 
where reduced state power accompanies the production of a non-state governmentality and 
the modality of government changes to “enterprise” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 989). At 
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the same time, the “technologies of subjectivity” vary widely as (Rose 1985,9) “a more 
radically individuated sense of personhood” becomes apparent (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2000,15). These discussions, relevant to the formation of North Korean subjectivity as 
North Koreans are encouraged to become consumer-clientele individuals. In relation to the 
institutions’ mediations, North Koreans are called upon to become self-managing service 
consumers, while at the same time, expected to remain compliant service receivers under 
the paternal care of Hana Centers. However, in probing the North Korean subjectivity, I do 
not readily assume that subjectivity is created by firm and coherent institutional 
engagement. Rather, I believe it arises in the institutional space as a system of meaning-
making which shows disjuncture and contradiction, rather than as a system that shows 
coherence and top-down governance. Scholars who deal with governmentality in relation 
to neoliberal arrangements of a contemporary society have pointed out various ways in 
which juxtapositions of seemingly contradictory or incoherent descriptors are made. For 
instance, as they make distinction between the government and governance, they assert that 
the reduced significance of state does not necessarily mean less governance (Burchell, 
Gordon and Miller 1991; Barry and Rose 1996), the state is comprised of “bundles of social 
practices” rather than a fixed mode of control (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). In explaining 
“neoliberalism as exception,” Ong also postulates that the “neoliberal exception allows for 
a measure of sovereign flexibility in ways that both fragment and extend the space of the 
nation-state”(Ong 2006,6). However, as the sovereign power increasingly asks populations 
to work for productivity in a way that best engages market interests, it uses “forms of 
governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the 
market” (Larner 2000,12).           
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 Particularly in this chapter, we will witness how North Koreans are subject to the 
kind of neoliberal citizenship produced by institutional mediation. In this regard, I will 
develop upon the previous literature on North Korean citizenship formulated through 
various kinds of institutional intervention (Bell 2013; J.Jung 2010; J. Lee 2015; Sung 
2010). For instance, J.Jung’s ethnographic study on a Christian institution reveals how 
North Koreans’ religious conversion process is intertwined with nationalist and neoliberal 
rhetoric, which is largely a cultural project to transform North Koreans into desirable 
capitalist citizens (J.Jung 2010). J. Lee’s study underscores how diverse kinds of NGOs’ 
operations contribute to creating a disciplinary power to formulate active and responsible 
North Korean citizenship, which is well aligned with the state’s policy framework in 
dealing with North Koreans. This chapter will discuss the matter of North Korean 
subjectivity in the space of Hana Centers, while pointing out the disciplinary power of the 
semi-state agency does not always emerge cohesive and consistent. Furthermore, I will 
demonstrate how affective expressions of discontent and “anxiety” arise in both clients and 
service providers, as the Hana Centers face competitions in the service industry for North 
Koreans, and how they play by the rules of clients’ needs and the market logic of efficiency. 
I will demonstrate that service providers’ showing “frustration” from their own affective 
care is connected to the broader politics of a market-oriented welfare regime. In this way, 
I will develop the previous discussion on the North Korean citizenship by not only focusing 
on the disciplinary power of the institutions, but also zooming in on the interactive and 
participatory side of the neoliberal service governance enacted by both the service 
providers and recipients. Thus, I will attend not only to how market logics such as cost-
efficiency and professionalism shape and limit the way individuals perform within these 
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institutions, but also to how it encourages both clients and institutions (and institutional 
workers) to conform to and participate in the establishment of the neoliberal norms 
surrounding these institutions.   
6.1 NEOLIBERAL WELFARE REGIME AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVICES FOR COST-EFFICIENCY AND 
PROFESSIONALISM   
In this part of the chapter, I will look at how the neoliberal drive in national policy 
on social minorities in general and on North Koreans in particular has percolated through 
the Hana Centers’ daily operations. The ideal of professionalism and the mission of 
individualization are articulated in the operations such as case management and counseling 
services of Hana Centers. Developing upon the earlier discussion of professionalism in the 
perspective of affective governing, this part will expand the significance of 
professionalization in the frameworks of policy and bureaucratic processes.    
Since the 1960s, the South Korean welfare regime had been rest upon a 
developmentalist frame which had heavily focused on a rapid economic development 
through the authoritative and centralized control of the government (H. Kim. 2000; Moon 
and Kim 1996). The uniqueness of South Korean welfare system is that it was concerned 
with creating valuable human resources through universal education and employment 
rather than through social protection (Chang 2007; Kim 2002; Kwon 2011). For the most 
part, each individual family was held accountable for the family members’ welfare and 
protection in Korea, as a hegemonic response to individuals’ success and class mobility 
was largely dependent upon education (Abelmann 2003).  
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Recent scholarship of Western social democratic societies have argued these state 
in general have transformed themselves from Fordist welfare states, where states played a 
major role in securing full employment and in standardizing welfare services to everyone, 
into post-Fordist workfare states, which places a greater importance on the civil sector in 
the delivery of public services and localization of welfare responsibility (Jiwani 2000; 
Morison 2000; Peck 2001). Appealing processes of globalization and neoliberal ideology, 
services for social minorities have been placed “outside the reach of state bureaucracy” 
(Morison 2000,105), as the welfare state has been scaled back, while market forces have 
become more important in organizing overall societal life (Jessop 2002; Larner 2000).     
The South Korean regime of social welfare echoes this trend in Western society, as 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare has redefined welfare as “social services”, rather than 
“social welfare” in recent years. It emphasizes, “expanding welfare services for consumers 
and focusing on creating jobs,” so that the new welfare regime can “contribute to increasing 
female social participation by supporting reconciliation between work and family” 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare 2015).42 This implies changes in the demographics of 
South Korean society, due to low fertility and aging population, but also it spells out the 
need of the social service sector to become a job-creating sector. It explicitly says that 
welfare services have to meet “the needs of consumers,” efficiently use welfare budgets 
and reduce unnecessary administrative costs. Since the 2000s, this trend in state welfare 
has been central in South Korea, and it parallels social scientists’ observations that Korean 
society is turning into a more “neoliberal welfare state” (Chang 2007; Kwon 2011; Song 
                                                          
42 Ministry of Health and Welfare, South Korea 
http://english.mw.go.kr/front_eng/jc/sjc0104mn.jsp?PAR_MENU_ID=100304&MENU_ID=100
304 accessed April 04, 2015)  
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2009). The new welfare regime encourages the consumption of social service, cost-
efficiency and state bureaucratization. This is somewhat comparable to what Western 
societies have experienced in their welfare regimes in neoliberal times, as South Korean 
government has exercised strong state bureaucracy in organizing social service. In dealing 
with the social crisis which emerged from the “IMF crisis,” the state has gained legitimacy 
and hegemony from the wider public in embarking on a new welfare regime (Kwon 2011; 
Song 2007). Thus, on the one hand, the state seeks ways of reducing costs, by outsourcing 
most parts of operations to civil agencies and corporate forces. However, this doesn't mean 
the governing force is completely transferred to the civil sector – rather, the state has been 
trying to influence the methods by which market forces are incorporated into the state 
welfare system via shifting technologies of governing. The Hana Foundation is a perfect 
example, as the government established the consultancy and supervising agency that create 
discourse and ideology in addition to managing the sub-agencies’ administrations.  
Discovering and meeting “needs” (yokgu 욕구) are already market behaviors, and 
as the definition previously stated, they are more for “service consumers” than anything 
else. It actively borrows the concepts of consumer and producer, exchanges of goods and 
highest profitability. Furthermore, the South Korean version of welfare emphasizes values 
such as the needs of consumers, self-assessment, job creation, and cost efficiency; all of 
which are instilled by the neoliberal ideology of welfare service.  
 As another characteristic of the new welfare regime and its concomitant fashioning 
of neoliberal subjectivity that informs state policies advances the autonomous and decision-
making agent. In a legal document, it goes,  
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“Social services guarantee a decent living to all citizens in need of assistance from 
the state, local municipalities, and the private sector in the areas of welfare and health 
care… by assisting with counseling, rehabilitation, …skill development, and social 
participation support.” (Article 3 of the Social Welfare Services Act) 
  Under this recent definition, social welfare hinges more upon individualizing service 
through “counseling,” “rehabilitation,” “skill development” and “social participation 
support.” These services are geared towards individualist needs and self-management, as 
they encourage service recipients to accumulate marketable human capital. To give another 
example of this voluntary, willful individual subjectivity, the Ministry adopted an 
electronic voucher system, where each individual investigates, applies for and accesses 
proper services by themselves. The users share the costs (in a “co-payment” system) with 
the government, which helps the state lessen the expense (Ministry of Health and Welfare 
2015). Habermas’ observation was right in this case, as he asserted that “welfare-state 
capitalism” in part “inflates the consumer role and deflates the citizen role,” and positions 
its subjects as clients. In so doing, welfare state capitalism produces system-conforming 
citizens, and this system refers to a bureaucratic and state-regulated capitalist economy. 
This leads to “colonization of the lifeworld” by a bureaucratic system of the market and 
the state (Habermas 1987). Even though his discussion centers on welfare-state regimes 
rather than the recent neoliberal welfare regimes, the Korean case shows the relevance of 
Habermas’ argument, as Korean programs exhibit the state-led style of welfare 
management.  
Zooming in on the types of service for individualization and professionalization 
offered by Hana Centers, the case management (saryegwanri 사례관리) and counseling 
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services are good examples for exploring the specific welfare framework that the state has 
adopted. In this broader frame of social welfare, or “social service” in South Korea, Hana 
Centers began to focus on individualized care, highlighting individual “needs.” To 
actualize the goal, the Centers placed counseling, the settlement helper system and case 
management at the core of their programs. Even though they are different categories of 
service, their goal is to implement individualized care. To meet this end, they need research 
on customers’ needs, paperwork with detailed reports and evaluation, and more 
importantly, workers’ minds and attitudes geared towards the discourse of personalization.  
Seoul Center categorizes its services in the medical, economic, and legal area. 
Services are administrated by social workers, who are in charge of sorting out general cases 
from crisis intervention cases. Case management consists of home visits, phone calls to the 
clients and monthly case managing meetings (Seoul Bukbu Hana Center 2015).43 This 
system of operation shows which areas a local Hana Center considers important, and how 
it directs service to “practical” and “therapeutic” needs. As Nancy Fraser also observed, 
bureaucracies like this one and especially “therapeutocracies” disempower clients through 
“preempting their capacities to interpret their own needs, experiences and life problems.” 
(Fraser 1989,130)     
“Social worker: Case management is stressed more in this year, actually it has been 
important already, but more.  
Park: What are the ways the Center tries to implement it, if it is an important area?  
                                                          
43 On case management: http://www.gnnkcenter.or.kr/Business/Example.aspx  
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Social worker: Actually, settlement helpers’ work is very important… they need to 
find out what North Koreans’ needs are since they are the closest workers. Then we 
(social workers) will be able to plan and operate the system accordingly… so that 
means settlement helpers are supposed to play more active roles than now. ”    
 
The social worker at the Seoul Center emphasizes the settlement helpers’ roles as 
close to that of the case managers – social workers and counselors – and he expresses his 
presumption that North Koreans’ needs are identifiable through close engagement with 
their daily lives. As the current welfare system highlights the call to identify the needs of 
the clients/consumers, it is important to discover pending needs and satisfy clients through 
providing the proper care.  
The peculiarity of the term “case management” is its flexibility and ambiguity. 
Depending on a variety of factors – clients’ condition, relationships among service 
providers and recipients, clients’ moving out, etc., the definition of case management can 
vary to encompass different types of care. Still, the case management paradigm implies 
value placed on individual care, personalized service and targeting the specific needs of 
clients’ everyday lives. There have been critiques that the Centers are neither able to catch 
clients’ needs, nor equipped with effective tools to actually execute case management at 
the site. Ministry of Unification conducted research on North Koreans’ “needs” and on the 
case management services meeting those needs. The resulting report confesses that support 
policies and practices fail to use realistic measures for individual clients who are enmeshed 
in diverse relationships (Ministry of Unification 2008). Additionally, few Centers have 
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conducted research on identifying North Koreans’ needs44 (Park et al 2012; Yoon et. al 
2005), and several studies mentioned that the Centers are in need of systematic evaluation, 
executive structure, professional supervision, professional labor division and work 
relationships among the staff to successfully practice case management (S.H.Kim 2007, 
Park et al 2012). Where these studies all emphasize the importance of case management in 
service provision for North Koreans, they stress the operation aspects of the case 
management system – “how-to”s –, instead of what it signifies in the broader socio-cultural 
settings. As a push towards more technocratic devices to effectively operate services 
emerges in the critique, the Hana Centers are probably going to instead develop the 
procedures and management skills of operating current services.     
Table 6.1 Monthly Report Card for Settlement Helper (Ministry of Unification, accessed 
in April 2015) 
                                                          
44 For instance, Gayang Social Center and Gongreung Center have published research papers based on their 
studies of North Korean settlers in the regions.   
Monthly report card for settlement helper (2015/_ ) 
Name  Period of service  
Client’s address  Phone number  
Family 
Name Age Sex 
Relationship 




Education Employment Health 
Hanawon 
graduate 
          
          
          
Service contents 
Home visit ( ___times) Material support (___times) 
Materials  Birthday  
Counseling  Wedding  




Spending holidays  Funeral  
Etc.  Etc.  
Local Guidance (___times) Refer to professional counselor (___times) 
Living convenience  Employment  
Public institution  Housing  
Cultural Centers  Education  
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Aligned with making the work more systematic and professional and making the 
needs more detectable, the Seoul Center requires settlement helpers to fill out detailed 
information on their North Korean clients every month. In the monthly report card, the 
elements for settlement workers to check are listed in detail. Additionally, it shows the 
collaborative tasks to be done with counseling care and closer case management. The 
Center asks settlement helpers to answer questions in these sections: employment, 
education, health, and particular concerns of the clients and service activities, such as home 
visits, material support for special occasions, local guidance, phone calls and professional 
counselor references.     
Through asking the settlement helpers to fill out the form, the Centers and the 
volunteering staff are encouraged to closely monitor their clients’ everyday lives, 
particularly those areas manageable by the Hana Centers’ service operations. Family, 
employment, work, relationships, education and living subsidy are the main concerns. The 
psychological aspect is also included as a category that the settlement helpers need to keep 
in mind, because the Centers and by extension the state, presume North Koreans have 
psychological/mental as well as physical/material issues that need to be treated to facilitate 
successful adjustment to society. Using evaluation system on what to watch out for, the 
settlement workers and social workers can focus on what they have to do, what they need 
  Medical care  
  Law  
Phone Call ( ____times) 
Participation in events  
Events Date Place Etc. 
    
    




to pay attention to. Instead of “taking care of everything” with motherly love, individual 
volunteers follow up with the needs listed on the form. 
Ms.Kim: In those days, we used to do everything, nearly everything… We had to 
drive them back and forth to everywhere, I gave them Kimchi and all the food, I took 
them to the church so that they can meet more people… you know. Two among them 
are still very close to me, they call me mom, as I told them to. I told them, here in the 
South you have me, I am your mom. If they had anything happening, they would 
come to me.   
     Park: wow, it must have been a lot of work for you all.  
Ms.Kim: It was a lot of work! Now it became much more convenient. After the 
Center took over the work what we used to do and they arrange the task overall, so 
it is just a piece of cake now.  
Park: what do you think about the Center’s professionalization? The social workers 
told me it is an important element…  
Ms.Kim: I think we need to talk about this, (cautiously speaking) the social workers 
are young and they all change frequently, so they really don’t know how to handle 
things. They are cold, and the worker *** did not even greet us. I mean… I have 
worked for them this many years, and I am probably the most experienced in here, 
but they don’t really respect us. It is just that we have meetings, dinners sometime, 
and that is all.  
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The settlement helper I talked to had already worked for North Koreans even before 
the Hana Center came into existence. As one of the oldest members, she recognizes 
changes in the service delivery in the region. In her experience, professionalization did 
divide labor among the workers, so it became easier for each volunteer to handle the work. 
However, she also mentions that the relationships have become “cold” since the Hana 
Center “professionalized” the process. She has decreased contact with her clients, and 
fewer areas that she has to take care of. She also testified that she did not feel she was 
welcome or that her work was appreciated. Usually at the Seoul Center, settlement helpers 
were assigned time to fill out their forms when monthly meetings were held, and social 
workers encouraged volunteer workers to fill them out more thoroughly and specifically. 
Detailed descriptions of clients were deemed to be critical for thorough and more accurate 
case-management, and the Center tried to implement the “individualized care” through 
settlement helpers’ detailed documentation of their clients’ personal details. Over time, the 
responsibility for the management of work has shifted away from individual volunteers as 
members of civil organizations or local churches. The work has also changed from an 
individual volunteer’s physical and emotional capacity for caring, to institutional 
establishment of quantifiable and detailed evaluation reports. This shift reflects changes in 
the North Korean service area, towards systemization, bureaucratization – epitomized in 
increased paperwork – and division of labor. However, it also shows localization of 
governance, as the Seoul Center allocates the case management work more to settlement 
helpers while other Centers hold social workers accountable for the same kind of task. For 
instance, at one Center in Gyeonggi province, a social worker told me that four counselors 
were working as case managers in addition to their psychological counseling work. While 
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the rhetoric and actual goal of “case management” in the current welfare regime has the 
national goal of optimizing productivity with less cost across the country, the way it is 
operated differs by local situation. Even with the identical documentation that the central 
government requires each Center to do, each Center implements the task in different 
fashions, in terms of collaboration and distribution of labor.   
However, knowing what the “needs” are and how to implement personalized service to 
fulfill the needs usually lack substantive discussion. As one social worker admitted,   
 “They actually do not know what they need for living here… even if we ask them 
what they need, they don’t know what to say, and they would say different things 
from what you expected. So I’d say that you should just go and visit their home. If 
you visit their home, you will know what they need and what they don’t.” – a social 
worker at a regional Hana Center  
As the social worker acknowledges, North Koreans do not consciously express their 
“needs,” particularly in the initial time of settlement. This necessitated social workers visits 
to assess the needs of the clients. Needs are recognized by the social workers and agencies, 
not by the clients’ conscious efforts to find their needs or verbalize their desire for support 
from state agencies. These needs and their corresponding programs are the fundamental 
reason for Hana Centers’ establishment – which also generate funding for North Koreans 
from the state, local governments, or any other funding agencies. However, finding and 
case managing according to North Koreans’ “needs” requires calculated considerations and 
understanding the society in a broader level. As I discussed in previous chapters, these 
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elements contribute to the misunderstandings, mistrust and miscommunications among the 
service providers and between providers and recipients.   
Counseling service is another area of case management. As the service is 
acknowledged as a legitimate, scientific approach to evaluating North Koreans’ overall 
well-being, it takes center stage throughout the initial settlement period, both in Hanawon 
and Hana Centers. Counseling is implemented in all the Centers as mandated by national 
law. Scholars have noted that psychotherapies are inherently de-politicising and 
individualist practices (Furedi 2003; Lasch 1980; Sennett 1977), yet there are also 
discussions of the practices not necessarily being so (Parker 2003). Where psychological 
service and counseling do not have to be per se individualist, the technologies of 
psychotherapy seek to “align political, social and institutional goals with individual 
pleasures and desires, and with the happiness and fulfillment of the self.” (Rose 1990,257)  
It is positioned as fundamental for North Koreans, as they are considered to be people with 
various kinds of trauma and life-threatening incidents that could lead to many 
psychological and physical problems. Overall, their social and cultural adaptation 
“problems” are thought to be curable and treatable by this specific form of individualized, 
scientific care. Nevertheless, the stress on counseling services for North Koreans as 
implemented with professionalism, which is deemed to work with “a distance” (Fournier 
1999; Larner 2000) and detachment, is another element of neoliberal governing. Based on 
the quantifiable features of the human mind, the state service industry can dependably 
detect and alter the individual’s characteristics and anticipate the emergence of a desirable 
subject. This is another example of how the state approaches North Koreans’ adjustment 
to society, which is aligned with the individualist, neoliberal trend in social service. 
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Because of its presumed significance, counseling services are supervised and administered 
by the Hana Foundation, rather than local Hana Centers. Arguably, the state has control 
over North Korean clients through direct hiring and management of the counselors.  
By adopting different technologies of governing, the state and each Hana Center 
try to create a therapeutic, individualist, and consumerist subjectivity which speaks to 
neoliberal governance. The next part of the chapter will close in on the aspect of 
“responsibilization of the self” induced by Hana Centers’ service operations, while the 
government nonetheless embeds heterogeneous and contradictory features within its logics 
and practices.     
6.2 RESPONSIBILIZATION OF THE SELF – A CALL FOR NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE-CLIENTELE 
SUBJECTIVITY AND ITS CONTRADICTION  
“There are the “smart” ones who are very informed of different kinds of service and 
who can gain those benefits. Those tend to be young women, women with young 
children. They need to know about the system for their kids’ education and household 
management, so they try to get to know the system quickly. It is that they are using 
the system very well. I can say that they are the ones adjusting well here.” – a social 
worker, male in his 20s, Seoul Center 
This social worker touted the “smart ones” among the North Korean clients, who 
are well informed of service provisions in diverse agencies and actively seek those forms 
of help to stabilize their lives. These happened to be “young mothers” who show passion 
in enhancing their children’s lives as well as their own. This positive light on client-ship 
insinuates the types of clients seen as desirable as well as the Hana Centers’ long-term 
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goals. This social worker’s story is well aligned with the state’s initial intervention in North 
Koreans’ resettlement as it encourages each North Korea to cite his/her own “needs” and 
desires in a responsible, rational and independent manner. The “smart,” well-behaved and 
responsible North Korean clients would benefit in this service industry. This specific figure 
of service client-ship is underlined in the very initial period of state and non-state 
institutional service industry and it formulates the ethics and norms of North Koreans’ 
citizenship as well as the overall service landscape (see also J.Lee 2015; J.Jung 2010; Sung 
2010). As Ong earlier observed, “technologies of subjectivity rely on an array of 
knowledge and expert system to induce self-animation and self-government so that citizens 
can optimize choices, efficiency, and competitiveness in turbulent market conditions” (Ong 
2006,6). 
 “Being smart” is also defined as personal traits and behaviors such as appearing 
responsible, appreciative, docile, and overall being “good enough”. In order to be good 
service recipients, North Koreans are called on to be responsive to Centers’ and other 
agencies’ service programs, but also to avoid giving the impressions of taking advantage 
of them. The call for being smart echoes “responsibilization of subjects” (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002), which is a prevailing mode of subjectivity in neoliberal spaces. The 
“impressions” that North Korean clients need to make in interpersonal communications are 
also dependent upon social workers’ and social agencies’ cultural understandings of what 
constitute “proper” attitudes and manners. The encompassing claim for North Koreans to 
become active, responsible and self-sufficient citizens is easily detected in different spaces 
such as NGOs (J.Lee 2015; Park 2011) and Christian-run agencies (J.Jung 2010) through 
their guiding, nonetheless disciplinary practices. Young North Korean women, who have 
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multiple dispositions of identities (H.Y.Lee 2012, see also Kwak 2000; I. Yoon 2011) as 
they have experienced commercial activities such as trading goods and their labor, and had 
to constantly negotiate the economics of sacrifice and gain through their migrations could 
be on the winning side when they go through another interpersonal negotiation process in 
the South Korean welfare system. Compared to older, “rough” and “inflexible” North 
Korean male service recipients (Choo 2006), young North Korean women are the easier 
and “most rewarding” clients in the “humanized” system of support.  A counselor at a 
Center explained how she treats her clients when they make a visit for counseling services:  
Counselor: If they visit me, I just adore (yebbeohanda 예뻐한다) them and praise 
them for the effort that they are making.  
Park: I see. … Who are the main clients?  
C: They are usually young educated ones, who seek for better skills for their social 
activities. 
In her story, the Korean term “yebbeohanda (예뻐한다)” entails a rather hierarchical 
and gendered love, which can be used by a senior person to a younger one. It conjures 
images of a mother to a child or a teacher to a student, and is often associated with 
favoritism, without necessarily having negative connotations. Because of that term, I asked 
who the main clients are, and as it turned out, they are mostly young people in their 20s to 
30s. As most cases show, those who are young and flexible in their thinking and attitude 
are the main service recipients, and those who do not hesitate in receiving counseling 
service. By giving the clients highly affective responses – adoring and showering accolades 
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–, the counselor can be reassured of their returning to the service. Such encouragement is 
also related to the specific skills needed to create a desirable subjectivity of North Koreans, 
as caring service becomes effectively mobilized through individual caretakers’ affective 
care. Similar to how American welfare service providers show “refugee love” by assigning 
refugee figures to a specific ethical contour (Ong 2003,146), South Korean service 
providers show their “North Korean love,” which is sometimes predicated upon 
judgements and suspicions.       
A point of contradiction sometimes appears in the discourses about North Koreans, 
particularly about their “service consumerist behavior.” It is widely known that the North 
Korean service sector is inundated with an overlapping and disorderly flock of service. For 
instance, if North Koreans use their stories as a witness at a church service, they get a cash 
reward worth $200 each time. If they attend a planned event punctually and consistently, 
they also get a “scholarship” with many NGOs, churches and education or training sites. 
Because of stories like these, services for North Koreans are widely thought of as 
excessive. North Koreans are easily marked as “spoiled” because they “do not know how 
to appreciate what they receive.” They are judged based on the free services that they are 
given. Their consumerist behavior in searching for different kinds of service provision or 
shopping around for providers is often criticized. Their reputation as “privileged” service 
recipients makes North Koreans susceptible to criticism. It generates public resentment and 
academic critique towards them, in comparison with other social minorities or groups of 
multicultural citizens (I.Yoon 2012). North Koreans are then presented as “service 
shoppers” who go for the best and the most beneficial service goods. If they leave for 
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another service agency, another person who cares them “better,” service providers feel they 
are used and unappreciated.  
“We get those claims. They somehow heard from their friends or acquaintances that 
our Center provides a TV as a present when they move in, but when our funding from 
the municipal government ran out, we were not able to provide that anymore. Some 
North Koreans got infuriated over that change and they said they would have never 
settled here if they knew there was no TV gift.” – A social worker at Wonju  
In explaining the frustration she had with North Korean clients, this social worker took 
an example of her clients’ complaints about the Centers’ service and search for another 
agency for the service contents that they want. The criticism works in turn as a regulating 
tool to correct North Koreans’ behavior as service recipients. Even though the vast service 
industry has created the consumerist subject, the bureaucrats and the volunteer force that 
are working closely for North Koreans try to exercise their power to create a moral figure 
of the rightful service recipients. “Spoiled,” “demanding,” and “unappreciative” are the 
common terms used to address North Koreans’ less than perfect service behavior. In sum, 
there is a fine line between “system manipulator” or “system dependents” and smart users 
of system. This discourse concerns efficiency in distributing state resources and self-
sufficiency, which echoes neoliberal modes of welfare (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; 
Rose 1985). 
On the other hand, Hana Centers and service workers are also in the grips of 
neoliberal forces. Technocratic measures such as writing grants, checking attendance, 
collecting expense receipts and keeping up with evaluation reports are the Center’s daily 
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job. Not surprisingly, many social workers and counselors commented on the heavy load 
of paperwork. Under the assessment and direction of the Ministry of Unification or Hana 
Foundation, each Hana Center pays the price for being a more “stable and official 
institution for North Koreans” with overwhelming paperwork. Thus, not only clients, but 
also service providers are evaluated and assessed in their tasks. Another social worker 
interviewed is always on the verge of being rejected by his clients and to keep his job, he 
needs to find a way to accommodate all the possible issues that North Koreans might bring 
to him. 
“I sometimes get questioned by the service recipients about my professional 
capability. They sort of test you whether or not you can provide whatever they want. 
They can still come to me unofficially and I can treat them comfortably as person to 
person… I can understand that they take the practical part into consideration. They 
should get what they need to get, so they want to make sure if I am a capable, and 
knowledgeable social worker who can provide them with the best services and 
information. Also, they need to build trust in Hana Center so as to trust workers in 
the Centers. ” – a social worker, at Seoul Center  
This social worker has to deal with clients’ trust in his capability as a professional social 
worker. Being professional means being knowledgeable of all the processes of daily 
necessities as well as bigger issues like the legal processes of family formation, adoption, 
divorce, living subsidy, conflict resolution, sending remittances, and so on. The heavy 
demands burn out many service providers. Unlike other social minorities in South Korea – 
the elderly, low-income households, foreign workers, marriage migrants, etc. – North 
Koreans are deemed to be deserving of “total care” (M.R.Yoon 2007). This means that 
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North Koreans are entitled to receive all kinds of care in the issues that arise from their 
resettlement lives - family issues such as divorce, marriage, adoption, and registering their 
children; labor issues such as job training, getting wage support, and finding relevant 
careers; residential and living subsidy issues such as moving in and out, and registration at 
local government; and education issues such as choosing schools and securing funding. 
This certainly factors into the burdens of social workers on the ground. In addition, each 
social worker faces the challenges of knowing and understanding everything, while 
managing each client’s case, as the new welfare regime requires localization of service and 
service providers’ own interpretation of their work.  
 
In this chapter, I explored what it means to be a North Korean client in the 
neoliberal arrangements of Hana Centers’ services. If the case management and counseling 
services are the Center’s “technocratic” dimensions of service provision established as 
formal programs of the Center, tending to individual needs, then discourses of “smart 
client-ship” and actions of encouragement and accolade are the affective dimensions which 
guide and direct North Koreans’ minds and actions to suit the neoliberal figure of the 
“responsible self”. In the processes of service delivery and reception, heavy competition 
and a call for enhanced professionalization in North Korean services make both service 
providers and recipients vulnerable to criticisms and mutual mistrust: North Koreans are 
easily marked as “spoiled and unappreciated” service consumers whereas service providers 






This research is based on year-long ethnographic fieldwork in two local Hana Centers, 
South Korean refugee resettlement agencies for North Koreans, and uses qualitative 
research methods. I have explored the ways in which the institutional establishments for 
North Koreans, such as programs and the relationships between service recipients and 
providers, have contributed to forging a specific North Korean service-client subjectivity. 
In particular, I zoomed in on the kinds of bureaucratic operations that emerged out of the 
socio-political contexts of neoliberal arrangements in the South Korean welfare area, where 
affective service provisions are encouraged and animated to realize the co-ethnic love and 
care for the less.   
 Hana Centers are sites where divergent ideas, expectations and practices are expressed 
and magnified, as the organization possesses pairs of contrasting characteristics: state and 
non-state; national and local agencies. When Hana Centers were introduced in 2009 across 
the nation, there were expectations that they would eradicate the decade-long problems in 
the service field such as inefficient delivery of services, politicization of the non-state 
actors, and Seoul-centeredness of resource distribution. As a semi-state organization, Hana 
Centers appeared to be the ideal service agency for helping North Koreans to settle in the 
regions of South Korea, through promoting neutrality and impartiality as well as 
organizational efficiency and professionalization. 
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However, this research has found that the preexisting problems in this service field 
still persist; moreover, new obstacles have appeared with the establishment of the Centers. 
This research was motivated by investigating why the service agencies that have ideal 
intentions and goals still fail to achieve the stated goals of integrating the North Korean 
newcomers successfully into the Southern regions. The common issues that the Centers 
across the nation experience include: the ambiguity of the Centers’ identity generating 
confusions and different work expectations among service providers; bureaucratic and 
redundant services leading to inefficiency and mistrust of service provision; both explicit 
and implicit conflicts in political and religious interests. One North Korean settler I 
interviewed said, “They are just creating buildings and offices here and there, hiring South 
Korean people who don’t hear or understand us. Eventually all the system will fatten South 
Koreans, not North Koreans.” Apparently North Koreans’ deep mistrust of South Korean 
bureaucracy and administrators was not overthrown by the quantity of the services 
provided by the state, which are “unprecedented for any refugee group in the world” (B. 
Chung 2009, 10). The central government and the supervisory agency attempt to 
“standardize” the quality of the services, but the local Centers view that attempt merely as 
a bureaucratic process that considers only measurable and quantifiable criteria of services. 
In the meantime, the other goal to “individualize” the services does not seem to satisfy 
North Koreans’ needs, particularly with regard to the general programs and interactions 
between the service providers and the recipients.    
In order to parse this problem, I adopted the theory of affect, which has been helpful 
to analyze beyond the material and physical dimensions and to underscore the interactive 
creation of subjectivity. I used affect as an analytical tool to advance the discussions of the 
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state institution, bureaucracy and governmentality, as they open the space of governing to 
the interactive field of “affecting” and “being affected” (Anderson  2009). Throughout this 
dissertation, I used the theory of affect to analyze two major dimensions: as a mode of 
governing and as a mode of interaction between the service providers and recipients. For 
instance, the Hana Centers use affect-laden expressions to promote their images as caring 
agencies and to guide and control North Koreans’ bodies and minds in more 
“individualized” and “humanistic” ways. In the site of affective interaction, both North 
Korean service recipients and South Korean service providers evaluate each other through 
neoliberal logics of self-sufficiency and competitiveness as well as participate in sustaining 
various kinds of “mistrust,” influenced by the antagonistic socio-political environment 
albeit with their shared notion of brotherhood or “the same blood.”  
The over half-century-long national division has bred not only political conflicts 
between the two countries, but also antagonism and suspicion between their peoples. While 
the social discourses of homogeneous ethnicity are still resonant in the abstract senses of 
“oneness” and “unity,” the suspicion and enmity towards each other easily seep into the 
relationships in the service field. These entangled emotions are augmented by the 
neoliberal arrangement of the South Korean welfare regime and the ambiguity in the 
organizational identity of the Hana Centers as both state and non-state agencies. 
  While each Hana Center has to follow bureaucratic standards, the nationwide 
operations of the semi-state agency also give each Center room to emphasize their own 
ethics and cultural values. Thus, even though the state tries to actualize the “total care” of 
North Koreans through the operational standards of individualization and practicality of 
Hana Centers, the local Centers’ operations show inconsistent, contradictory and value-
 
197 
laden services. The two poles of the operational goals of the standardization and the 
individualization of services to enhance efficiency and competitiveness only appear to 
increase the documenting workload and the anxiety of each service provider as a 
responsible professional on the ground; this echoes what anthropologist David Graeber 
(2015) provocatively suggests with regard to the contradictory relationship between the 
neoliberal efficiency and the increase of bureaucracy.   
This ethnographic research on the national refugee resettlement agency in South 
Korea contributes to the previous literature on bureaucracy, governmentality, state 
institution and caring services for refugees. It emphasizes that the multiple and yet 
unknown powers of affect operated on the institutions in the neoliberal and post-Cold War 
South Korea, where they created particular landscapes of service delivery and reception. 
However, this research is also somewhat limited in a couple of aspects regarding the 
institutional engagement and North Koreans as a social minority and refugees: considering 
that the North Korean service area is comprised of diverse types of institutional support 
such as religious communities, political or grass-root NGOs, and local governments, this 
study is limited in that it does not capture the dynamics and interconnections among the 
diverse service providers in the service assemblages sufficiently. The intersectional 
approach in terms of examining positionalities and the relationships among service 
providers and recipients could have been applied even further. As Jasbir Puar (2011) 
asserted earlier, discussion of intersectionality and the analysis of affect and assemblage 
do not have to come into conflict. As this study focuses on the locations where affect-laden 
expressions and interactions emerge as a salient governing and simultaneously as a 
contradictory force from the bottom, it does not explicitly incorporate intersectionality of 
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identities into an analysis. However, intersectional analysis based on different positions in 
the service area could provide valuable questions to raise, if it is used in an open-ended 
way: questions related to this analysis could address matters of the self-identification of 
North Korean service recipients in relation to their engagement and participation in 
institutional activities; the dominance of woman service providers with considerations of 
care labor and the imaginaries of the state agency; the differences between the Seoul and 
the Wonju Centers in terms of formality in interactions and the self-identifications of 
workers.  As these points of interest will benefit the research on North Koreans who are 
situated in these complex webs of institutional support, I hope my project contributes to 
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